




# Challenges of IDP Protection

Research study on the protection of internally displaced persons in Afghanistan






**Samuel Hall.** ([www.samuelhall.org](http://www.samuelhall.org)) is a research and consulting company with headquarters in Kabul, Afghanistan. We specialise in socio-economic surveys, private and public sector studies, monitoring and evaluation and impact assessments for governmental, non-governmental and international organisations. Our teams of field practitioners, academic experts and local interviewers have years of experience leading research in Afghanistan. We use our expertise to balance needs of beneficiaries with the requirements of development actors. This has enabled us to acquire a firm grasp of the political and socio-cultural context in the country; design data collection methods and statistical analyses for monitoring, evaluating, and planning sustainable programmes and to apply cross-disciplinary knowledge in providing integrated solutions for efficient and effective interventions.



The **Norwegian Refugee Council** (NRC, <http://www.nrc.no>) is an independent, humanitarian, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, established in 1946. NRC works to protect the rights of displaced and vulnerable persons during crisis. Through our programmes we provide assistance to meet immediate humanitarian needs, prevent further displacement and contribute to durable solutions. Through our advocacy we strive for rights to be upheld and for lasting solutions to be achieved. Through our stand-by rosters we provide expertise as a strategic partner to the UN, as well as to national and international actors.



The **Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre** (IDMC, <http://www.internal-displacement.org/>) was established by the Norwegian Refugee Council in 1998 and aims to support better international and national responses to situations of international displacement and respect for the rights of internally displaced person (IDPs), many of whom are among the world's most vulnerable people. It also aims to promote durable solutions for IDPs, through return, local integration or settlement elsewhere in the country.



The **Joint IDP Profiling Service** (JIPS, [www.jips.org](http://www.jips.org)) is an inter-agency service set up to provide support to profiling exercises of displacement situations. It responds to requests for support in planning and implementing profiling and advocates for the benefits of profiling at the global level. JIPS also facilitates field-to-field experience sharing through the database of the Profiling and Assessment Resource Kit (PARK, [www.parkdatabase.org](http://www.parkdatabase.org)) and the dissemination of profiling tools and good practices. JIPS is supervised by a Steering Committee bringing together the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), NRC-IDMC, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The service is funded by AusAid, DRC, the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), NRC-IDMC and UNHCR.

# Challenges of IDP Protection

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Research study on the protection of internally displaced persons in Afghanistan

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November 2012

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# Acronyms

AIHRC	Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission	MoLSAMD	Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and the Disabled
ALP	Afghan Local Police	MoPH	Ministry of Public Health
ANDMA	Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority	MoRR	Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation
ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy	MoWA	Ministry of Women's Affairs
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces	MRRD	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
ANSO	Afghan NGO Security Office	NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
AOG	Armed Opposition Groups	NDMC	National Disaster Management Commission
APC	Afghanistan Protection Cluster	NFI	Non-food Item
AWEC	Afghan Women's Educational Centre	NGO	Non-governmental organisation
CB	Capacity Building	NPP	National Priority Programme
CDC	Community Development Council	NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
CPAN	Child Protection Action Network	NRVA	National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment
CWGER	Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery	OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
DACCAR	Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees	SCA	Swedish Committee for Afghanistan
DDG	Danish Demining Group	STC	Save the Children
DoRR	Department of Refugees and Repatriation	TLO	The Liaison Office
DRC	Danish Refugee Council	UNDSS	United Nations Department of Safety and Security
ESNFI	Emergency Shelter and Non-Food Item	UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
EVI	Extremely Vulnerable Individuals	UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
FSAC	Food Security and Agriculture Cluster	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
GBV	Gender-based Violence	VAW	Violence against Women
HLP	Housing, Land and Property	WaSH	Water, Sanitation and Health
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee	WB	World Bank
ICLA	Information, Counselling and Legal Aid	WFP	World Food Programme
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross		
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre		
IDP	Internally Displaced Person / People		
IMC	International Medical Corps		
IMF	International Military Forces		
IO	International Organisation		
IOM	International Organisation for Migration		
IP	Implementing Partners		
IRC	International Rescue Committee		
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force		
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Networks		
IP	Implementing Partner		
JIPS	Joint IDP Profiling Service		
KII	Key Informant Interview		
LAS	Land Allocation Scheme		
MoD	Ministry of Defence		

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# Executive summary

This report – based on research from Samuel Hall Consulting and commissioned by the Norwegian Refugee Council – provides the first systematic overview of protection of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Afghanistan. It combines the voices of IDPs with analysis of the decision-making processes shaping responses to internal displacement. The authors show that internal displacement is not a merely humanitarian ‘problem’ but should be just as much the concern of those in the development community. Recommendations are offered to help the Government of Afghanistan develop a national IDP policy.

## Prolonged and recent displacement

A 2009 survey concluded that 76% of Afghans have experienced displacement.<sup>1</sup> The majority of those displaced (or multiply displaced) by decades of conflict have not returned to their place of origin. They generally lead perilous lives in urban areas as they seek to survive in the informal economy. IDPs, especially women and children, are exposed to multiple protection risks. To their number have recently been added newly displaced caseloads, people whose flight is due to the steady spread of conflict and generalised insecurity into areas hitherto relatively peaceful. The number of civilian casualties has been on the rise since 2007.<sup>2</sup> The total population displaced by conflict grew by 45% between 2010 and 2011.<sup>3</sup> A third of all those displaced today fled their homes in 2012.<sup>4</sup>

In October 2012, the number of IDPs has reached over half a million individuals. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated the number of conflict-induced IDPs alone in Afghanistan substantially exceeded 400,000. This is a conservative figure that does not capture IDPs scattered in urban areas, those displaced by natural disasters, nor IDPs not accessible due to security reasons. Neither does it capture all those who do not necessarily self-identify as IDPs but whose struggles for livelihoods are made even harder by the fact they are have faced the enormous shock of displacement and years of disappointment stuck in prolonged displacement, unable to climb out of chronic poverty.

The study builds upon existing research with new information collected through an extensive quantitative and

qualitative survey of over a thousand IDP households in five provinces (Kabul and Nangahar in the east, the southern province of Kandahar, the western province of Herat and Faryab in the north-west). Evidence from individual and household studies shows the range of protection violations from which IDPs may suffer and what it means to be an IDP in Afghanistan.

## Challenging misunderstandings

The report presents evidence to show how government responses have often been shaped by erroneous assumptions. It refutes such widespread misconceptions by confirming through evidenced-based research, that:

- While difficult, it is possible to distinguish between an IDP and an urban migrant.
- There are both long-term and short-term IDPs and those who have been displaced for years are not better-off than the newly displaced.
- IDPs are not limited to displaced sedentary populations but includes nomadic groups traditionally following pastoral-based lifestyles whose livelihoods have been disrupted by conflict, such as Kuchi.
- Most IDPs would prefer to integrate locally and not return to their rural homes.

Many stakeholders use a definition of IDP linked to duration and place a time limit on internal displacement. This interpretation neither fits the situation on the ground, nor the universally applicable requirements defined by the *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the Framework for Durable Solutions*. The *Framework* clarifies that a truly durable solution is “a long-term process of gradually diminishing displacement-specific needs”<sup>5</sup> that does not occur at one point in time and which leads to one of the three durable solutions (local integration, resettlement and return).

## Key Findings

- Over half of IDPs interviewed identified the Taliban and other anti-government elements as primarily responsible for their displacement.
- There are multiple kinds of other (much less acknowledged) conflicts – typically inter-tribal, ethnic or resource-driven – which trigger displacement.





10-year-old Fatima and her cousin Mahboba collect water from a river near their shelter in Herat Province, Western Afghanistan. (Photo: NRC/Farzana Wahidy, June 2012)

- Natural disasters (droughts, floods, avalanches and earthquakes) were cited as the primary trigger of displacement by 17% of respondents.
- Wherever they are found, and regardless of gender or length of displacement, IDPs indicated their three major protection priorities are employment, food and water and housing.
- Over three quarters report they hope to settle permanently in their current location. The desire to return 'home' reduces steadily over time: the longer families are displaced, the less interested they are in returning.
- Approximately 90% of IDPs interviewed qualify as extremely vulnerable individuals (EVI) as they meet one or more criteria established by UNHCR to indicate those whose socio-economic profiles place them not only below national averages but also at risk of living in life-threatening conditions.
- IDPs are worse off than the rest of the population. The illiteracy rate for both IDP men and women is above national averages. IDPs live in larger households (9.5 people) than other Afghans (7.3) but have lower household incomes
- Unemployment rates for IDPs are well below national averages and increase with length of displacement. Due to post-displacement difficulties in securing employment the IDP households surveyed have seen their monthly incomes decrease by 21%.
- The majority of IDP households spend over three quarters of their income on food, with over half spending above 90%. Over a third had not eaten for several days prior to being surveyed. IDPs who were displaced in 2012 report the same nutritional deficiencies as those displaced 10 years ago.
- Water is in short supply, of low quality and often the cause of disputes with members of host communities and other IDPs.
- More than a third of IDP children lack access to education. IDPs complained their children are often unwelcome in school and that teachers and non-displaced students tease children whose families are unable to buy them shoes, schoolbooks and stationery.
- IDPs generally have positive relationships with their immediate host communities but feel unwelcomed by authorities.
- Less than a tenth of IDPs have received employment or housing-related assistance, compared to the two fifths who have received emergency food, water or transportation aid.
- There is significant geographical discrepancy in IDPs' likelihood of receiving assistance: those in Kabul are over eight times more likely to have received aid than IDPs in Kandahar.
- Women's vulnerabilities increase further as a result of displacement, particularly widows whose incomes are significantly less than those of other IDPs.

## Employment and livelihoods

On average, household income decreased by 21% as a result of internal displacement. 62% of surveyed IDPs stated that employment-related issues were their main problems during displacement. After being displaced, IDPs typically move away from agriculture to construction and other day-labour in the informal sector. IDPs enter urban areas – often after suffering the losses associated with displacement, including those of assets and social networks spanning generations – at a unique disadvantage. Women from rural origins, no longer with the opportunity to do farming work and denied jobs in the male-dominated construction sector, are forced into perilous dependence on irregular tailoring, sewing or begging. Though many IDPs seek to diversify income, they often lack means to purchase equipment or access capital. Trapped in the informal economy, IDPs become more dependent than the non-displaced on daily labour that is usually badly paid, temporary and insecure.

Household circumstances generally do not improve: prolonged IDPs reported a higher rate of unemployment than more recent IDPs. Researchers found that an average of only 1.12 individuals were contributing to the respondents' monthly household income, typically relying heavily on a single individual to meet all of the household's economic needs. Rural IDP households earn significantly more than urban households. This suggests high levels of irregular and insufficient employment in urban areas and that urban IDPs' motivations in remaining in the city are primarily driven by the desire to find security and are unrelated to economic or employment opportunities.

Without sufficient employment opportunities, over 90% of IDPs reported having had to borrow money for basic needs after being displaced. Over 30% of IDPs reported borrowing money at least six times in the previous year to buy food.

Those IDPs who have received livelihoods-related assistance from the humanitarian community are critical of its temporary nature. The International Labour Organisation has noted that “most jobs that have been generated by the international development assistance tend to be casual or temporary and are clearly not sustainable without continuing aid inflows.”<sup>6</sup> IDPs reported lack of transparency in the selection of IDP beneficiaries. Lack of a proper methodology to conduct pre-assessments led to incomplete surveys, leaving some IDP households excluded. This often results in jealousy and internal tensions within beneficiary communities.

Many IDP children are engaged in street vending, scavenging plastic bags and washing cars. Children working in urban areas are particularly susceptible to violence, kidnapping and car accidents.

## Gendered Vulnerabilities

Women's vulnerabilities increase further after displacement, particularly for widows who made up a fifth of our total female respondents. Employed male IDPs earn, on average, 4.3 times more than females. When one considers the markedly lower rate of female economic participation it is apparent that surveyed IDP males earned between 23 and 47 times more than female IDPs. Displaced women are more likely to be socially isolated and to lack traditional protective mechanisms. Displaced women and girls' increased economic vulnerabilities place them at a higher risk of prostitution and forced marriages.

Field observations show linkages between displacement and forced and early marriages. IDPs may rely on dowries as a source of household income to meet their basic needs. The survey showed that at least one child had been forced to marry in almost a third of IDP households. This is especially the case for female-headed households. Several women noted they felt their daughters were targeted for low-cost marriage by outsiders who had heard that poor IDPs would accept low levels of dowry. Overall, 27% of female children were reportedly forced to marry against their wills.

Only 18% of IDP women have a national ID card (*tazkera*) (as opposed to 83% of men) – a factor contributing to their low level of engagement in elections.

## Housing, land and property

Of IDPs interviewed, the number of households that owned their dwelling dropped significantly, from 70% pre-displacement to 26% with only 21% holding a legal record of their ownership. IDPs arrive in places of refuge with few resources, typically lacking the financial resources and social networks to live anywhere but in tents and cramped, insubstantial mud homes. Respondents who were displaced before the fall of the Taliban in 2001 were no more likely to own land than those who were displaced between the end of 2001 and 2009. Because they often illegally occupy private or government owned land, IDPs are sometimes threatened by evictions, whether lawful or otherwise. Many choose to live

in informal camp-like settlements on state land in the belief their high visibility will reduce threats of eviction.

Many IDPs (unlike repatriating refugee returnees) have been excluded from government-sponsored Land Allocation Schemes since identity documentation is required and IDPs are ineligible if they do not return to their original, often insecure, province of origin. In any case, allocated areas often lack access to water, basic services and income-generation opportunities.

Of the IDPs sampled, 44% had built their dwellings without assistance. Often IDPs – especially in female-headed households – lack skills and build precarious structures, often being forced to re-build with each passing rain-storm. Dwellings offer little protection against the cold: during the winter of 2011-12 over a hundred IDP infants and children in informal settlements in Kabul died of cold.



Dogul, 45 years old, with her son. Originally from Ghazni Province, Dogul and her family have been displaced to Shaharak Baharistan, Herat Province, since 2006 following increased insecurity. (Photo: NRC/Farzana Wahidy, June 2012)

Privacy is limited, and girls and boys – sometimes distant relatives – are forced to sleep in the same room, thus violating opposing traditional social mores. Lack of space and living in cramped circumstances can increase the risks of violence against women.

