



Re-Imagining the Drought Response

Lessons Learned and Recommendations

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ACRONYMS

ADSP	Asia Displacement Solutions Platform
ATR	Assess Transform Reach Consulting
ALCS	Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey
AMD	Afghanistan Meteorological Department
ANDMA	Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority
AHF	Afghanistan Humanitarian Fund
ARCS	Afghan Red Crescent Society
CERFT	Central Emergency Respond Fund
DiREC	Displacement and Return Executive Committee
DINA	Drought Impact and Needs Assessment
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
ERM	Environmental Resources Management
FEWS	Famine Early Warning Systems
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
ICCT	Inter Cluster Coordination Team
IDLG	Independent Directorate of Local Governance
IRC	International Rescue Committee
IOM	International Organization for Migration
KII	Key Informant Interview
MoRR	Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation
MAIL	Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock
MRRD	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
MEW	Ministry of Energy and Water
MoE	Ministry of Education
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
NSIA	National Statistics and Information Authority
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
SFSA	Seasonal Food Security Assessment
WFP	World Food Programme
WV	World Vision
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. Background

Afghanistan has seen an unprecedented rise in Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the last two years, the phenomenon largely triggered by the ongoing conflict and recurring natural disasters. Based on IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), around 2,598,000 IDPs are displaced within Afghanistan. The figure was collected between December 2017 and December 2018 and includes people who were displaced between 2012 and 2018.¹

In 2018, over 170,000 people were displaced in Afghanistan's western region alone after drought conditions adversely affected livelihoods, forcing locals into chronic food insecurity. Assessments conducted by humanitarian NGOs and aid agencies indicated that insufficient access to water and fodder culminated in crop failure and livestock mortality, respectively.² The socio-economic demographic of western Afghanistan is typically comprised of subsistence farming, the prevailing majority of such households struggling to absorb shocks caused by natural disasters. As a prolonged dry spell developed into a drought, local farmers relied on distress mechanisms including limiting food consumption, marrying-off their daughters at a young age, and liquidating assets to buy food.

Hunger was a main factor triggering displacement. Qala-e-Now and Feroz Koh (the provincial capitals of Badghis and Ghor provinces, respectively) were the first urban centers where households were forced to leave their homes in search of food, drinking water and healthcare services.^{3,4} The scale of damage created by the drought called for an immediate coordinated intervention by the Afghan government and relevant humanitarian actors, to provide life-saving assistance to affected communities. However, these late efforts proved ineffective in preventing an emergency situation from transforming into a full-scale crisis, leading to acute, prolonged displacements and frustrating the possibility of return.

This study is aimed at answering the following question: *What would the drought response have looked like if its key long-term objective had been to prevent a protracted displacement scenario?* Through a desk review of relevant documents and a series of Key Informant Interviews (KIIs), this study returns to the chain (or indeed gaps) in the decision-making process that led to a crisis with such protracted displacements. It also presents a set of recommendations, primarily addressed to the humanitarian community and the Afghan government.

From dry-spell to large displacements: the unfolding of a crisis

Afghanistan's western region was affected by a prolonged dry spell in the 2016-17 wet season, but limited awareness of the risks of displacement caused by drought characterised this initial period. The prolonged dry-spell weakened the resilience and coping mechanisms of affected households, and no early action was taken by the Afghan government

1 IDMC's Global Report on Internal Displacement, 2019. Retrieved from: <https://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/2019-05/GRID%202019%20-%20Conflict%20Figure%20Analysis%20-%20AFGHANISTAN.pdf>

2 OCHA, Afghanistan: Forced to flee, April 2019. Retrieved from: <https://www.unocha.org/story/afghanistan-forced-flee>

3 Norwegian Refugee Council, Afghans fleeing conflict face worsening hunger, June 2018. Retrieved from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghans-fleeing-conflict-face-worsening-hunger>

4 Norwegian Refugee Council, Afghans fleeing conflict face worsening hunger, June 2018. Retrieved from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghans-fleeing-conflict-face-worsening-hunger>

and humanitarian community to mitigate the impact of the drought conditions. Afghanistan's early warning system provided sufficient information in late 2017 of the impact of below-average rainfall during the 2017-18 wet season (typically January through March) in conjunction with conflict, food production, and pastures. Early warning messages were either poorly disseminated or poorly understood.

Initial displacements in early 2018 were not considered to be of serious concern as the situation had not been closely monitored, or indeed analysed in the context of a dry spell. However, concerns began to mount in April as it transpired that the emergency assistance initially provided to affected households was insufficient, and that a further increase in displaced families was likely. Planned emergency responses were further frustrated as it emerged that humanitarian assistance could not contain the scale of displacements.

In mid-April 2018, the Afghan government declared a drought. In mid-May 2018, the Humanitarian Country Team revised the 2018 Humanitarian Response Plan to facilitate fundraising. The government set up a drought emergency task force to coordinate and align the response with the humanitarian community.

The 2018-19 Humanitarian Drought Response in the western region was effective in addressing basic and immediate needs of displaced households. However, the response was not structured in a way that could enable communities both displaced and in their location of origin to quickly recover, resume livelihoods and, most importantly, remove or diminish dependency on humanitarian aid. This convergence of challenges was caused by shortsightedness in planning from both government and humanitarian actors. **Emergency responses were directed at troubleshooting issues in IDP settlements, rather than offering more dynamic solutions by way of returning displaced families,** and resolving complex challenges such as decimated livelihoods and development gains within drought-affected communities. Whilst an early recovery intervention may have been more effective at resolving challenges as they arose, calls for a comprehensive drought response went unanswered during the acute stages of displacement.

Re-imagining the drought response: increasing awareness, improving decision-making processes and linking development and humanitarian action

While around 3.5 million people were provided with life-saving emergency assistance in 2018-2019, displaced households did not benefit from durable solutions. To avoid displacement, more efforts to inform stakeholders of the multiple risks associated with drought should have been undertaken. Further, certain key factors should have been considered to prevent such protracted displacement, including:

- Improved engagement with government, national and international actors committed to **addressing climate change issues in the region**. The drought was primarily caused by climate change, which should have been prioritised in the region years ago, especially considering the vulnerability of the area to drought conditions;
- An **earlier appeal for funds** in early 2018 may have prevented large-scale displacement, if fund allocations had been prioritised to address life-saving support in drought-affected communities;
- Sufficient humanitarian and recovery efforts in communities affected by the drought may have **facilitated a return** for families forced to flee their home;
- As demonstrated by the millions displaced by the prolonged period of drought and ensuing floods, there is an **urgent need for a development strategy to tackle climate change effects and increase food security**.

LESSONS LEARNED

- A. Proper monitoring can help to prevent sudden drought onset. Delivery of food assistance to beneficiaries in areas affected by the dry-spell during late 2017 and early 2018 were part of the humanitarian response efforts in Afghanistan's western region. However, no mechanism existed to monitor whether the food assistance provided was sufficient, and more action was needed in order to prevent a sudden onset. Whilst beneficiaries in the mentioned region were grateful for the food provided to them, food was not all that they needed. They also required water, seeds and fodder that could help them to overcome food insecurity, and sustain their agricultural livelihoods as their main source of income.
- B. While there has been a lot of information about the impact of below-average rainfall during the 2017-2018 wet seasons on food production and pastures; initial internal displacements due to the failure of local coping mechanisms; and the need for sufficient assistance, information was rarely, if ever, communicated to humanitarian decision-making bodies in the capital through a formal and institutionalized channel. The sub-national communication system relied more on individual two-way communication. If the decision-makers were officially asked to consider warnings and take collective action to provide a timely response to the development crisis, the opportunity to mobilize resources for mitigating risks would not have been missed.
- C. Integrating measures for disaster risk-reduction, and slow-onset drought reduction in particular, is crucial in long term development plans. It can help to improve vulnerable households' resilience towards climate shocks, particularly during slow-onset disasters. A mechanism for systematic and successful integration of disaster-risk reduction measures in long-term national development strategies and actions plans is required. Absence of such a mechanism can further add to a natural disaster-induced displacement crisis.
- D. Early warning signs of a developing or imminent disaster in communities can be used to request donor funding before a disaster occurs. The humanitarian community should not wait for the government to officially declare a drought, allowing them to raise funds to address critical needs of drought-affected families. There are alternative funding options that can be explored including **ECHO (for Drought Preparedness), DfID (for Social Protection) and USAID (Crisis Modifier). These long-term funding mechanisms have been utilized in the Horn of Africa for preparedness, mitigation, and recovery interventions in order to build the resilience of local communities.**
- E. Provision of sustainable livelihood support as part of early recovery and resilience building interventions at places of origin during the early stages of drought-induced displacement can prevent further waves of internal displacement. INGOs including DRC, NRC and Relief International recommended the provision of emergency assistance to IDPs, but it was only suggested as a last resort in order to avoid pull factors. In early June 2018, the recommendation was ignored by the Inter-Cluster Coordination Team (ICCT), when discussions commenced regarding how to prevent displacement from becoming protracted. If humanitarian actors had placed their focus on areas of origin, it is estimated that over 160,000 Afghans would not have been displaced due to the drought as at August 2018.
- F. The provision of livestock restocking support would have assisted families to mitigate the number of livestock 'distress sales' in drought affected areas of Afghanistan. This livelihood-based intervention can provide much needed support through the provision of milk, and an income supplement. It should also be accompanied by interventions aimed at increasing water availability for livestock. Procurement of local goats and sheep, and the distribution of ten to each household who were landless or had lost all their assets as a result of drought, was a lesson learned also in Afghanistan.
- G. Cessation of humanitarian assistance to IDPs forces them to make the decisions to return. In early 2019, the Humanitarian Coordination Team (HCT) decided that assistance to IDP households would be provided upon their return to their place of origin. A number of households took the decision to go back to their village because of the generous cash support they received from the government (**250 USD per family**). **However, they were provided**