## Poor coordination and information sharing

Detailed analysis of response mechanisms indicated that:

- There is no forum in which information collected for programmatic interventions can be shared.
- Links between Kabul and field offices of many organisations appear to be either weak or excessively centralised.
- While many actors have collected field information, only recently has the practice of collecting and sharing information become a joint activity: thus, IDP profiling is unable to provide a composite nationwide overview.
- Information collected is generally fed into individual agencies' systems rather than analysed to forecast potential protection concerns that fall beyond food security, shelter and non-food items.
- It is challenging to obtain verified and evidence-based information about beneficiaries. Division of responsibilities over conflict-induced IDPs and natural disaster-induced IDPs, between UNHCR and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) means there is no single source providing cumulative information on total numbers of IDPs.
- There is considerable variation in the way that actors (in Kabul and the field) understand what protection of IDPs means.
- Information provided typically involves numbers of IDPs without sufficient additional disaggregated information to permit informed decisions on protection issues, especially of vulnerable groups such as women, children, older persons and persons with disabilities.
- Once the first stage of emergency assistance is over, coordination between agencies becomes blurred and follow-up referrals and support minimal.
- The roles of the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation (MoRR) and the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA) are poorly demarcated: it is often unclear how they relate to each other, to other government ministries and to provincial governors.
- Though MoRR and ANDMA are part of the IDP Task Force that coordinates emergency response for conflict and natural disaster-induced IDPs at provincial level they are often, in practice, merely passive participants.
- Efforts by humanitarian actors to boost the capacity of MoRR are yet to yield concrete results: civil servants still do not see issues such as VAW and exploitation of IDP children as matters of concern within their remit.



An Afghan boy stands in front of tents home to IDPs in Bagrami district of Kabul. Many families here came from Tagab in Kapisa Province, Central Afghanistan, following increased insecurity over the past two years. (Photo: NRC/Farzana Wahidy, June 2012)

- Unavailability or inadequacy of protection information prevents many agencies from making convincing fundraising appeals to donors to support protection programmes.
- Is it possible to provide humanitarian assistance to IDPs without direct contact with beneficiaries?
- Is it desirable if organisations cannot monitor and check the impact of their actions and interventions?
- Is it ethical to transfer security risks to NNGO staff who often take risks that others are not willing to take?

### Afghan NGOs and dilemmas of remote management

In recent years, national NGOs (NNGOs) have begun filling the vacuum created by shrinking humanitarian space for international humanitarians. Researchers found their field staff generally have a poor grasp of what protection concretely means. Many cannot distinguish between a traditional humanitarian organisation adhering to humanitarian principles and a civil-military contractor. NNGOs are not bound by mandates and are willing to implement military-funded humanitarian and development projects without necessarily understanding the risks entailed. Often, such decisions are driven by cost-benefit analysis, a strategy to survive by contracting to deliver specified services.

Remote management via poorly trained staff of NNGOs raises key questions:

### Informing a national IDP policy

The report's evidence-based recommendations come at an opportune time. Afghanistan lacks a national policy on internal displacement. Researchers found many provincial decision-makers to be confused about if and how to respond to displacement and in need of guidance. Afghanistan has accepted the applicability of *The Guiding Principles*. In July 2012, MoRR launched a National IDP Policy process. Still in its infancy, this should provide an opportunity for stakeholders to develop a national policy in conformity with international best practice.

Policy guidance is urgently required. Many analysts predict no let-up in the accelerating level of new displacement. The two major destinations for Afghan migrants

and refugees for decades – Iran and Pakistan – appear less of an option for the recently displaced. With IDP numbers set to rise further there is fear – at a time of transition as international military forces prepare for withdrawal – that post-transition international funding for IDP support programmes may be sharply reduced.

The report urges all stakeholders (including IDPs, NNGOs, community representatives, IDP leaders, civil servants and politicians) to work together to draft a comprehensive national policy which – if approved and implemented – would go a considerable way towards creating a transparent, more predictable, better-informed programme planning process. A range of international actors (including NRC) are strong supporters of this initiative. The findings of this study should inform the emerging national policy.

## Recommendations

The report has specific recommendations for many national and international stakeholders. Its key recommendations are:

- The government needs to show greater will to address IDP issues: at the end of the day, it is state actors who are primarily responsible for protecting IDPs, with humanitarian actors taking a supporting role.
- Protection must be mainstreamed into all international and national response procedures.
- IDPs in prolonged displacement must not be forgotten.
- An inter-ministerial coordination mechanism on IDPs needs to be created.
- A national IDP policy must be driven by the search for all three forms of durable solution: government must cease focusing only on promotion of return and acknowledge that IDPs retain the rights to freedom of movement and choice of residence enshrined in Article 39 of the country's constitution
- Guidelines for resettlement of affected and displaced families must be based on social impact assessments and consultation with all parties so as to build transparent processes of compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement.
- MoRR and ANDMA staff, particularly in the provinces, urgently require additional training, especially in international humanitarian law and human rights.
- MoRR and its partners should pool basic information on internal displacement to facilitate consensus, coordinated planning and response and assumption of national responsibility. Vocational training is required to bridge gaps between IDPs' skills and those required to enter the labour market in their place of displacement.

- Mechanisms to provide psycho-social support to IDPs are urgently required.
- Membership of cluster and task force coordination fora needs to be expanded to be representative of all actors involved directly and indirectly in IDP assistance.
- IDPs are not just a humanitarian concern. Development actors need to be brought into the response framework earlier in order to target early recovery programmes that support income-generation and livelihood projects for IDPs.

# 1. Introduction

## Objectives of the IDP Protection Study


The Inter-Agency Section Committee (IASC) defines protection as “all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the Human Rights law, the International Humanitarian Law and the Refugee law”<sup>7</sup> National authorities have the primary responsibility for providing full protection to populations displaced within their borders.<sup>8</sup> Yet, when states lack the capacities to effectively protect these populations, international organisations have the responsibility to support them. Such is the case in Afghanistan where the Afghan authorities are currently unable to guarantee the basic necessities of life or other rights of IDPs. Analysts agree that the current level of protection provided to internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Afghanistan is insufficient.<sup>9</sup> Operational challenges partially explain the current gap in analysis and response to the protection needs of IDPs.

While a number of international humanitarian organisations provide emergency relief to displaced populations, few consistently undertake protection activities in conjunction with the national authorities. Given ongoing challenges across Afghanistan in profiling IDPs, particularly in insecure and conflict-affected areas, understanding of core protection and assistance needs facing vulnerable displacement-affected communities remains poor.

To address this important gap, the NRC commissioned Samuel Hall Consulting to undertake research which aimed to provide:

1. **Enhanced understanding of displacement dynamics during displacement** with a typology of IDP populations’ protection issues.
2. **Analysis and prioritisation of self-identified IDP protection needs during displacement.** Given the dif-

Map 1 Survey sampling of five provinces



difficulty of operating in Afghanistan, it is important for humanitarian actors not to waste resources and to focus their actions on the most urgent protection needs of IDPs and on feasible initiatives. The present study aims at establishing priorities for such intervention and programming.

3. **Identification of gaps in coordination of stakeholders involved in IDP responses** and recommendations to develop more efficient coordination mechanisms, in order to collaborate on assessments and protection response and improve access
4. **Evidence-based recommendations to feed into the ongoing National IDP Policy formulation process**, by giving policymakers empirical evidence with which to shape informed policy.

### Informing a National IDP Policy

This research into internal displacement protection challenges in Afghanistan comes at an auspicious moment to support the development of an official national IDP Policy, the first instance of an overarching attempt by the Government of Afghanistan to take ownership of the response to internal displacement. First decided by the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and announced at an IDP Task force meeting in Kabul in March 2012, the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation (MoRR) is leading the policy development process with the support of a technical working group composed of UN agencies, NGOs and the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission. This research will directly contribute to the development of Afghanistan's IDP Policy. It highlights the need for all-encompassing multi-level consultations with all actors, including with displaced communities. It is important to develop a strategic approach to humanitarian access to areas where IDPs are hosted or are settling. This report offers an important evidence-base that highlights key protection risks and challenges as well as gaps in responding to IDPs' protection needs.

### Methodology of the Study

The study builds upon existing research with new information collected through a quantitative and qualitative survey of over 1,000 IDP households in five provinces (Map 1).

The **methodology for this research** (available in full in Annex 1) was carefully designed to include quantitative and qualitative methods, bridging the gap between IDPs' self-perceived needs and stakeholders policies and programmes. Random sampling methodologies are

not possible in Afghanistan, due to the lack of population estimates and household data. Thus the findings of this report are not to be extrapolated or generalised to the entire IDP population. However, our data can help us better understand internal displacement and show what it means to be an IDP in Afghanistan.

Acknowledging past contributions to understanding patterns of displacement in Afghanistan, this report offers a first systematic look at protection through a set of self-identified priorities as expressed by displaced people themselves. This report does not focus on historical phases of displacement as earlier reports have thoroughly engaged with the past. It instead adopts a forward-looking approach, providing an in-depth analysis of protection needs for IDPs.

This is an attempt to bridge the 'protection gap' by gathering data from the field and from key stakeholders, assessing links between protection concerns and displacement and providing recommendations for a better-informed and coordinated response.

### Structure of the Report

- **Chapter 1** provides an introduction to the context and gaps surrounding internal displacement and protection issues and explains the rationale to the survey methodology presented in Annex 1
- **Chapter 2** gives an overview of displacement dynamics among the sample surveyed
- **Chapters 3 and 4** address the key protection findings from the survey: looking at protection priorities, before delving into other areas of protection challenges and durable solutions
- **Chapter 5** offers an overview of 'who does what where' among stakeholders working on IDP and protection in Afghanistan with a view to identifying best practices and gaps
- **Chapters 6 and 7** present key findings and set out actionable recommendations for the government, the humanitarian community and other stakeholders.

### Internal Displacement in Afghanistan in 2012

By the end of October 2012, the number of IDPs reported in Afghanistan was estimated to substantially exceed 400,000.<sup>10</sup> This is a conservative figure that does not capture IDPs scattered in urban areas nor IDPs not accessible due to security reasons or lack of access. Actual numbers are recognised to be significantly higher. Since

2009, the reported figures for the number of people newly displaced by conflict have risen from about 50,000 in 2009 to 160,000 at the end of 2011 (UNHCR 2011). Conflict-induced displacement is a growing reality and the reflection of a changing political, military, social and economic context. According to UNHCR's planning figures, the number of IDPs is expected to increase by another 100,000 by the end of 2012.<sup>11</sup> Figures on internal displacement are estimates and speculations at best, given the difficulties of tracking population movements in a country where access to the most vulnerable populations in insecure provinces is limited. Those displaced by natural disasters further add to the caseload of vulnerable displaced people. IOM report that in 2011 they assisted 103,012 people affected or displaced by natural disasters.<sup>12</sup>

This report follows the Tokyo Conference of July 8, 2012 at which donors pledged \$16 billion for an ambitious package of National Priority Programmes (NPPs) focusing on long-term development. Concurrently, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) are depicting a staged process of withdrawal in their narrative of transition. Where do humanitarian actors fit into this transition towards longer-term development prospects for Afghans? What is the role of the government and where are the linkages between relief and development to be made?

Afghanistan remains in the midst of conflict, beset by fragmentations that have led to a renewed internal displacement crisis. This is compounded by recurrent drought and floods that have triggered further displacement across Afghanistan. Humanitarian actors identify the need to adapt to these changes and continuous challenges, to find ways to deliver assistance, to make a reality of their protection mandate and to ensure that protection interventions are effective and sustainable. This requires improving understanding of protection in order to develop a common understanding and consensus on key protection priorities and respective and collective responsibilities (whether as lead protection actors or as supporting actors). There is a need to honestly reflect on initiatives that work and do not work, in order to achieve a more concerted, coordinated and accountable response to identified protection priorities.

This report seeks to guide stakeholders through an analysis of IDPs' protection needs against a backdrop of increasing internal displacement. Crucially, this study

goes beyond a simple presentation of new data, seeking to link it with the analysis of response needs and existing response mechanisms. A defining characteristic of an IDP, differentiating them from migrants, is the forced nature of their movement. The complexity of mixed migration patterns in Afghanistan has often led to blurring of boundaries between IDPs, migrants and repatriated refugees. There are key aspects distinguishing internal displacement from other forms of internal migration.

1. An economic situation that tends to be worse than that of other Afghans and especially rural-urban migrants. Non-displaced rural-urban migrants tend to be better off, having invested in migration in expectation of a positive economic return.<sup>13</sup>
2. As they have been displaced, IDPs are less well positioned to maximise economic benefits from their resettlement.

Analysis of displacement in Afghanistan entails addressing the question of duration of displacement - although the duration itself is not a factor determining IDP status. In Afghanistan, as in most other displacement contexts, the question of when an IDP ceases to be an IDP is often controversial. In Afghanistan most stakeholders use a definition of IDP that is linked to duration and therefore places a time limit on internal displacement. This interpretation neither fits the situation on the ground, nor the universally applicable requirements defined by the *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* and the *Framework for Durable Solutions*.<sup>14</sup> Indeed, this definition of IDP status in fact creates protection risks. The Framework clarifies that the end to displacement and securing of a truly durable solution is "a long-term process of gradually diminishing displacement-specific needs"<sup>15</sup> that does not occur at one point in time and which leads to one of the three durable solutions (local integration, resettlement and return) to be discussed and contextualised in this study.<sup>16</sup>

## Context Analysis: Redefining Responses to IDP Protection Needs

A protection concern, in the field of internal displacement, is identified when it results from the shock of displacement. This report highlights where linkages between displacement and protection issues can be made, identifies where displacement has created distinct or heightened protection needs for the displaced population and formulates recommendations to strengthen the humanitarian response to the protection of IDPs.





45 year old IDP Bibi Amina looks on while holding her grandson in her temporary home in Jalalabad Province, Eastern Afghanistan. (Photo: NRC/Farzana Wahidy, June 2012)

As a result of growing insecurity, displaced populations in Afghanistan suffer from a lack of access to basic humanitarian assistance and protection due to reduced reach by both humanitarian agencies and national authorities. There is thus, a lack of baseline data and analysis of protection needs. As a result, all actors find it difficult to respond systematically and quickly, causing IDPs to frequently slip through the humanitarian response net.

After over three decades of conflict and recurrent natural disasters, displacement has become an increasingly salient issue for the country. A 2009 ICRC survey concluded that 76 per cent of the Afghan population had experienced displacement.<sup>17</sup> Historical accounts of the different phases of cross-border and internal displacement highlight the massive scale of migration and displacement.<sup>18</sup> Since 2001, close to six million refugees and one million IDPs have returned, while around three million Afghan refugees remain in exile, mostly in Pakistan and Iran.<sup>19</sup> The vast majority of returning refugees have received assistance from UNHCR's voluntary repatriation programme, while IDPs have not fallen directly under the mandate of any agency. Afghanistan today is characterised by a bewildering complexity of migration

and displacement flows. The co-existence of multiple forms of human mobility complicates the response of government and humanitarian institutions.