with no information about the situation in their villages. There was also no investment in the provision of basic services, nor had livelihood diversification at their place of origin been considered. This resulted in return flows becoming precarious and potentially unsustainable.

- H. Coordination and alignment of return interventions of the government with the national and international humanitarian community can ensure safe and voluntary returns of drought-induced IDPs. Both humanitarian actors and relevant government institutions need to develop coordination mechanisms to implement return interventions.
- I. Participation of drought-induced IDPs and their hosts in the planning, implementation and monitoring of interventions contributes significantly to facilitation of integration and social cohesion in communities. The 2018-19 drought response in Afghanistan saved lives and alleviated the suffering of a large number of drought-induced IDP households at the place of their displacement. However, the concerns of host communities were not taken into account, which not only led to tensions among the IDPs and host communities, but also affected the planning for durable solutions.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The following sections review how the crisis unfolded and recommend a set of institutional reforms, tools and systems that could foster effective decision-making, and increase the likelihood of the successful support to drought affected communities. It should be noted that the new prototype launched by the World Bank 'Early Warning, Early Action, Early Finance' which was presented to the High Poverty Council in December 2019 integrates many of the below recommendations. The challenge for the humanitarian community thus rests on how best to support and build this system.

B. Initial Onset

There was limited awareness of the slow onset nature of the drought in 2017. Resulting from weak coping mechanisms, this slow onset weakened the resilience capacity of households, interrupting livelihoods and consequently pushing them into severe food insecurity. No early action was taken to mitigate the impact of drought conditions because early warnings were neither communicated as widely as needed, nor analysed and understood, so HCT missed the opportunity to prepare and mitigate for the looming crisis.

In the initial onset period, a humanitarian response was not required - in fact, recovery or development interventions were more appropriate and could have focused on building resilience by increasing access to water, drought-resistant seeds, fodder, and alternative livelihoods. The establishment of grain banks at the community level (as currently organised under CCAP) would have mitigated the impending shock and could have postponed displacement by a couple of months, providing more time for humanitarian agencies to then provide lifesaving assistance to affected people at their place of origin.

For this course of action to be possible, the following changes are required:

- 1) Improving the use of early warning signs;
- 2) Prioritising recovery and development activities in response to early warning signs;
- 3) Investing in strengthening coping mechanisms at the local level.

Recommendation 1: Improve the dissemination and analysis of early warning signs

The newly established National Early Warning Committee and ANDMA should **translate FEWSNet reports in Dari and Pashtu and disseminate them to related government institutions**, including Provincial Governors' office, OCTs and planning and policy directorates in all relevant ministries. Also, these reports should be regularly shared at the fortnightly Inter-Cluster Coordination Meetings with the Afghan Coordination Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR) and UN agencies.

For these reports to be useful, they should be discussed and analysed during the various coordination meetings, including ICCT meetings, OCT meetings and at the NDMC. Members of these institutions could then communicate their analysis to the National Early Warning Committee (NEWC), responsible for issuing early notifications of drought and triggering the release of early financing for interventions building resilience and providing safety nets (under the 'Early warning, early action, early finance' WB prototype).

Recommendation 2: Prevent displacement by addressing the structural causes of food insecurity

While the World Bank prototype focuses on prioritising the financing of resilience-building interventions, funding is likely to be insufficient. Humanitarian actors have to take on an advocacy role, engaging in dialogue with development partners to ensure that building resilience is prioritised in areas experiencing stresses with the potential to transform into disasters. The monitoring on food security led by the FSAC could be used more widely to inform decision-making among development actors, including line ministries and the Ministry of Finance. Advocacy for prioritising zones at risks could be done through various channels, including the NEWC.

Recommendation 3: Explore alternative, longer-term funding options

The examples of ECHO (for Drought Preparedness), DfID (for Social Protection) and USAID (Crisis Modifier), suggest that alternative, longer-term funding mechanisms could be explored for drought responses to allow for preparedness, mitigation, and recovery interventions that build the resilience of local communities.

C. Early Stages of Displacement

When initial drought-induced displacement occurred in early 2018, no one predicted the crisis ahead. This was because the risks of displacement had yet to be overtly associated with dry spells in Afghanistan. Additionally, the drought's adverse impact on food security were underestimated. All humanitarian organisations meeting at the regional level analysed and shared relevant information about initial displacements with same sector actors, but these meetings failed to ring the proverbial alarm bells. Closer monitoring of drought conditions accompanied by an analysis of initial displacements will help to provide early preventive actions.

Humanitarian relief activities were being implemented at the place of displacement and also in some places affected by drought to mitigate the risks of displacement. Nevertheless, the scale of the response was far from sufficient. Scaling up initial efforts with data-led strategies would have ultimately proven more cost-effective.

At this point of the crisis, the following actions would have greatly increased the successful management of the crisis:

Recommendation 4: Recognising that a dry spell can cause displacement and monitoring this risk.

The impact of a dry spell at the community level should be rigorously monitored through early warning signs. This should include a tracking of displacement movements in vulnerable areas via IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix.⁵ IOM collects data about displacement movements through KIIs, focus group discussions (FGDs) and direct observation at settlements. Displacements can also be tracked via UN-OCHA⁶ and the Provincial Directorates of Refugees and Repatriation (DoRR). It is also recommended that information about displacements are analysed in a timely manner and distributed to all relevant institutions, particularly ANDMA and MoRR.

⁵ IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix. Retrieved from: <https://afghanistan.iom.int/reports/displacement-tracking-matrix>

⁶ Humanitarian Response, Overview of Natural Disasters November 2020. Retrieved from: <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/natural-disasters-0>

Recommendation 5: Identifying needs prior to developing the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) and before the drought is declared.

UN-OCHA, under the leadership of the Humanitarian Coordinator and the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), should start assessing needs of affected-families at the place of origin before the HRP is designed and developed. While security was declared to be a constraint to conduct such assessments, the access that some of the NGOs operating in these areas had been able to secure could have been better utilised. When first displacements took place, it would have been useful to immediately assess needs that required to be addressed to avoid further displacement. In addition, the response plan should cover families that are already displaced. Provincial IDP Task Forces should conduct assessments of IDP settlements, generating information about numbers of families displaced, their current and former locations, their access to water and food, return intentions, and needs. Responses should be designed and implemented based on the results of the survey.

Recommendation 6: Providing livestock restocking support.

It is important to assist families, to reduce the distress sale of livestock, as this provides much-needed nutrition support through provision of milk and an income supplement. Livestock restocking should be considered as a priority livelihood-based intervention in drought-affected areas. It should also be accompanied by interventions aimed at increasing water availability for livestock. The humanitarian community should integrate lessons learned from Ethiopia, where livestock restocking proved an effective initiative in drought-affected communities. FAO procured local goats and sheep and distributed ten to each household (most vulnerable people who were landless or had lost all their assets). The beneficiaries were able to quickly reap the benefits, helping to restore lost livelihoods.