The massive scale of return of refugees from Iran and Pakistan since 2002 has received important attention from policymakers, practitioners and analysts. There is increasing recognition of the critical need to respond to the plight of IDPs. A concrete example is the gathering effort by a range of stakeholders to work together to develop a National IDP Policy to shape analysis and practical response.

Afghanistan's ongoing armed conflict between armed opposition groups (AOGs) and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and International Military Forces (IMFs) has had a high cost for civilians.<sup>20</sup> The number of civilian casualties has been on the rise since 2007.<sup>21</sup> The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) registered over 3,000 civilian deaths in 2011 compared with nearly 2,500 in 2009.<sup>22</sup> The increased level of violence has had a direct impact on increasing levels of internal displacement, as exemplified by the 4,000 IDPs who fled the districts of Marjah and Nad Ali following ANSF-IMF operations in Helmand province in 2010.<sup>23</sup>



An Afghan IDP, Namatullah, lights a gas lamp in his tent in a Kabul IDP settlement. Namatullah and his family have been displaced from their hometown Tagab district of Kapisa Province of Afghanistan since 2008. (Photo: NRC/Farzana Wahidy, June 2012)

It is difficult to predict the consequences of political transition and complete handover of security to the ANSF. Analysts fear a resurgence of civil conflict. In the south, given the fact that the gains of the international coalition are highly dependent on the strong presence of international troops, the handover might open opportunities for the Taliban and other insurgents.<sup>24</sup> In the north, there is already a fluid security landscape with antagonistic armed groups operating in the same province, as is the case in Faryab. The withdrawal of international troops, and potential reduction of the presence of the Afghan state, may leave these groups the space to seize control of new areas. It may be assumed that security will deteriorate in the coming years, triggering more internal displacement and ushering in an era of major constraints to achieving durable solutions for internally displaced Afghans. Conflict and insecurity have spread throughout the country, embroiling areas hitherto considered relatively safe. As armed conflict has lessened in severity in the south, it has intensified in south-eastern, eastern and northern provinces where increased numbers of Afghan civilians have been killed and injured, thus raising the proportion of all civilian casualties across the country. This geographical spread

of the conflict is fuelling insecurity and displacement, destroying livelihoods and restricting access to state services and assistance programmes

The two major destinations of Afghan migrants and refugees – Iran and Pakistan – appear less of an option for the recently displaced. Increasingly, the Pakistani and Iranian governments wish to see Afghan refugees return home. In recent years there has been a sustained flow of returns. Accelerating harassment of Afghan refugees and deportations from both countries, as well as the closure of refugee camps by the Pakistani authorities, have significantly reduced the attraction of these two countries as a destination of refuge or migration.<sup>25</sup> As a result, Afghan households contemplating flight increasingly have little choice other than relocation within Afghanistan.<sup>26</sup> Conflict and insecurity complicate the return of refugees, preventing many from returning to their place of origin and forcing them into secondary displacement within Afghanistan.

Traditional migratory patterns are also significantly impacted by increasing insecurity within Afghanistan. Nomadic communities, like the Kuchis, have had to

abandon their migratory routes as a result of the loss of livestock and the closure of traditional migratory routes.<sup>27</sup> (cf. Box 3)

Afghanistan experiences cyclical natural disasters, putting a high level of pressure on rural livelihoods. Recurring droughts, flooding and harsh winters have impacted rural communities, especially in the north, fuelling significant displacements. The World Food Programme (WFP) reported an intensification of internal displacements as a result of the 2010-2011 drought.<sup>28</sup> The exceptionally severe winter of 2011 highlighted the extreme vulnerability of IDPs living on the outskirts of Kabul.<sup>29</sup> (cf. Box 6).

In the short to mid-term it is expected that criminal activity, smuggling of guns and opium trafficking will result in changing power relations and uncertainty at both national and local levels. There will likely be more confrontations between all actors. Response becomes a sensitive issue when access to remote and insecure areas is increasingly limited. How can humanitarian actors reach populations and offer protection? Despite the confidence of the post-conflict discourse heard in the 2000s, the current reality is of conflict and denial of access in many parts of the country, especially the south.

Internal displacement in Afghanistan is a matter of grave and growing concern. In the absence of adequate humanitarian responses, and sufficient recognition by the government, internal displacement has potential destabilising effects for Afghanistan and its neighbours as it increases vulnerabilities and competition over resources. The scale of displacement requires specific attention from all stakeholders and reconsideration of the current modalities of humanitarian and development response.

### **Building Evidence: Supporting Response to IDP Protection Needs**

Assessing the breadth and depth of protection challenges faced by IDPs is not an easy task in a country where population figures, household data and insecurity often prevent researchers from obtaining robust evidence. Such constraints, however, should not prevent academic researchers and humanitarian practitioners from attempting to inform policies by gathering evidence.

Evidence on internal displacement takes diverse forms. On the one hand are the purely statistical and quantitative descriptions of internal displacement. It is not an easy task as the main estimations exclude significant

numbers of IDPs in inaccessible regions or those ‘invisibly’ living among urban populations – where the categories of IDP, repatriated refugee and migrant often overlap. At the end of October 2012, the government and UNHCR estimated there were over 400,000 conflict-induced IDPs alone, with the highest concentration in the south (32 per cent), west (25 per cent) and east (22 per cent). A third of the total current IDP caseload is composed of families displaced in 2012.<sup>30</sup> The statement in the 2008 *UNHCR National IDP Profile* (corroborated by analysts) confirms a “trend clearly indicating that displacement is on the rise.”<sup>31</sup> Numbers alone cannot tell the whole story. Qualitative evidence is required to obtain an in-depth assessment of the needs of IDPs. Building a comprehensive knowledge on IDP profiles and protection needs is a priority as available information on IDPs is limited.<sup>32</sup>

This research examines a segment of a large IDP population by focusing on one specific element: the protection of their basic human rights. This focus on protection addresses a gap. As with any research project, it is vital to highlight what new information is being added. At a workshop convened at MoRR on July 18, 2012, the key findings of this study were presented to government, non-government and UN agencies. This research is unique for three main reasons. It:

1. provides quantitative and qualitative evidence necessary to support the process of building a national IDP policy
2. confirms a set of protection challenges but also challenges some commonly held beliefs in order to promote change and adopt more effective and context-specific policies and programmes in response to internal displacement
3. provides a comparative outlook, by comparing (when-ever feasible) information collected to national averages, identifying direct links between the shock of displacement and protection concerns and suggesting where stakeholders might prioritise assistance. Comparative methods allow us to highlight vulnerabilities specific to IDPs.

### **Filling the Protection Gap: From Theoretical to Operational Challenges**

#### *The conceptual framework*

Responding to the protection needs of IDPs in Afghanistan requires an effort to demarcate definitional boundaries, thus raising significant debates.

## Who is an “IDP”?

The *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* defines IDPs as:

Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised State border.<sup>33</sup>

The two important components of this definition are the forced nature of movement and the fact that displacement takes place within national borders.<sup>34</sup> The *Guiding Principles* stress the irrelevance of the primary cause of displacement as a determinant of qualifying for IDP status and recognises that it is common to find a combination of different factors leading to internal displacement.

The question of differentiating between voluntary and forced displacement is a traditional bone of contention. Such rigid categories cannot fully describe the complexity of field reality in Afghanistan. A 2011 World Bank/UN-HCR study demonstrates that urban IDPs have specific vulnerabilities when compared to the mass of the urban poor.<sup>35</sup> It notes “the significance of displacement as a factor underlying vulnerabilities observed in informal settlements, and identifies IDPs as an extremely deprived segment of the population.”<sup>36</sup> The report acknowledges that IDPs, returned refugees and migrants often overlap and mix in locations throughout the country, finding themselves heading to more secure and economically stable urban centres.

The *Brookings-Bern Manual on Internal Displacement*<sup>37</sup> argues that the fact that the displaced person has “not crossed an internationally recognised state border” has to be understood broadly. The definition of an IDP should include those who first moved to another country and then came back to their country of origin but could not go back to their home. The inability or unwillingness of some refugee returnees to return to their places of origin or habitual residence, due to conflict, landlessness or natural disasters, has led an unknown portion into secondary displacement within the country. The quantitative aspect of this study provides information on this population. The section on stakeholders’ response includes these ‘returnee IDPs’ in the analysis so as to illustrate and understand the various facets of internal displacement in Afghanistan. When can a durable solution be said to

have been achieved? A Brookings Institute report from Azerbaijan argues that a blanket approach “ignores the fact that during twenty years of displacement, some IDPs have succeeded in integrating into mainstream society and have improved their living standards.”<sup>38</sup> A fine-tuned analysis is necessary to assess whether older groups of IDPs still suffer from specific assistance or protection needs linked to their displacement or face discrimination in enjoying their human rights on account of their displacement.<sup>39</sup> The present study integrates various durations of displacement in the sampling to address this question and analyse the evolution of IDPs’ socio-economic circumstances and vulnerabilities through time.

In 2005, Afghanistan along with all other UN Member States recognised the *Guiding Principles* “as an important international framework for the protection of internally displaced persons and resolve[d] to take effective measures to increase the protection of internally displaced persons.”<sup>40</sup> As Afghanistan formulates an IDP policy, stakeholders must acknowledge the multiple facts of internal displacement while ensuring policy and practice respect the integrity of the IDP notion as laid out in the *Guiding Principles*.

## Defining Protection

“The lack of a universally accepted definition allows different actors to apply very different standards.”<sup>41</sup> Protection is understood as encompassing “all activities, aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the relevant bodies of law (i.e. human rights, humanitarian and refugee law).”<sup>42</sup> The definition stresses that protection is a rights-based concept aimed at guaranteeing that all citizens – including internally displaced persons – are equally protected by national authorities.<sup>43</sup> This means protecting IDPs from discrimination born out of their displacement and guaranteeing their full enjoyment of their rights as citizens. The *Guiding Principles* restates international human rights and humanitarian law and spells out what protection means are appropriate in various phases of displacement. The rights protected include:

rights related to physical security and integrity rights related to the basic necessities of life (including food, water, health, and shelter) other civil and political rights (including political participation and personal documentation) other economic, social and cultural rights (including access to property, livelihoods and education).<sup>44</sup>



A displaced Afghan girl Shahzada holds her baby sister. Shahzada and her family, who returned to Afghanistan from Pakistan last year, were recently displaced owing to growing insecurity in their village in Badghis Province, North-western Afghanistan. (Photo: NRC/Farzana Wahidy, June 2012)

Of relevance in Afghanistan is Principle 2 (1) requiring “all authorities, groups or persons irrespective of their legal status” to observe and apply the *Guiding Principles* without adverse distinction. The role of armed opposition groups in contributing to the protection of IDPs and their responsibilities under international humanitarian law cannot be ignored.

The primary responsibility for responding to IDPs’ protection needs falls on national and provincial authorities.<sup>45</sup> International actors have the responsibility to support them when they lack the capacities to effectively guarantee the protection of vulnerable populations.<sup>46</sup> International organisations such as UNHCR, UNICEF, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and ICRC have specific protection mandates, while OCHA is charged with coordinating humanitarian response.<sup>47</sup> National and international civil society actors, in addition to agencies such as IOM, play a protection role despite lacking a specific protection mandate.

To be operational, the concept of protection must be context-specific. At present in Afghanistan there is neither a consensus on the definition of protection nor an adequate context-specific policy that addresses the protection concerns of IDPs in a comprehensive manner. Protection as a concept is still nascent and many provincial offices of key stakeholders involved in IDP assistance are unaware both of their responsibilities under international and national law to protect the rights of IDPs and also of how protection translates into action on the ground. The present study aims to assist the government, humanitarian actors and donors to determine protection priorities for Afghan IDPs, according to their own accounts and experiences, in order to contribute towards improved assessments and responses.

### Operational Challenges

The theoretical challenges surrounding the notions of internal displacement and protection make it extremely complex to practically respond to IDPs’ protection needs. Humanitarian responses to internal displacement are also rendered difficult by the complexity of the Afghan operational environment.

Limited access to vulnerable populations weakens response to internal displacement by:

- reducing availability of accurate information about internally displaced populations
- impeding potential humanitarian assistance and protection response
- rendering futile initiatives to prevent displacement and assist populations in the place of origin<sup>48</sup>
- reducing capacity to support IDPs in their search for durable solutions.

Efforts are now being made to develop tools to better track population movements. However, this is a mammoth task in rural Afghanistan where people often lack any form of documentation of identity. It is difficult to map stationary populations, let alone keep track of moving groups of people. Compounding difficulties is the fact that many actors have collected field information, but only recently has the practice of collecting and sharing information become a joint activity. As a result, IDP profiling efforts are not yet able to provide a composite overview of the internal displacement situation across the country.<sup>49</sup>

## 2. Displacement overview

As indicated above (and further explained in Annex 1) methodological limitations prevent us from generalising our findings to the entire population of IDPs in Afghanistan. Yet, our data can help explain the realities of internal displacement and clarify more precisely what it means to be an IDP in Afghanistan.

A key determinant of IDP status is the forced nature of movement, as distinguished from migrants choosing to move to improve their living conditions. Two main aspects characterise internal displacement and distinguish it from regular migration (especially rural-urban):

1. the causes that triggered displacement
2. The reality that the economic circumstances of IDPs tend to be worse than the rest of the population and especially that of rural-urban migrants. The latter are usually likely to be better-off because they tend to be families of rural origin who have invested in migration in expectation of a positive economic return.<sup>50</sup>

Analysing displacement in Afghanistan also implies addressing the question of duration of displacement, although the duration itself is not determining who an IDP is. While most stakeholders use a definition of IDP that is linked to duration and put a time-limit on internal displacement, this view neither fits the situation on the ground, nor the requirements defined by the *Guiding Principles* and the *Framework for Durable solutions* and as a matter of fact creates protection risks. Following the framework, “a durable solution is achieved when internally displaced persons no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement”.<sup>51</sup>


It must be stressed that although they have been forced to leave their places of habitual residence, IDPs in Afghanistan retain the rights to freedom of movement and choice of residence which are enshrined in Article 39 of the country’s constitution: “every Afghan shall have the right to travel and settle in any part of the country, except in areas forbidden by law.”<sup>52</sup>

### Major Causes of Internal Displacement

Globally, there are several major causes of internal displacement:

placement: conflict (including armed conflict and generalised violence); violations of human rights; natural disasters; human-made disasters and development projects. Our study has confirmed that conflict-induced IDPs represent the main segment of the IDP population in Afghanistan. Equal numbers of urban, semi-rural and rural IDPs were incorporated in the study (see Annex 1). Survey results indicated that 75.6 per cent<sup>53</sup> of them had been displaced due to conflict, 16.9 per cent by natural disasters and 6.7 per cent by both (Graph 1).<sup>54</sup> The prevalence of conflict-induced IDPs is linked to military political developments: while violence and insecurity increase in intensity in the country, the conflict also expands to new areas, triggering increased displacement. Despite the repetition of natural crises in Afghanistan, conflict remains the primary cause of displacement among respondents.

**Graph 1. Causes of Displacement**



### Primary Causes of Flight (i): Conflict and Insecurity

The majority of IDPs interviewed indicated that the primary trigger of displacement was insecurity caused by armed confrontation or hostilities (67.5 per cent), whether localised or involving international military forces. Notably, there were few differences between the major causes of displacement and province of origin, type of origin location, and duration of displacement. IDPs from northern and western provinces were as likely to be displaced due to conflict as those from southern and eastern provinces. Recent IDPs were also as likely to

be displaced due to conflict as their counterparts in prolonged displacement. IDPs displaced between 2001 and 2004 were less likely to be displaced due to conflict (60.4 per cent versus 75.6 per cent): The fall of the Taliban regime and the influx of international military forces reduced overall conflict in populated areas but insurgency re-started in 2004 and continues unabated.

Though most IDPs characterised the conflict as involving government or international military forces (77.1 per cent and 63.8 per cent, respectively), relatively few considered them the main actor responsible for their displacement (0.8 per cent and 15.3 per cent for ANSF and IMF). Instead, 54.7 per cent of IDPs identified the Taliban and other anti-government elements as primarily responsible. This is in part due to the limitations of the study and the fact that IDPs in Taliban-controlled areas were not surveyed. The conflict between insurgents and the government and international forces must not hide the variety of types of conflict which trigger displacement in Afghanistan. The perceived source of displacement is often a combination of various types of conflict. Local armed fights (19 per cent); inter-tribal conflict (14 per cent) and ethnic conflict (8.5 per cent) are identified as causes for displacement. At the local level, the combination of these various types of conflict significantly impacts security. Nuristan is a good example (see Box 10). It is therefore necessary for stakeholders to keep in mind the various sources of conflict at play at the local level, and not to assume that the withdrawal of IMFs from the country will lead to a reduction in the rate of displacement.

### Primary Causes of Flight (ii): Natural Disasters

Natural disasters were reported as the second most prominent cause of displacement, the primary trigger of displacement cited by 16.9 per cent of respondents. IDPs displaced from western and north-western provinces, such as Badghis and Faryab, were more likely to be displaced due to natural disasters. While drought is recurrent throughout the country, north-western and western provinces are particularly at risk of flooding and avalanches. The impacts of drought are often not properly interpreted, for those displaced by drought are characteristically depicted as migrants, rather than IDPs.

IDPs currently living in urban areas were less likely to have been displaced due to natural disasters (3.1 per cent versus 17.3 per cent in rural areas). This is hardly surprising given the latter's dependence on agro-pastoralism to meet their basic needs.

Natural disaster-induced IDPs were more evenly represented in the various types of locations (urban, semi-rural and rural) than conflict-induced IDPs. They were more likely to settle in urban and semi-rural areas than in rural areas.

### **Box 1.** **Experiences of Multiple Displacement**


Chronic conflict and natural disasters can cause households to be displaced multiple times, a trend present only among 6.4 per cent of our study's respondents. Capturing multiple displacements is particularly difficult in Afghanistan due to the ambiguity around the definition of displacement. While displacement from one province to another is a clear instance of internal displacement, displacement within provinces, cities or villages blurs the definition of displacement. This presents a methodological challenge as respondents might not have considered some past movements as worth reporting.

Of the identified multiply displaced respondents, many chose to first migrate to provinces with major urban centres, such as Kabul, Nangarhar and Kandahar. While our study does not capture where in each of the provinces IDPs settled, it may reasonably be assumed they travelled to regional hubs. IDPs who experienced multiple displacements did not demonstrate any significantly different protection needs when compared to the rest of the IDPs interviewed, suggesting they are generally as vulnerable as other IDP populations.

While most stakeholders agree that the primary cause of displacement is security-related, it is commonly believed that the primary pull factor is economic opportunity, which blurs the IDP-migrant distinction. Our findings indicate that the primary pull factor has been security-related. Most IDPs (56.8 per cent) sought refuge in a location perceived as more secure.

Looking specifically at conflict-induced IDPs, the number choosing their new location for security-related reasons was 69.5 per cent. Perceptions of better economic / employment opportunities were the reported main pull factor for only 8.9 per cent of conflict-induced IDPs, as opposed to 49.1 per cent of natural disaster-induced IDPs.

**Graph 2. What was the main factor that informed your choice of place of displacement?**



Graph 2 confirms that IDPs consider economic calculations when choosing their destination. Although difficult to assess, 17 per cent of respondents rank economic opportunities as the main consideration in choosing place of refuge.

For 11 per cent of respondents, geographic proximity was the major factor shaping their choice of destination. This shows that displacement is a risky and costly process and that the most vulnerable cannot always afford to go far or to seek refuge in neighbouring countries. Many respondents reported having to make quick decisions where to flee, thus further constraining destination choices.

Only four per cent of IDPs chose their place of displacement based on the presence of relatives. This is a rather surprising figure given the documented importance of social networks in shaping patterns of migration. Field observations noted an important number of cases where relatives were displaced all together. Sometimes, all village members were displaced simultaneously. This is an important finding in relation to the role of communities in protecting themselves and in becoming advocates on their own behalf. Herat province provides examples of long-term displaced IDPs who fled disaster affected regions some 15 to 20 years ago and who have been living in camp-like settings. The presence of the community has allowed them to have a stronger collective voice in negotiations with the authorities around their demands for durable solutions.

### Duration of displacement

Of IDPs surveyed, 49.4 per cent have been displaced since 2009 with 15.5 per cent reporting being displaced in 2012 alone. This finding confirms that internal displacement is not an historical issue, but an accelerating problem.<sup>55</sup> The numbers of people displaced by conflict

“The entire village of [QaderAbad] is an IDP village, we are all from the same area of origin. The rest of the community back in Ghoryian [about 2,000 families] is planning to come. But most of the people there sold their livestock to come here.”

*Local community leader from Qader Abad*

in 2011 was 45 per cent greater than in 2010.<sup>56</sup> Table 1 shows the spectrum of durations of displacement as represented by respondents, and reflects general knowledge about the different historical waves of displacement in Afghanistan. About 11 per cent of surveyed IDPs were in prolonged durations of displacement, living in displacement for over ten years while still exhibiting the conditions of more recently displaced populations. Internal displacement in Afghanistan thus has to be conceived through all different temporalities, bearing in mind that the conditions of displacement are not duration dependent.


Large numbers of IDPs risk falling into permanent displacement with no immediate prospect of durable solutions. IDPs suffer from the risk of being ‘stuck in displacement’, being unable to find or stalling in their search for durable solutions, with its related vulnerability risks. This, which is most often related to the funding gap during the transition from conflict to early recovery.<sup>57</sup> This indicates the need to create conditions more conducive to durable solutions and closer collaboration between humanitarian and development actors and donors. It is hoped that Afghanistan’s emerging IDP policy will stress that assistance and protection is provided based on assessed needs, and not based on categories or caseloads.

### IDPs as Vulnerable Communities

Our findings confirm the vulnerability of those living in IDPs communities, both in absolute terms and relative to the rest of the Afghan population. Policy makers and donors need to recognise they have demonstrable vulnerabilities and protection needs unique to displacement. Approximately 90 per cent of IDPs interviewed qualified as extremely vulnerable individuals (EVI) whose socio-economic profiles place them not only below national averages, but also at significant risk of living in life-threatening conditions. EVI households must meet at least one of the following UNHCR-standardised categories: headed by a female, single parent or an unaccompanied elder or minor; having a physically disabled,



**Graph 3. Did you return to Afghanistan voluntarily?**



mentally or chronically ill, or drug-addicted household

**Table 1 When did you leave your place of origin?**

Severely prolonged: before the fall of the Taliban regime (late 2001)	11.2%
Between 2001 and 2004	10.0%
Between 2005 and 2009	29.4%
New: after 2009	49.4%

member; being a poor and large family consisting of five or more dependents and without any apparent livelihood strategy.<sup>58</sup>

With few resources and even fewer opportunities, the protection needs and vulnerabilities of IDPs affect all facets of their lives. They are generally worse off than the rest of the national population:

- The illiteracy rate for both IDP men and women is above national averages (for men: 74 per cent vs. 61 per cent; for women 98 per cent vs. 88 per cent).<sup>59</sup>
- Women’s vulnerabilities increased further after displacement, particularly for widowed women who composed 19 per cent of our total female respondents.
- On average, IDPs live in larger households (9.5 people) than other Afghans (7.3 people according to national statistics). With higher average household sizes and lower incomes, IDPs struggle to meet their family’s most basic needs.<sup>60</sup>

The present study showed the importance of collecting disaggregated data - by age, gender or location for instance - to identify the most vulnerable groups within the IDP population, get a precise picture of their specific needs and inform the humanitarian response accordingly. This study attempted to capture the most vulnerable within the already vulnerable IDP population by investigating the possible presence of protection needs and vulnerabilities unique to women, children and those

**Box 2. Returnee / IDPs: Common and similar needs**

Decades of conflict have forced millions into exile. Some three million Afghan refugees remain in neighbouring countries, and are at risk of internal displacement on return to Afghanistan. 27.4 per cent of IDPs interviewed for our study were previously refugees in either Pakistan (19.8 per cent) or Iran (7.7 per cent). Most remained in exile for less than five years (41.1 per cent) but many lived in exile for at least ten years (28 per cent), only then returning to a very different country still plagued with conflict and insecurity. While the common belief is that returnees come back to Afghanistan with additional urban skills from their time in exile, the study found that secondary displaced refugee returnees interviewed did not return with an advantage. Most did not exhibit fewer severe protection needs than their singly displaced counterparts. Returnee/IDPs shared many key employment, food and land-related protection needs with the rest of IDPs interviewed. Furthermore, returnee / IDPs reported typically living in rural areas while in exile (77.4 per cent), with many living in Afghan refugee camps (55.6 per cent), thereby limiting their ability to learn urban skills in their new environment.

These secondary displaced refugee returnees in this sample usually chose to return to Afghanistan voluntarily (67.7 per cent, cf. Graph 2), most stating that Afghanistan was “their country and always will be.” Of those who did not return voluntarily, the majority left their place of exile because their refugee camp was closed down (38.4 per cent) or they were compelled to leave due to harassment or threat (53.3 per cent). Once in Afghanistan, our study showed that secondary displaced refugee returnees were usually at par with other IDPs.

who were part of Afghanistan’s several marginalised communities. The survey highlights the disproportional presence of one such group, the Kuchis – 7.2 per cent of our total respondents – as a significant minority among the overall internally displaced populations.

### **Box 3. Internally Displaced Kuchis<sup>61</sup>**

Kuchis interviewed were displaced for reasons of conflict (63 per cent), natural disaster (13.7 per cent) or both (23.3 per cent). They were more likely to experience prolonged displacement (with 28.8 per cent of Kuchi IDPs experiencing displacement prior to the fall of the Taliban regime, as compared to 11.2 per cent of other IDPs). Conflict-induced IDP Kuchis often suffered from the disruption of traditional migratory networks, particularly along the border regions between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Conflict and natural disaster sometimes also caused Kuchis to lose their livestock and, therefore, their livelihoods. Kuchis were thus forced to end their traditional nomadic lifestyles and settle in their places of displacement. The key component of Kuchis' displacement was that it was forced. Circumstances denied them the ability to continue semi-nomadic lifestyles. The government's preferred durable solution, the promotion of return, is, especially for displaced Kuchis, highly questionable.<sup>62</sup>

There are those who argue the Kuchis, due to their pastoral-based nomadic lifestyles, should not be considered to be IDPs. This view is challenged by our findings, which show that Kuchis are indeed IDPs and that very often they are even more vulnerable than other IDPs and in dire need of targeted assistance.

# 3. Protection priorities

## Top Three Protection Priorities

This chapter identifies three protection priorities. Each of these protection needs is shown below together with its rights-based equivalent:

1. **Employment: Under- and Unemployment:** IDPs should not be discriminated against as they exercise their right to seek work and engage in economic activities (Guiding Principle 22b)
2. **Housing, Land and Property (HLP):** IDPs cannot be arbitrarily deprived of property and possessions they had to leave as they fled (Guiding Principle 21)
3. **Food Access and Quality:** IDPs have a right to an adequate standard of living and authorities are obliged to provide them with safe access to essential food and potable water (Guiding Principle 18)

Addressing internal displacement is not a merely humanitarian ‘problem’. It is just as much the concern of those in the development community. It should be more widely appreciated that IDPs are unable to obtain a durable solution due to failure to guarantee them these three universally-recognised fundamental rights, among the core conditions to achieving a durable solution according to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s (IASC) *Framework for Durable Solutions 2010*.

## 1 Employment: Under- and Unemployment


Under and unemployment was assessed using the International Labour Organisation’s definition of employed and unemployed populations. This is the prime pre-occupying challenge faced by IDP households, 61.5 per cent of surveyed IDPs stating that employment-related issues were their main problems during displacement. Significantly, this does not vary considerably by age, gender, duration of displacement or province.

IDPs’ basic protection needs are strongly intertwined with their economic situation. Without sustainable and regular income, IDPs are left without the ability to meet their basic food, health and other needs. Respondents’ experiences of under- and unemployment and its related consequences – typically forced debt, labour migration and pressure to accept a small dowry when marrying their daughters – confirms that their economic vulnerability exceeds both that of other Afghans and their own pre-displacement circumstances.

The data showed that IDPs experience numerous economic shocks:

- Unemployment rates rose by six per cent during displacement.
- IDPs are more than 33 per cent below the national average poverty line, an increase of 15 per cent from pre-displacement figures.