Recommendation 7: Given that there are many agencies active in Afghanistan (International NGOs, local NGOs, and UN agencies) mandated to deliver development and humanitarian actions, there is a need for building connections and coherence between these two services .

Humanitarian agencies that have both humanitarian and development functions should first arrange internal discussions to determine what actions can be introduced in the first three months of the response as immediate life-saving measures, while considering longer-term risk reduction or recovery interventions. Internal discussions should be coordinated at the ICCT and HCT level, and decisions could be then passed on to development coordination bodies (such as the High Council on Poverty) to prioritise the required resources.

Recommendation 8: Consider the possibility of conducting early access negotiation, before a disaster takes place and advocate for a common approach to access negotiations.

Communicate neutrally and impartially with non-government elements through community leaders, religious figures and influential tribal elders in hard-to-reach areas. For the drought, all major actors independently negotiated their own access, impeding assistance delivery for some actors. Access negotiation should thus be done as a team of humanitarian actors responding together to a crisis. Also, access issues had emerged in 2017, and as such, negotiations should have been considered at this time. Mandatory reporting of access issues to the ICCT, at the national level, would certainly help in ensuring that the problem is tackled.

D. Acute Displacement

Considering that it takes up to 3 years for farmers and herders to recover from the adverse impacts of drought, this study finds that the humanitarian response had not accounted for a comprehensive response and early recovery at the place of origin. Instead, a standalone emergency response was administered during the acute phase of displacement in 2018. Many interviewees cited that an effective humanitarian response should have included a longer-term

programming pitch, that is, drought recovery support at the places of origins for drought-affected people in order to minimise displacement. It is recommended that future humanitarian responses prioritise planning for early recovery and resilience building at the place of displacement.

Recommendation 9: Collect information and develop a durable solutions strategy.

With the arrival of new displaced-households, a survey should be conducted at informal displacement sites through Flow Monitoring Points (FMPs)⁷ installed in 2018 on major routes close to IDP settlements. Timely information about IDPs' intentions is critical to better understand barriers to return and requisite conditions for safe and voluntary return. Such data should be discussed at the ICCT at both the regional and national levels, and should lead to decisions on longer term solutions (return or long term solutions, or a mix) early on in the crisis. The absence of timely decisions led to farmers missing an additional planting season and further delayed the integration of families planning to stay at their place of displacement. In IDP sites in Herat, no activities were conducted to support IDPs (many of whom had intended to stay) to build self reliance by market-led skills programmes so they can adapt to the local labour market. Starting such activities early in the displacement period would have reduced IDPs' dependency on aid.

Recommendation 10: Provide livelihood assistance at the place of origin to avoid pull factors and facilitate early returns.

In drought-affected areas, livelihood-based interventions are an important way to prevent or mitigate further displacement. To be effective, however, interventions should be designed in coordination with provincial authorities, displaced households at the place of displacement, and if possible, with influential community leaders (such as Mullahs, community elders and farmers). In the western region, development-oriented activities-could have included the rehabilitation of secondary and tertiary canals, *Kareez*, boreholes, rain water reservoirs, groundwater recharge, and management of sub-basins and other projects that can build the resilience of affected-families. Such projects could also allow useful cash injections into the community with the provision of local labour in the construction phase. The project should be designed in a way that can also encourage earlier returns.

E>Returns

The majority of displaced families in Qala-e-Now returned to their place of origin from March 2019 when emergency programmes announced they would be ending by mid-2019 in displacement sites. The HCT decided to cease humanitarian assistance at the place of displacement as the focus of the assistance shifted to the place of origin in order to facilitate returns. At the place of origin, returnees were provided with humanitarian support to restore their livelihood. At the place of displacement, the government provided those who wanted to return with cash support so that they could arrange their journey back to their villages. However, these decisions came at a time when the situation was not conducive in places of origin in terms of security, weather and sustainable livelihoods. Government officials admitted that return support was not sufficient or timely. Expressing frustration over the lack of coordination between them and the government, humanitarian NGOs also stated that most returns were shaped by an interplay between the lack of assistance in place of displacement and pro-return government policy.

⁷ In 2018, IOM set up Flow Monitoring Points on major routes connecting to Herat City. It proved to be very successful in terms of assessing return intentions, causes of displacement and assistance needed for return.

Recommendation 11: Build resilience in places of origin through supporting livelihoods and DRR initiatives, in order to create pull factors which facilitate sustainable, safe and voluntary return.

Encouraging a return which is not safe (because of security, weather conditions or access to basic services) creates risks for a secondary displacement. Therefore, displaced individuals need to be updated about the conditions in their place of origin while they are at displacement sites. Establish IDP Shuras and select a group of Shura members (male and female) and initiate “Go and See Visits” if necessary. The visits can be arranged by DoRRs and Provincial Governors, who should facilitate discussions between populations who are already residing in the areas, and IDP representatives in order to identify issues related to conflict, protection and whether or not the root causes of displacement have been resolved. IDP representatives can arrange group sessions inside IDP settlements for information sharing about the place of origin. In addition, immediate needs that condition the safe return should be addressed. For instance, food distribution and livelihood support, particularly provision of drought-resistant seeds should be systematically linked with the crop cycle of the affected areas. Most households in Badghis and Ghor were displaced when their half crop cycle failed. Those who were in Qala-e-Now and Feroz Koh missed the October-November crop planting season as well. FSAC should develop a timeline based on the crop cycle unless there were significant resources to help people to not depend on their crops for a long period of time. Development of a timeframe that is aligned with the crop cycle can encourage earlier return of crop dependent families, but FSAC needs to make sure there is good operational and strategic leadership alongside its timeframe, for which it needs sufficient time to work with families and do regular scoping of crop chances for each subsequent year.

Recommendation 12: Coordinate and align return interventions within the national and international humanitarian community.

Development of return plans with humanitarian NGOs could present a well-timed opportunity for building on existing coordination mechanisms and attracting the attention of NGOs technical support to ensure safe and voluntary returns. Greater coordination between humanitarian NGOs and government could also assist MoRR with the development of better return plans.

F. Ongoing Displacement

There is no doubt that the 2018-19 drought response helped to save lives and alleviate immediate suffering of displaced families in the western region. However, most of the interviewees described the role of the government as inefficient in terms of seeking to provide sustainable solutions to the problem of displacement in the three geographic locations (Herat, Qala-e-Now and Feroz Koh), in particular after emergency programmes ended in June 2019. There is a general perception that the government is strongly opposed to integration, and it considered return as the only option. It requires a focus on assisting IDPs to become self-reliant and also simultaneously working for long-term programmes at the place of origin to ensure sustainable and safe returns.

Recommendation 13: Provide local market driven vocational training programmes to IDPs.

The programmes shall be linked to existing economic opportunities in Herat, Qala-e-Now and Ghor and they should offer apprenticeships to IDPs, who by the end of the training, can use their skills and join the local market.

Recommendation 14: Provide assistance to vulnerable members of the host community.

Migrants and their hosts face similar challenges in terms of access to basic services. Therefore, provide assistance and / or design response plans with a focus on the needs of vulnerable host communities too. Likewise, equal participation

of displaced households and their hosts in planning, implementation and monitoring of initiatives through their representatives (male and female) can ensure that needs of both communities are adequately taken into account.

Recommendation 15: Facilitate IDPs' access to civil documentation so they gain access to employment, credit and education.

Central Statistics and Ministry of Communication, Information and Technology (MoCIT) can extend their current bio-metric operations to Herat, Qala-e-Now and Feroz Koh to provide electronic *Tazkira to IDPs and record keeping when it is established. Humanitarian organisations shall advocate with the government at national level to issue Tazkiras locally through the current biometric system.*



ADSP

Asia Displacement Solutions Platform

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The Asia Displacement Solutions Platform is a joint initiative of the Danish Refugee Council, International Rescue Committee, Norwegian Refugee Council and Relief International, which aims to contribute to the development of comprehensive solutions for Afghans affected by displacement. Drawing upon its members' operational presence in the region, the ADSP engages in constructive dialogue and evidence-based advocacy initiatives to support improved outcomes for displaced Afghans.