**Graph 4. Currently, what are the 3 greatest problems your household faces?**



- Household income decreased by 21 per cent as IDPs earned less income from land, house rental and the sale of agricultural / livestock products.
- IDPs moved away from agriculture to construction and other day-labour in the informal sector. The proportion of IDPs working in agriculture was 59.1 per cent prior to displacement, but only 5.6 per cent while in the place of refuge. The proportion of people working in construction rose from 11.9 per cent to 39.9 per cent (Graph 4).
- Women from rural origins, no longer with the opportunity to do farming work and denied jobs in the male-dominated construction sector, are forced into perilous dependence on irregular tailoring, sewing or begging.
- Though many IDPs seek to diversify income, they often lack means to purchase equipment or access capital.
- Trapped in the informal economy, IDPs become more dependent than the non-displaced on daily labour (56.9 per cent versus 14 per cent<sup>63</sup>) that is usually badly paid, temporary and insecure.
- In addition to the drop in the average monthly income, IDP households are faced with an accompanying reduction in the diversity of income sources (Graph 7). The sole source of family income to rise during displacement was remittances: this has become a common coping strategy in western Afghanistan.
- Zakat dropped nearly 14 per cent, perhaps explained by post-displacement distancing from traditional kin, faith and neighbourly commitments and networks.

Unemployment is not easy to measure in Afghanistan given long-standing debates about how to best define and measure unemployment.<sup>64</sup> Yet, overall, the unemployment rates of surveyed IDPs rose by six per cent during displacement, going from 11.8 per cent up to 17.5 per cent, above national averages (Table 2). This heightened risk of unemployment for IDPs has to be recognised as a specific protection concern. IDPs enter new societies – often after suffering the losses associated with displacement, including those of assets and social networks spanning generations – at a unique disadvantage.

“All we need is employment. For men, for women, for anyone. We just need jobs. We can buy water with jobs. We can buy food with jobs. We can go to the hospital with jobs. We just need jobs.” – 19-year-old Bibigul, who was born in a refugee camp in Pakistan and is now displaced with her family in the village of Farm Ada in Nangarhar’s Behsood District

Table 2 Unemployment rates

	IDPs Pre-Displacement	IDPs During Displacement	National Average (2007/2008) <sup>65</sup>
Male	1.4%	8.8%	7%
Female	34.8%	40.2%	7%
<b>Total</b>	<b>11.8%</b>	<b>17.5%</b>	<b>7%</b>


All IDPs seek work. IDP respondents asserted that regular and sufficient employment is their underlying protection need. It is a desire equally important for conflict-induced and disaster-induced IDPs (17.2 per cent vs. 15.8 per cent). Employment chances vary among various locations of refuge. Among IDPs who moved to rural areas, 23 per cent reported being unemployed against 17.2 per cent for urban IDPs. IDPs within each province’s urban centres indicated widely different primary areas of employment. There was a much higher rate of reported complete unemployment in Nangarhar (44.1 per cent) than in Kabul (5.3 per cent). Prolonged IDPs reported a higher rate of unemployment than more recent IDPs (27.2 per cent as against 16.8 per cent). Clearly, lack of employment poses an acute protection crisis for many of those who have been displaced for prolonged periods.

The survey also highlighted severe under-employment among IDPs. The International Labour Organization (ILO) identifies two types of underemployment: time related underemployment, due to insufficient work hours, and inadequate employment situations due to inconsistencies in the labour market which limit the capacities and well being of workers. The ILO further states that “a person can be simultaneously in these two forms of underemployment.”<sup>66</sup> In Afghanistan, as the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) asserts, individuals “simply cannot afford to be unemployed,” shedding light on not only IDPs’ extremely low unemployment rate pre-displacement but also the severity of their remarkably high unemployment rates post-displacement.


Qualitative fieldwork brought out the debilitating effects of underemployment. IDPs often reported finding work only sporadically and in low-paying jobs, noting that “one day we eat, the next day we don’t”. Given that 90 per cent of the Afghan economy relies on the informal sector,<sup>67</sup> it is difficult to gauge the levels of underemployment in the local labour market and therefore to establish a clear link between underemployment and displacement.

Displacement leaves IDPs without the necessary skills to integrate well into new labour markets. IDPs moving from

**Graph 5. Distribution of Employment Sectors Post-Displacement in Urban Settings Among Provinces**



**Graph 6. Household Income by Province & Type of Location**



rural to urban areas lack social, technical and marketable skills and, in many cases the support networks and systems of reciprocity required to integrate into urban economies. Likewise, IDPs moving to new rural areas often lack agricultural skills and/or access to arable land.

Typically, IDP respondents were primarily employed in either agriculture or construction. Agriculture cannot provide families with consistent income during the winter months, during which time “40 per cent of Afghan households do not receive any revenue.”<sup>68</sup> This lack of consistent income for agricultural-based IDP households is further compounded by limited diversification in the number of household members contributing to the monthly income. An average of only 1.12 individuals were contributing to the respondents’ monthly household income, typically relying heavily on a single individual to meet all of the household’s economic needs.


## Income

A direct consequence of these remarkable shifts in terms of access to and patterns of employment is a significant drop in household income following displacement. Respondents reported a 21 per cent drop in monthly income per person during displacement – from 1,063 Afghanis (\$21) to 840 Afghanis (\$17) – resulting in an average monthly income well below the national average poverty line (1,255 Afghanis) (Table 3). This individual drop in income was pervasive, affecting nearly all displaced households surveyed regardless of household size.


**Table 3 Average monthly incomes (per person in Afghanis)**

Poverty line (2007/2008) <sup>69</sup>	1255.0
Pre-displacement	1063.4
During displacement	840.5

**Graph 7. Average Monthly Income for Male v Female IDPs (in Afghanis) by Type of Location**



**Graph 8. Average Monthly Income Difference Pre- and During Displacement**



Notably, while income and employment did not differ greatly across provinces, households' monthly income differed significantly between types of locations. Rural households earned an average of over 1,000 Afghanis (\$20) more than urban households (Graph 6). This suggests high levels of irregular and insufficient employment in urban areas and that urban IDPs' motivations in remaining in the city are unrelated to economic or employment opportunities.

In some places IDPs have better opportunities than others. IDP households settled in Kandahar were earning up to twice as much as IDPs in other provinces. However, factoring in household size, indicates little difference in per capita income between provinces. This may be due to an important volume of cross-border business. It is also linked to the large amount of intra-provincial displacement in Kandahar that allowed IDPs there to maintain their relatively large social networks and com-

parative familiarity with their location of refuge. It is important to note, however, that the average monthly incomes per person per household were nearly uniform given higher average household sizes in Kandahar and Nangarhar.

IDPs' employment prospects are greatly dependent on gender due to a number of constraints, including lack of family permission and social discouragement.<sup>70</sup> Employed male IDPs earn, on average, 4.3 times more than female (8,055 Afghanis (\$161) vs. 1,861 (\$37)). When one considers the markedly lower female participation in economic activities, it is apparent that surveyed IDP males earned between 23 and 47 times more than female IDPs.

The limited employment opportunities available to IDP women, particularly in urban areas, is of increased concern for widows and female heads of household. Wid-

ows, for instance, reported the lowest income during displacement:<sup>71</sup> only 588 Afghans (\$12) a month (53 per cent below the poverty line), followed by Kuchis at 917 Afghans (\$18) a month. IDP women are thus most vulnerable to displacement-induced employment challenges.

In addition to the drop in the average monthly income, IDP households are faced with an accompanying reduction in the diversity of income sources (Graph 8). In line with loss of property often associated with displacement, IDPs earn less income from land, house rental and the associated sale of agricultural / livestock production.

On average, economic indicators suggest IDPs were already more vulnerable than the average population even prior to displacement. Once displaced, IDPs are more than 33% below the national average poverty line, an increase of 15% from pre-displacement figures.

## Coping Strategies

### Debt

Without sufficient employment opportunities, over 90 per cent of IDPs reported having had to borrow money for basic needs after being displaced. This figure is found regardless of location. Over 30 per cent of IDPs reported borrowing money at least six times in the previous year to buy food. This was particularly apparent in semi-rural locations, where nearly 47.6 per cent of respondents reported having needed to borrow money more than ten times in the previous year to purchase food. IDPs were typically able to use their social networks, including relatives and the local host community, as sources for loans (Table 4).

**Table 4** Have you needed to borrow money since you arrived here? Multiple answers possible.

Yes	From my relatives	69.4%
	From the IDP community	55.2%
	From shopkeepers	36.6%
	From the local community	27.5%
	Other source	0.5%
	Repeatedly, I'm unable to find loans	0.6%
No/Rarely	Never needed a loan	7.8%
	Unable to find loans	1.3%

## Labour Migrations: Herat, Nangarhar and Kandahar

In the absence of local employment, IDPs in Herat, Nangarhar and Kandahar have sought employment outside Afghanistan. The nature of observed employment differed significantly by region:

**1) West (Herat Province):** Communities preferred irregular labour migration to Iran (albeit with its known security and physical risks and vulnerability to imprisonment, detention and deportation<sup>72</sup>) to working in the city of Herat because of the ability to find more regular and sufficient work in Iran. According to a study on Afghan deportees from Iran, they had received four times the wages available in Afghanistan and had thus been able to regularly remit funds to families left in Afghanistan.<sup>73</sup>

"I worked in construction there [in Iran]. What am I to do? I went there to make money. I did not go because I wanted to go. I do not like it there. All I do from morning to night is work to make money and then bring it here. This is the life of people like me... I have to go there and work and I'm left there. When I come back for two or three months, then I must go back and work. This is no future." 16-year-old Mansur has been living in the village of Sharband in Herat since 2011 after being affected by government and anti-government conflict. On his way to Iran earlier this year, a friend of his who accompanied him died from starvation during the six-day trek to Iran. His friend was survived by a wife and young child.

In Herat's Qader Abad village, fieldworkers encountered a recently displaced IDP community without many of its traditional male household heads. The only males were young boys and old men as most other males had left for several months' work in Iran. Absence of its leaders can increase the community's social vulnerability.

Migration in search of labour in Iran brings its own vulnerabilities. Informants reported difficulties having to deal with the police and border authorities. Male IDP children as young as 12 travelled into Iran in cramped vehicles with many starving or being brutalised by the Iranian border police.

**2) South and East (Kandahar and Nangarhar Provinces):** As indicated earlier in Graph 5, the average income per household was greatest among IDP communities in Kandahar and Nangarhar. Field observations and past studies

reveal that, unlike in Herat, labour migration to Pakistan consisted of short-term border crossings for work to meet the family’s daily food needs and living expenses.<sup>74</sup> These temporary eastern migrants are not thought to remit funds to their families in Afghanistan as their migration is generally short-term (often for only a few days) and cyclical.

**Assistance: Lack of Sustainability and Opportunities for Beneficiaries**

Those IDPs who have received livelihoods-related assistance from the humanitarian community are critical of its temporary nature. UNHCR has noted that “most jobs that have been generated by the international development assistance tend to be casual or temporary and are clearly not sustainable without continuing aid inflows.”<sup>75</sup> IDPs voiced a number of concerns:

- 1. Selection process:** Issues with the selection of IDP beneficiaries were reported. Lack of a proper methodology to conduct pre-assessments led to incomplete surveys, leaving some IDP households excluded from lists of potential beneficiaries. Selection procedures were not always clear for IDPs, leaving room for feelings of anger or disappointment. A transparent and public selection process was often lacking, often resulting in jealousy and internal tensions within the beneficiary communities.
- 2. Sustainability:** Short-term work programmes were unsustainable. Many criticised the often short-term and casual nature of employment programmes offered. A lot of employment-related programmes offered to IDPs were based on cash-for-work. These do

not address the essential lack of adequate skills that characterises IDPs in their new environment.

- 3. Follow-up:** IDPs reported a lack of opportunities to apply skills learned and lack of post-training assistance and follow-up. An IDP in Chaman Babrak village in Kabul noted that while a recent tailoring course for women had begun he did “not know how the women will be able to work...W]e do not have any equipment for machines for them to use.” Organisations which provide necessary equipment or business start-up funds present much more sustainable options for IDPs.


The role of the private sector in providing employment for IDPs needs to be encouraged. This was underlined during the IDP Policy Workshop and requires further research.

**2 Housing, Land and Property**

Research embraced all varieties of IDPs’ housing, from apartments and homes in semi-rural areas to camp dwellings in urban areas. Some were living in mud homes they constructed in the 1990s; others were squatting (sometimes on land owned by authorities) or renting property on urban fringes. They repeatedly noted that ownership of well-situated land was one of their primary aspirations.

Of IDPs interviewed, the number of households that owned their dwelling dropped significantly, from 69.7% per cent pre-displacement to 25.6% per cent (regardless of the duration of displacement) with only 21.3 per cent holding a legal record of their ownership. Because they often illegally occupy private or government owned land, IDPs are sometimes threatened by evic-

**Graph 9. Pre- and During Displacement Housing Arrangements**





tions, whether lawful or otherwise. Although findings did not explore fully the extent of the impact evictions have on IDP households, nine per cent of respondents reported having suffered from forced eviction in their place of displacement. The threat of eviction was not reported as a major risk: (9.3 per cent in urban, 10.8 per cent in peri-urban and 6.8 per cent in rural areas).

Displacement caused a significant rise in the number of individuals living in temporary makeshift shelters and shacks, from 9.9 per cent to 39.2 per cent, and camp dwellings, from 0.1 per cent to 3.6 per cent (Graph 9). This is not surprising given the shocks related to displacement, forcing IDPs to abandon property without being able to sell or let it. IDPs arrive in places of refuge with few resources, typically lacking the financial resources and social networks to live anywhere but in tents and cramped, insubstantial mud homes.

IDPs living in urban areas were as likely as those in semi-rural and rural areas to live in temporary shelters. Urban IDPs generally enjoyed more access to toilet facilities (less than one per cent have no access, compared with 16.9 per cent in rural areas) and public services such as electricity (46.2 per cent of urban IDPs lack access to electricity versus 85.7 per cent of rural IDPs).

Rural IDPs were more likely to own single-family homes than urban IDPs (30.6 per cent versus 12.4 per cent). This is probably due to lower land costs in rural areas. This was also the case for IDPs in prolonged displacement who were twice as likely to own single-family homes as IDPs who left after 2009 (25.6 per cent versus 13.3 per cent).

Respondents who were displaced before the fall of the Taliban in 2001 were no more likely to own land than those who were displaced between the end of 2001 and 2009. In fact, IDPs who were displaced between 2001 and 2004 were the most likely to own a single-family home (36.7 per cent). On the other hand, IDPs in prolonged displacement were the most likely to live in camps (21.2 per cent). A primary reason for living in informal camp-like settlements on government-owned land is the perception of reduced threat of eviction due to their high visibility. This is the case in settlements such as Charahi Qambar in Kabul Province.

Both qualitative and quantitative findings indicate that IDPs in prolonged displacement, particularly those in urban areas, suffer from a lack of access to land at the same or greater levels as rural, semi-rural and recent IDPs.

## Housing Hazards: Precarious Structures and Overcrowded Dwellings

Sub-standard housing renders households even more vulnerable to external shocks of the kind witnessed during the particularly harsh winter of 2011/2012 that led to numerous deaths of infants in the Kabul Informal Settlements (KIS) (see Box 7). Families displaced to new areas where they are unfamiliar with markets, may not immediately be aware of where to purchase construction materials, often requiring assistance from their social networks. Of the IDPs sampled, 43.3 per cent built their dwellings without assistance. External assistance itself was often limited to helping find the dwelling through a relative or friend (13.2% per cent) or building the structure (11.5% per cent). The lack of assistance often resulted in IDPs without technical skills or female-headed households building precarious structures, often being forced to build and re-build with each passing rainstorm or season.

Field observations further demonstrated that dwellings' structural shortcomings were often matched with a shortage of space and construction materials, seen in small overcrowded rooms housing multiple families. 13.4% per cent of respondents reported sharing their house or flat with other households. Privacy was thus limited, and girls and boys – sometimes distant relatives – were sleeping in the same room, violating traditional social mores. It is thus unsurprising that, when asked about the main assistance needed to improve their living conditions, IDPs commonly requested more space (26.7 per cent). Lack of space and living in such cramped circumstances can increase the risks of violence against women (VAW).

Sanitation facilities were also limited with most IDPs using traditional covered latrines (62.3 per cent), designated toilet facilities lacking a pit (24.5 per cent), or resorting to open fields or bushes (11.5 per cent). Overcrowded conditions, in conjunction with the lack of adequate sanitation facilities and open defecation, can produce serious health concerns. A mother unable to wash her hands before cooking can spread bacterial infections to entire households.

“They [mud homes] are so weak. During the rain, it just leaks through and sometimes the roofs collapse.”  
*Omar, aged 16, was displaced from Ghoryian District to Nawadabad in Herat Province.*

### 3 Food Needs: Quality and Quantity

**Access to food** is a major and ever-present concern for many IDPs in both rural and urban areas. IDPs, like other Afghans, have a right to adequate food in terms of quantity and quality. However, IDPs struggle to find regular and sufficient employment, making it difficult for them to meet their most basic food needs. Many are forced into negative coping strategies that reduce the quality and quantity of food intake. Our data looks into IDPs' access to food of a self-identified sufficient quality and quantity. IDPs identify access to food as a top protection priority given that a third of respondents reported being often or mostly unable to satisfy their households' food needs, with over two thirds (almost 70% of respondents) claiming that they were sometimes unable to meet their food needs.<sup>76</sup> Field observations further confirmed high levels of malnutrition among both adults and children.

Inability to meet basic food needs is particularly worrying when one considers that the vast majority of IDP households are spending over three quarters of their in-


come on food, with over half spending above 90 per cent (Graph 10). A high household allocation towards food expenses is a strong indicator for income-poverty and suggests that employment levels and incomes are insufficiently providing for household consumption needs.

### Coping Strategies

IDPs' inability to meet their food needs forced them to resort to several coping strategies, the most common of which are shown in Graph 11.

No correlation was found between food needs and coping strategies and the duration of displacement and type of environment, indicating that insufficient access to quality food is a widespread issue for all IDPs. Overall, 57.6 per cent of households reported reducing the quality of food they consume, while 52.5 per cent reduced the quantity.


**Graph 10. Percentage of Households' Monthly Income Spent on Food**



"We have a need for everything here. It is surprising to me that life is so difficult here. I thought that life in the city would be easier, but it is much harder. It is harder to find money here to buy food than it was in Qaysar. In Qaysar, we were always fed without a problem and it was good. Here, we work and work and look for work and still can't afford to buy food. We need food." *Mari, aged 30, was displaced from Qaysar District to Maimana city in Faryab Province in early 2011*

"We need oil, rice, milk, everything. We have nothing here. The money we have goes to rent and everything else is no longer necessary, including food. My children go hungry because of this. This little girl in front of me goes hungry. She is so sick, and I think it is because she does not have food. It is terrible." *Sophya, aged 18, was displaced from Qaysar District to Maimana city in Faryab Province in 2011.*

**Graph 11. Most Common Food Coping Strategies**



As many as 34.8 per cent of respondents had not eaten for several days previously, raising grave human rights concerns. IDPs who were displaced in 2012 reported the same levels of food needs as those who were displaced 20 years ago. IDPs in prolonged displacement, therefore, lacked the adaptive advantages they are often believed to possess. Closer examination of the data reveals important differences: urban and peri-urban IDPs were 46 per cent more likely to restrict adult food consumption in order for small children to eat. Given that intra-provincial household sizes differed little, this may be due to urban and semi-rural families' lower monthly incomes.

Limited monthly incomes, accompanied by rising food prices<sup>77</sup>, contribute to IDPs' experiences of chronic food shortages. For instance, in January 2009, IRIN reported that most IDPs in Kabul's Charahi Qambar makeshift camp suffered from significant food and water shortages.<sup>78</sup> Two years later, our field teams observed that IDPs in prolonged displacement still lacked adequate access to quality food.

## Water


Approximately a third of IDPs reported access to water as one of the primary issues facing their households, noting water sources were severely limited, of low quality and the cause of disputes with neighbours. IDPs living in urban areas were more likely than rural and semi-rural families to utilise public hand pumps and wells while rural IDPs are more likely to be able to access rivers, lakes and canals.

These limited water sources resulted in occasional disputes between IDPs and host communities as well as other IDP communities forced to share the same

public hand pumps. In Charahi Qambar informal settlement, where hundreds of families share a handful of sometimes faulty water pumps, there have been several reported violent clashes between Pashto- and Farsi-speaking IDP communities. Respondents who shared scarce water resources with host communities sometimes reported incidents of violent disputes, especially between children, who are typically tasked with fetching water. IDPs also described the low quality of the water available to their families and ensuing health hazards. 97 per cent of IDPs reported not having access to safe drinking water (compared to 74 per cent nationally), revealing acute vulnerabilities regarding not only water access, but also the quality of the water available to IDPs.

"I'm spending five Afghanis for a small amount of water and I don't even know anything about where the water comes from. Tanks just come and bring the water. Is it halal? Is it dirty? I don't know, but I don't have a choice to know anymore." *Sharifa, aged 28, was displaced from Helmand to Kabul by conflict in 2007.*

"A year ago, when my son was bringing water for us, the other kids – this neighbour you talk about [referring to host community] – were hitting them with slingshots and rocks ... so one of these boys threw a large rock at him with the slingshot. His arm is useless now; it is crooked and I do not have enough money to take him to the doctor... I do not want him to go there though the other children go sometimes, I think. Now he walks thirty minutes away to go another village for water. We have to get up early and wait until 7 am to get water." *Mullah Mohdeen, aged 53, was displaced by conflict to Nawadabad Village in Herat Province in 2011.*



# 4. Protection challenges and durable solutions

In addition to the self-identified protection priorities outlined in the previous chapter, there is a range of other protection concerns requiring serious attention. In order to cover a more comprehensive range of protection issues, this study supplemented the self-identified “top 3” protection priorities with rigorous identification of protection concerns by field teams. These protection challenges combine major protection concerns identified by trained fieldworkers (such as rates of violence against women) and during desk review or key informant interviews. It is important to identify and carefully assess where links can be made between specific or heightened protection concerns and internal displacement, in order to help determine the best humanitarian, development or joint response required.

The key protection challenges covered in this chapter relate to:

1. violence against women (VAW)
2. child protection
3. health
4. documentation
5. secure environments (physical security, host community relations, justice and political representation).

It is important to note that these concerns are closely interlinked with the protection priorities highlighted in Chapter 3 (employment, HLP and food). IDP protection response requires a holistic approach that is mindful of how protection concerns impact on each other.

## 1 Violence Against Women

Although the study does not identify a direct link between VAW and displacement, findings suggest that displacement itself can greatly increase women’s vulnerabilities to VAW. Displaced women are more likely to be socially isolated and to lack traditional protective mechanisms. Analysis of qualitative data also revealed that displaced women and girls’ increased economic vulnerabilities not only places them at a higher risk of, for instance, prostitution and forced marriages, but also typically leaves them without the resources to seek assistance. Within

the broad conception of VAW, this section will look into the issues of domestic violence, targeted marriages and severe cases of IDP vulnerabilities to VAW.

Charged to explore the possible link between displacement and VAW, the study’s findings were unfortunately limited by:

- cultural sensitivities and reluctance to report VAW, leading to complications in attempts to collect and analyse data
- unavailability of VAW data for comparison to the national or non-displaced populations in order to explore its potential link to displacement.

### Box 4. Defining Violence Against Women

This study relied primarily on the definition of VAW contained in the UN *Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women* (1993): “any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.” The VAW portion of the quantitative study was composed of questions asked of all females interviewed. Our limited investigation into VAW is only a starting point, highlighting the need for further explorations of this acutely sensitive topic in Afghanistan.

## Domestic Violence

Almost two thirds (64.1 per cent) of female respondents reported domestic violence during displacement, with nearly a third (32.4 per cent) reporting that it occurred often, very often or every day. Of these women, 12.6 per cent noted that domestic violence occurred more often during displacement. Women indicated that their husbands were “more stressed” during displacement, and this could lead to either increased or decreased

“Our men don’t hit us...because we don’t have money. Why should we fight? There is nothing to fight over. He has nothing. I have nothing.”

26-year-old Sara from Helmand

domestic violence. An IDP who was displaced in 2010, for instance, explained that the men of the community were put under greater pressure by displacement.

“We all have more problems at home with our husbands, I think that’s fair to say. But they are under a lot of pressure, so I understand that they get nervous more easily. It is not easy living here because we don’t know how long we can stay here. There is pressure on the men but they don’t realise that there is more pressure on us! At least they get to go out”.

*Shaharзад, 20, was displaced to Kandahar in 2011.*

While propensity for displaced men to use violence remains anecdotal, reported domestic violence rates among IDP women are high: 55.4 per cent recount having directly suffered from verbal harassment and 42.9 per cent from physical beatings (Graph 13). Our findings further suggest low levels of sexual violence, though this trend is inconclusive given various social limitations that may discourage reporting of sexual harassment, abuse or exploitation. Women were asked both if they had personally experienced VAW and if they knew it existed in their community. When the question was generalised to the community women were more likely to report a higher prevalence of VAW perhaps due to an inhibition against speaking to strangers about personal events.


The extent of domestic violence in Afghanistan is unknown, but it is generally believed to be high.<sup>79</sup>

## Forced Marriages

Field observations showed a clear relation between displacement and an increase in the number of forced and early marriages. This is linked to two phenomena. Firstly, IDPs, typically more impoverished and vulnerable than non-displaced populations, may rely on dowries as a source of household income to meet their basic needs. The survey showed that at least one child had been forced to marry in 26.9 per cent of surveyed IDP households. This is especially the case for female-headed households. The absence of an adult male significantly increases their economic vulnerability, and therefore the need to rely on other sources of revenues such as early marriages. Several women interviewed expressed feelings of community victimisation, mothers noting they felt their daughters were targeted for low-cost marriage by outsiders who had heard that poor IDP s had arrived and would accept low levels of bride-price.

“We do it out of hunger for our children. In Ghoryian, it was not needed as often as it is needed here. I gave her away. I gave her away because I needed. [Her husband] found us ... these people come from all over to people like us. They came because they knew refugees were here and they know our daughters are cheap.” *Marina, aged 35, was displaced from Herat’s Ghoryian District in early 2011 and has not seen her daughter since she married.*

**Graph 13. Most Commonly Reported VAW Acts**



## Severe Cases: Drugs, Prostitution and Social Isolation

IDP women's increased social isolation in their locations of displacement can further make them more vulnerable to VAW, drug use and prostitution. IDP females under 18 years of age, 21.9 per cent of whom were reported as not being allowed to leave their homes, lack outlets outside of the home to receive assistance. While IDP adult females were typically reported as being authorised to leave their homes either alone (41.3 per cent) or if accompanied (52.1 per cent), it is unclear how often women actually leave their homes and their freedom outside of the home to seek assistance. Although social isolation cannot be reduced to the physical ability to leave one's house, this remains a strong indicator of isolation in Afghanistan.

While a direct link between displacement and VAW was not established by the quantitative component of this study, it is, nonetheless, clear that displacement increases women's vulnerabilities to VAW. IDP women are uprooted from their communities, sometimes leaving them without adequate social protection, into new areas where they have less access to assistance. It is thus often difficult to reach IDP women and girls who need protection. Outside assistance, particularly from international humanitarian actors, can be met with resistance from community members, potentially increasing risks for beneficiaries. Assistance is most sustainable and feasible – albeit difficult – when localised, an approach that should guide VAW programming. The difficulties associated with addressing VAW issues, such as access and cultural barriers, should not be used as an excuse for inaction as they can be (and have been) overcome by dedicated programming and a localised, holistic approach.

## 2 Child Protection

Child protection remains a pressing concern. Available studies do not fully capture the extent of IDP children's protection needs. As with VAW data, this study was faced with two primary challenges: a cultural tendency to under-report child protection issues, such as child labour, and a lack of clarity over the definition of a child. Therefore this report provides only a partial look into IDP children's protection needs as it discusses access to education, child labour and early and forced marriages.

### Box 5. Lacking Traditional Social Protective Mechanisms

Afghan society emphasises traditional, family-based structures. Afghan women and girls rely on close male relatives to act in their best interest, including protection from unwanted and early marriages and abusive relationships. Decades of conflict have taken a toll on the Afghan family, with many families left without fathers or brothers. As noted above, our sample included a higher number of widows (19.3 per cent of all female IDPs interviewed) than the national average, suggesting that such families often lacked traditional protection. Such households can leave women vulnerable to VAW, as shown in the following case studies:

Roya, aged 19, lost her father in childhood as conflict spilled over into her village in Faryab Province. Her mother soon remarried, leaving Roya and her three brothers under the care of an unrelated friend in Maimana city. Roya's new caretaker soon arranged a marriage for her. "It was not forced, but it was also not my choice. I did not know what was happening. I was not involved. When I got older, I decided that I did not want to marry him." Roya has since broken off the engagement, but consistently suffers reprisal sexual and physical harassment and regular beatings from her caretaker. Roya is constantly being pressured into marrying one of her caretaker's nephews and cannot count on protection from her brothers as they have become opium addicts. "I'm scared. My aunts come and tell my [caretaker] that, if I don't get engaged soon, someone will kill me."

"When I was seven years old, I was sold for 30,000 Afghanis (\$600). No one called it being 'sold,' but that is what it was." 17-year-old Shazia was engaged against her will to a man who regularly beats her. Two of his brothers beat their fiancés, but both women managed to break off the engagement. "Their fathers broke off the engagement without a big problem, but my father is dead and can't give me that protection." After approaching her fiancé with her desire to break off the engagement, Shazia has since run away to a women's shelter. "He still calls ... and I am afraid of going back [home] in case he finds out and then tries to take me away so I don't leave again."

## Access to education

IDPs often lamented that their children’s educational needs – and the right to education – were unmet during displacement. While most IDP children attended either a formal or community-based school (53.4 per cent and 5.5 per cent, respectively), more than a third of IDP children lacked access to education primarily because the community lacked a school (65.3 per cent).

Without funds and space to build a school, Nangarhar’s IDP community in the village of Farm Ada, were forced to provide informal education to over a hundred girls in the open air. Female students regularly fainted, unable to concentrate in the summer heat without water.

Our qualitative data revealed that IDP children generally attend school at rates similar to national averages (which place primary school enrolment at 52 per cent in 2007/2008).<sup>80</sup> Our findings indicated that the vast majority of families with school-attending children (96.9 per cent) allowed their girls to also attend school. This is a significant finding when compared to girls’ enrolment rates at the national level, which is regularly some ten per cent below the national average for children of primary school age.<sup>81</sup> Our data suggests that IDP families are typically more willing to allow their female children to attend school than the rest of the Afghan population. It is important to note, however, the distinction between school enrolment and attendance, which was not fully captured in the present study. Amnesty International has reported high levels of IDP absenteeism,<sup>82</sup> which suggests access to education should not be addressed


through formal enrolment only. Other constraints restricting attendance and completion such as child labour, dropping-out, early marriage and discrimination should also be addressed.

Qualitative interviews revealed that teachers and non-displaced students regularly tease those IDP children whose families are unable to buy them shoes, required schoolbooks and stationery. IDPs complained their children were unwelcome in formal school systems and often did not want to attend school as a result.

Discrimination against IDP children may not be formalised by educators but does indicate the acute vulnerability of IDP children within the education system. A classroom offers a space to address several multiple protection concerns but must, at the very least, ensure that children are protected from discrimination within its own walls.

“One of my boys stopped playing with the other children. He said that they would bully him ... he is alone a lot. He is very quiet now. He never used to be like that. My girls also come home crying sometimes because they are teased because of their old clothes ... One of my girls stayed home from school for weeks because the other kids pulled her hair and made fun of her shoes. They tried to take her scarf off and they called her poor. She was so ashamed that she didn’t go for a few weeks. Now, she is going again but she comes home every day and says it is the last day. But we make her go because it is an education.” Sadafgul has eight children, four of whom attend school.

**Graph 14. Reported Reasons Children Do Not Attend School**



## Child Labour


Given their often desperate economic situation, many IDP families choose to send their children to work instead of school, thus denying them the fundamental right to education set out in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Child labour, while not a protection concern in and of itself, becomes one when it violates children's rights. Not only is child labour a complex subject to assess on the ground but it can also be difficult to distinguish when it qualifies as a protection concern. It is not easily translatable when many families do not consider gathering plastic bags to sell or begging as 'child labour.'<sup>83</sup> We are thus conscious that our findings that 12.2 per cent of children work is likely to be an under-estimate.

The NRVA for 2007/2008 estimates child labour rates at 18 per cent, but notably utilises a broader definition of child labour that incorporates six to 15-year-olds, whereas this study's definition did not include those over 14 years of age.<sup>84</sup> Child labour that was reported and which fits the criteria for this study takes many forms (Graph 15), each of which poses particular risks and dangers to children. These included:

- Children engaged in street vending (36 per cent of those in work) are particularly susceptible to violence, kidnapping and car accidents. Children who work on the street without protection are extremely vulnerable.
- Sixteen per cent are engaged in agriculture / livestock. Traditionally, Afghan children have often contributed to their family's livelihoods through working with land and animals. Today, most IDPs are no longer independent agricultural producers but instead employees. Children can be subjected to harsh working conditions. Additionally, such work is seasonal and unpredictable.
- The 12 per cent working in construction are particularly vulnerable to work-related accidents, and are typically engaged in physically demanding labour. Such children can also face health risks, including musculoskeletal and respiratory problems.<sup>85</sup>
- An additional 21 per cent are engaged in such low-skill urban daily labour as scavenging plastic bags, selling ice cream and washing cars.

IDP children are further engaged in other unremunerated and often hazardous activities. Our research revealed that IDP children were typically responsible for fetching water for their families from wells, hand pumps and natural water sources, often at a significant distance from their place of residence. This can make children vulnerable to violence and conflict over inadequate water resources. This physically demanding, time consuming

Graph 15. Sectors of Child Labour



19-year-old Jamila was displaced to Maimana city after local militia commanders began forcibly recruiting young men and boys. Soon afterwards she was forced into a *badal* marriage. Her brother, who married her husband's sister, soon learned that his new wife and brother-in-law had had an incestuous relationship. Jamila was soon divorced at the age of 11. By the age of 12, she was forcibly married again to a man who soon began to beat her and sodomise her, oblivious to her protests. He has broken her hand, hurt her back, and beaten her with wooden sticks. She has since escaped to her parental home, where she has been living for a year as she tries to separate from her husband.

Our field team also spoke to a woman displaced in 2009 to Bagrami settlement in Kabul. Though reluctant to talk, she eventually explained that her husband had died several years previously and that her 16-year-old son is now the head of the family. After being first displaced to Pakistan, her son – then about ten years old – developed severe anger management problems and began to beat his mother in frustration at her refusal to pay for a long-planned marriage to a nine-year-old girl. His mother, the sole breadwinner in a family of four, endures her son's beatings so that the pre-pubescent girl will not be forced into marriage.

task is often prioritised over schooling and other child protection needs. While this coping mechanism allows adult family members to dedicate more time for income generating activities, the impact on children's educa-



tion and futures is a major concern. Our findings show how child labour has a serious impact on IDP children's education, health and safety. All forms of child labour must be acknowledged and addressed by policymakers despite the definitional challenges.

### Early and Forced Marriages


Female IDP children were particularly susceptible to early and/or forced marriages with 35.7 per cent of families reporting that at least one girl under the age of 16 was married during displacement. An additional 26.6 per cent of female children were forced to marry against their wills. Girls with few options and social protections lacked options, leaving them vulnerable to the household's need for a brideprice, community pressures to marry and, sometimes, a family's inability to feed a child incapable of contributing to the family's income. Our qualitative fieldwork suggested that occurrences of badal (a traditional practice involving the exchange marriage of two siblings to two other siblings from another family) increased during displacement. Respondents reported that less than a quarter of their families experienced badals. Badals, which may be arranged at birth, leave children vulnerable to early and forced marriages.

### 3 Health

IDPs generally live in overcrowded dwellings where lack of food, potable water and sanitation facilities has adverse effects on their health. Access to quality health-care facilities is thus an important protection need, deeply interconnected with related concerns such as VAW or child labour.

Our findings indicate that despite the associated hurdles (including transportation and health care costs) IDPs often sought professional medical assistance. Most of the IDPs who reported having a household member who was sick or injured in the previous three months (79.4 per cent) indicated that they sought treatment at a clinic or mobile clinic (43.5 per cent) or hospital (29 per cent) (Graph 16). Less than three per cent of respondents with a sick household member reported not seeking treatment. Many IDPs – generally regardless of their province and location type – reported that the nearest clinic or hospital was more than an hour away (44.3 per cent), much higher than the national average which indicates that only 15 per cent of those surveyed did not have access to a health facility within an hour's distance. Although the survey did not explore the types of health

**Graph 16: Type of Medical Care Used (over the last three months)**



### Box 6. Cold 2011-2012 Winter for IDP Children

Their poor housing conditions and poverty make IDPs vulnerable to winter cold. The death of at least a hundred IDP infants and children in informal settlements in Kabul during the winter of 2011-12 sparked international media attention.<sup>87</sup> IDP protection actors in places like Charahi Qambar were unable to provide warm clothes or charcoal, leaving young children without adequate resources or healthcare. Aid and attention to these relatively high visibility IDP children arrived too late for many. This is particularly alarming, given that these IDPs receive much more aid than their counterparts in less accessible provinces such as Kandahar. The impacts of cold need to be taken into consideration as a major protection concern.

“[W]e went to the clinic the day before. My husband was already [also] very sick. I do not know why. [My infant son] would cough up a lot of blood. They gave us medicine, but he still died. He was cold.” *Shehzeen, 25, who was displaced from Helmand to Kabul, lost her son during the winter of 2011-12.*

care problems that respondents sought medical attention for (and for which they did not), findings suggest that although IDPs have relatively low access to health care compared to the national average, they seem to prioritise the need to seek medical treatment whenever feasible. This is an interesting finding in light of the fact that access to affordable healthcare did not figure atop IDPs' expressed priorities.

“[W]e have no options. We go to the clinic nearby, but they can’t see everyone or they give us the same medicine for every problem we have. Any problem we have. They never give us any help. It’s always the same answer.” *Wazhma, aged 25, was displaced from Sangeen District in Helmand to Charahi Qambar informal settlement in Kabul in 2010.*

Respondents often seek medical attention but criticise available health services. IDPs explained that they often felt their trips to the clinics were ineffective, expressing the belief that medical personnel prescribed the same medication for all illnesses.

### Psychological and Mental Health Needs

Our data does not suggest a significant difference between the reported mental health needs of conflict and natural disaster-induced IDPs. Psychological support is particularly required for conflict-induced IDPs who have often directly witnessed or otherwise experienced violence in addition to the potential trauma of displacement itself. Young children are particularly vulnerable. Overall, 35.2 per cent of respondents indicated that they themselves or members of their households needed some kind of psychological assistance (see Graph 17).

It is generally believed that accounts of mental illness in Afghanistan are under-reported. When disaggregated by gender, our findings indicate more willingness on the part of female respondents to receive psychological support for both themselves (76.7 per cent) and their family members. Despite the apparent need for psychological

support, less than five per cent of IDPs reported receiving any post-displacement counselling.

### 4 Documentation

It is generally believed that the proportion of IDPs possessing the national ID card (known as a *tazkera*) is lower


“I’m still afraid from Kunar, that what happened there will happen here. The fear came with me here.” *Aged five, Nazwali was displaced from Kunar to Nangarhar province. He hopes to move to Jalalabad city and become a construction engineer.*

than the national average and that IDPs face special challenges in obtaining one. However, our quantitative findings based on IDPs’ testimony suggest otherwise:

- Most IDPs (64.4 per cent) interviewed had a *tazkera*. There were marked differences by gender (Graph 18).
- Non-possession of a *tazkera* was only marginally related to displacement but instead reflects a nation-wide systemic vulnerability.
- Most IDPs believed that they could obtain a *tazkera* in their province of origin. This is problematic given insecurity in areas of origin
- Of the IDPs who did not have a *tazkera*, many felt that it had no effect on their daily lives (47.8 per cent).

Most IDP households surveyed had at least one member with a *tazkera*. It is important to note here that the definition of a *tazkera* is not always understood by IDPs. The official state-issued document specifies such identifiers as the holder’s province of origin. Our fieldwork revealed

**Graph 17. Do you think you / members of your household need psychological support?**



that some IDPs held other forms of documentation they misconceived as a formal *tazkera*. It is possible that our data that almost two thirds of IDPs have a *tazkera* is higher than the actual number. Among those who did not have a *tazkera*, 88.2 per cent explained that they had never had one while only 3.4 per cent reported having lost it during displacement. The lack of *tazkera* is therefore not a direct result of displacement but rather a general problem of lack of documentation in Afghan society.

Men are much more likely to have a *tazkera* than women (83.4 per cent versus 18.2 per cent). This is not as grave as it initially appears as in Afghanistan it is common for women to access state services provided she has a close male relative with a *tazkera*. There are regional variations, respondents in Kabul being more likely to have a *tazkera* (72.9 per cent) than those in Herat (50 per cent). Notably, the duration of displacement and type of location in displacement was not a significant factor in whether IDPs were more or less likely to have *tazkeras*.

Our qualitative data indicated that most IDPs correctly believed that they could attain a *tazkera* in their province of displacement, despite legitimate concerns from stakeholders that IDPs can and have been denied documentation in their sites of refuge. This suggests a lack of clarity from authorities and IDPs' uncertainty about how to obtain one. IDPs are sometimes told that they must return to their province of origin (regardless of the security situation) in order to obtain a *tazkera*: such was the case for eight respondents. This raises serious protection concerns and contradicts principle 15 (d) of the *Guiding Principles* which provides protection against


forcible return to any place where life and safety would be at risk.

Many IDPs further believed that the cost of the *tazkera*, 20 Afghanis (less than \$0.5), was higher, with one IDP saying that *tazkeras* cost thousands of Afghanis. Those who did not misconceive the *tazkera's* cost explained that their families did not prioritise acquiring one because of the additional travel costs incurred.

Of the IDPs lacking a *tazkera*, most felt that this had few consequences. Around half of IDPs (47.8 per cent) noted that, in their view, the absence of the *tazkera* had no effect on their daily lives. Only a limited number reported that it constrained their movements (13.6 per cent) ten percent that it impeded access to formal education, 8.1 per cent that it reduced job opportunities and 7.9 per cent that it exposed them to harassment from local authorities.. Although officially a *tazkera* is required for school enrolment, informants reported being able to circumvent this proviso and to enrol their children.

The majority of IDPs who did not have a *tazkera* during displacement never had one. It is possible that such IDPs lack full understanding of the possible difference ownership of a *tazkera* would make. Their perception may therefore not indicate the real impact of the lack of documentation on their daily lives. Without ID, IDPs cannot benefit from land allocation schemes (LAS), gain employment in certain types of skilled labour, nor vote in national elections. It should be noted that due to multiple constraints (such as awareness of LAS, lack of skills and lack of means to buy land) IDPs without ID do not consider these documentation-related obstacles as major issues.

**Graph 18. Tazkera Ownership by Gender**



The extent of IDP participation in electoral processes was not specifically addressed through this research. In the build-up to the next presidential elections the issue is important, yet IDPs did not raise it as a specific concern. Additional research is needed to understand the voting intentions and behaviours of IDP households, disaggregated by duration of displacement, location and gender. As there are at least 400,000 IDPs they constitute an important electoral bloc and should be included in programmes to boost voter registration. The fact that only 18.2 per cent of women IDPs hold a *tazkera* is an important gender issue in a country where reaching out to women and including them in electoral processes has proven challenging.

## 5 Secure environments: Physical Security, Host Community Relations, Justice and Political Representation

### *Sources of Physical security*

A 2010 study asserted that IDPs often rely on local warlords and other armed actors to ensure physical security in their places of displacement where their unfamiliarity and vulnerable status may put them at special risk of targeted violence. Our study found that most IDPs (95 per cent) reported feeling physically secure in their places of displacement and most did not seek protection at all (80.8 per cent). Those who did rely on strategies to ensure their physical security were far more likely to seek protection from the local police (66.9 per cent) than other sources, such as powerful government officials (22.1 per cent) or anti-government groups (1.1 per cent). IDPs were thus typically able to ensure their physical security without outside assistance or protection.

Sampling limitations should be noted. Our field teams did not visit insecure areas nor explore protection of civilians from armed conflict or forced recruitment of minors. Our sample of mainly secure areas indicates that generally IDPs enjoy overall positive relationships with host communities.


### *IDPs' Relationship with Host Communities*

Many of those within the aid community and state institutions contend that IDP influxes strain the host community's resources, thereby engendering tension. Understanding the perspectives of displacement-affected host

communities is vital in order to acknowledge the important role host communities often play in contributing to the protection of IDPs. Policymakers should particularly note the need to frame responses to internal displacement in urban areas without alienating host communities.

Our quantitative findings indicate that, despite the extra burden, nearly all IDPs felt host communities were typically very welcoming or welcoming (96.6 per cent), noting that host communities often treated them kindly (85.5 per cent), did not insult (71 per cent) or assault them (56.9 per cent), occasionally lent them money (18.1 per cent) or shared their water resources (21.9 per cent). IDPs who interacted with members of host communities by, for instance, going to the same market or living as neighbours, generally indicated positive relationships. Interestingly, this did not vary with the duration of displacement, the province of displacement or even the type of location.

**Graph 19. IDP - Host Community Relations**



Focus groups with host communities confirmed IDPs' perceptions of cordiality. Host respondents also felt their relationship with IDPs was positive. However, host communities recognised IDP presence as a strain on the community's resources and noted a level of "assistance fatigue," requesting outside help for IDPs because the IDPs were a strain on their resources. Their tolerance of IDPs, and their own expressed needs, further highlight the need for policy responses which factor in the protection and other assistance needs of both IDPs and their hosts.

While relationships with the nearby host community appeared positive, relationships with and perceptions of the greater host community (at the city or provincial level) appeared more negative. IDPs often explained that they felt "unwanted" by provincial authorities, noting further that they were discriminated against by employers and

authorities. Thus, IDPs generally have positive relationships with their immediate host communities but feel unwelcomed by authorities.

### Political Representation and Justice

This perceived feeling of exclusion may be related to the IDPs' low level of political representation and their mar-

“I said before that our perception is good about the IDPs and I said that if we were able to help we would do it. When they were coming here we helped them very much and also now they are living with us. We are helping them, they are coming to the mosque and talk about their problems and we get together to help them and we know them as a part of our society ... I think the IDPs' community has an impact on local peoples' lives, for example, if there are too many people in the community there would be many people in the clinic and at that time the quality of the medicine will be less, and also the price of the medicine will rise.”

*Host community leader, Kandahar*

ginalisation. Groups lacking adequate political representation are at risk of discrimination and marginalisation. Our findings show that most IDPs:

- understood they were entitled to vote (91.2 per cent)
- understood that they did not need to return to their province of origin in order to vote (83.3 per cent)
- feel they are still not represented in local political institutions (58.4 per cent).

It is significant that IDPs understand their right to vote, yet few are represented in the political arena. Our study could not capture whether this lack of representation was due to a lack of trying or discrimination. It is clear that even if aware of their right to political representation, IDPs do not have a sense of ownership of local political institutions. Most local issues are therefore discussed and decisions made without IDP input.


Our findings show interesting differences between the political understanding of IDP men and women. Women are more likely to believe they are legitimately disenfranchised (14.5 per cent vs. 4.6 per cent of men). IDP women were also more likely to be unaware of whether or not their communities were politically represented. Over 60 per cent of women said they did not know whether their communities had political representation, as compared to only 20 per cent of men (Graph 20).

In terms of access to justice, IDPs – like non-displaced Afghans – typically prefer to seek informal justice (74.9 per cent), indicative of traditional nation-wide preferences for intra-community systems of conflict resolution. Only 5.2 per cent reported seeking justice through formal or national systems, of whom 40.4 per cent thought their case was treated appropriately. Of those who did use formal justice 36.8 per cent believed national institutions discriminated against them because of their displacement. This perception of being discriminated against explains their reluctance to engage with formal justice systems, perhaps further compounding their marginalisation.

While IDPs generally have positive relationships among themselves and with their hosts, tensions and conflicts due to resource limitations and ethnic discrimination can arise. IDPs' preferred use of informal justice systems and their lack of political representation can leave the most vulnerable – such as women and members of ethnic minorities – beholden to the more powerful.

### IDP Perceptions of Assistance

Humanitarian and government actors have developed a variety of programmes and policies attempting to directly or indirectly address the protection issues laid out in Chapters 2 and 3, and many have successfully provided assistance to IDPs in Afghanistan. This section will review humanitarian emergency assistance and beneficiaries' perceptions of it. It is the most significant type of assistance provided: approximately 44 per cent of respondents reported having received assistance during displacement, with the biggest single type being emergency assistance (40 per cent) (Graph 21).



## Box 7. IDPs' Relationship with other nearby IDP communities

While conflict and natural disaster-induced IDPs are typically displaced alongside their families and neighbours, some areas of settlement include mixed, unrelated IDP communities. This is the case among IDPs in prolonged displacement in Herat's Maslakh Camp. Community leaders interviewed wanted full representation for the various ethnic groups present in the camp, noting that there were over ten leaders in the camp itself. The camp had an organised, internal political system representing several diverse, unrelated IDP communities.

On the other hand, ethnic-based tensions between IDP community members were apparent in both Charahi Qambar and Bagrami settlements in Kabul Province. Charahi Qambar, where Tajik and Pashtun IDP communities live side by side, has witnessed several clashes over limited water resources. Pashtun IDPs said clashes arose three to four times a year between the two ethnic communities. In Bagrami settlement, the Pashtuns marginalised the Tajik minority by not only forcing them to move to the outskirts of the IDP settlement adjacent to the host community but also by impeding aid delivery to them.

"Most of the Tajiks are not allowed to live here with the Pashtuns in the tents here. They won't accept us and we have to go to find other places to live. Our lives do not have a problem because we are women; it is because we do not speak Pashto. As if we do not need as much help. We need more help because we do not get any." Nadia, 37, a Tajik IDP resident of Bagrami. While speaking to her, our field team was criticised by the local Pashtun leader and told not to speak to the Tajiks.

Nadia noted that previous aid deliveries to Bagrami did not reach her. The control of aid delivery by local leaders, who did not always distribute aid fairly among IDPs, is alarming.

The assistance addressed IDPs' self-perceived protection priorities to a limited degree. Support around issues concerning housing, land and property (HLP) and employment were the second and third most common type of assistance received but lagged far behind emergency assistance. Less than ten per cent of IDPs received employment or HLP-related assistance, compared to the 40 per cent who received emergency food, water or

transportation aid. Assistance that was received was often unsustainable, leaving IDPs' priority protection needs generally unmet.


*"Before this project, we had nothing. After this ends, we will have nothing." 72-year-old Zymoon commenting on a short-term employment programme.*

Unmet needs were particularly evident among certain IDPs. Those in prolonged displacement were 25 per cent more likely to have received assistance than newly displaced IDPs (64.9 per cent versus 39.7 per cent). Urban and semi-rural respondents were more likely to have received assistance than their rural counterparts, only 31.2 per cent of whom reported having received assistance during displacement (as compared to 47.6 per cent and 53.8 per cent of urban and semi-rural respondents). The most significant difference in who did and did not reportedly receive aid was found between the provinces of Kabul and Kandahar, with only 23 respondents in Kandahar having received aid. This amounted to only 11.3 per cent of total respondents in Kandahar, an insignificant figure both absolutely and in comparison to other provinces, such as Kabul, where 94.5 per cent of respondents reported having received aid. Given that most assistance was provided by international organisations (89.7 per cent) who are generally constrained from operating extensively in insecure provinces, this is hardly surprising. This finding highlights the need to continue searching for means to expand access, a need widely acknowledged by humanitarian actors.

Our findings indicate both appreciation of the assistance received and criticism about its short-term (or, sometimes even just once-off) nature. IDPs commented that the assistance they received did not help them in the long-term.

## Conclusion

Wherever they are found, and regardless of their gender or length of displacement, IDPs have clearly indicated their three major protection priorities (employment, food and water and housing). A range of further protection concerns, not necessarily voiced by IDPs themselves, were identified through field observations and qualitative fieldwork: violence against women, child protection, health, documentation and security. Analysis of IDP protection needs shows the existence of two groups of particular concern: women (at heightened risk of violence, particularly widows) and children (for whom dis-



placement brings increased risks of child labour, early and forced marriages and limited access to education.). Women and children reported higher demands for mental and psychological support than male IDPs.

The focus on emergency assistance to IDPs fails to address a range of specific protection issues, including the primary concerns of employment and HLP-related problems. Delivery is often hit-and-miss. Some IDPs, particularly in the south, receive only marginal assistance, while particularly vulnerable populations, women and children, do not receive the specific assistance they need.

### Durable Solutions

According to the IASC's *Framework for Durable Solutions*, "a durable solution is achieved when internally displaced persons no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement".<sup>90</sup>

In Afghanistan, as elsewhere, the search for durable solutions must be at the heart of all interventions. It is essential to consider IDPs' intentions and perspectives, without which programmes to promote durable solutions cannot succeed.<sup>91</sup> The *Framework* sets out eight criteria to determine to what extent a durable solution has been achieved: safety and security; adequate standard of living; access to livelihoods; restoration of housing, land and property; access to documentation; family reunification; participation in public affairs; and access to effective remedies and justice.

Our respondents were asked about their return intentions and expectations and conducive conditions to enable return. The results were revealing and are of considerable significance in light of current efforts to promote return over and above other possible solutions, thus – in violation of *The Guiding Principles* – making return "the single, de facto durable solution".<sup>92</sup>

### Local integration as a Durable Solution

The vast majority of respondents (76.2 per cent) hope to settle permanently in their current location. This provides conclusive support to the internationally recognised need (codified in *The Guiding Principles*) to allow and facilitate displaced populations to pursue local integration as a durable solution. The Government of Afghanistan is not the only state prioritising or privileging return and reintegration as the only possible solution to displacement.<sup>93</sup>

"Let our grandfathers stay there (in their graves). We have no reason to go back."

The graph below shows the self-identified protection priorities of respondents hoping to settle permanently in their place of displacement.

Four points are of particular importance:

1. Among the range of concerns that need to be addressed to facilitate a durable local integration are: employment, access to basic services, housing/shelter and land issues and access to sufficient food and clean water.

“The conflict there may not be permanent, it may end soon, but we can’t go back because it only takes one incident to lose all our children. We have seen it and don’t want to risk it anymore, so we will stay here.”  
*Nazgul, aged 20, was displaced to Kandahar.*

2. There are key similarities between integration concerns and the protection priorities identified by all respondents – prioritising un/underemployment and access to food, housing and land. This further underscores the need for better policies and programming.
3. Those preferring local integration suffer less from un/underemployment (55.1 per cent as opposed to 76.3 per cent) than other respondents who are more likely to want to pursue alternative solutions, including return.
4. IDPs may not rank lack of ID as a priority but policy designers should reconsider the importance of ensuring wider access to formal documentation, particularly for women.

### Return as a Durable Solution

Findings clearly demonstrated that the majority of respondents (76.2 per cent) preferred local integration, settlement in their current location. Only 23.3 per cent (Graph 23) expressed a preference for returning to their pre-displacement location or other area of prior resi-

### Box 8. Four Core Conditions for a Durable Solution


In considering return, local integration and return elsewhere as possible durable solutions for IDPs it is necessary to take note of the core criteria for a durable solution set out in the IASC framework:

- long-term safety, security and freedom of movement
- adequate standard of living
- access to employment and livelihoods
- access to effective mechanisms that restore their housing, land and property or provide compensation.

These criteria are particularly difficult to address in Afghanistan, a country where even a non-displaced person often does not benefit from an adequate standard of living and long-term security. Policymakers and other actors have limited ability to guarantee that any perceived durable solution will provide a displaced person with long-term security. Furthermore, with diverse (and sometimes informal) land ownership traditions, confirming proof of ownership in order to restore property or provide displaced people with compensation, is often highly problematic.

dence. The findings clearly demonstrate that urban IDPs are less interested in return as a solution: 40 per cent of those who indicated they would like to return were located in urban areas, while almost 60 per cent were in rural locations.

**Graph 22. Self-identified primary protection priorities of those hoping to locally integrate**





The desire to return reduces steadily over time: the longer families are displaced, the less interested they are in returning home (Graph 24).


In line with the broader literature on global displacement and national and international laws, this finding should not imply that the option of return should be closed to IDPs. The right to seek local integration can never be denied.

When prompted further about the conditions under which they might consider return, it was reaffirmed that the vast majority would never consider the option (74.7 per cent). The minority said it would depend on a range of factors (Table 5). It should be noted here that multiple answers were possible when answering this question, indicating that for a number of IDPs return depends on more than one condition being satisfied.

These findings suggest that facilitating voluntary and sustainable return will not be a simple process due to ongoing conflict. The fact that 92 per cent of those wishing to return would only consider it when peaceful conditions prevail underscores the urgency of considering other possible durable solutions.

The survey clearly indicated a link between respondents' desire to return and their perception of the economic impact of displacement. Graph 25 indicates that 58 per cent of IDPs hoping to return consider their economic situation to be either worse or far worse than it was before they were displaced. That the other 42 per cent of those hoping to return consider their economic situation to be 'far better', 'better' or the 'same' as it was

**Graph 23. What is your plan for the future?**




**Table 5 On what conditions would you consider returning to your place of origin?**


If it is secure	22.9%
If I find a job there	17.5%
If I can get my land/house back	11.8%
Other	2.3%
Under no condition do I want to go back there	74.7%

before displacement reminds us that there are many other explanatory factors behind the desire to return.

A further suggestive finding looks into the link between the provision of assistance and the desire to return. The survey found, unsurprisingly, that of those respondents who wish to return, over 60 per cent have not received



**Graph 25. Impact of Economic Situation on Willingness to Return**



assistance in their current location of displacement. This statistic however should be analysed with caution. Further research is needed to explore the impact of humanitarian assistance on displacement and the search for durable solutions.


### Settlement Elsewhere as a Durable Solution

Despite the fact that very few respondents (0.5 per cent) indicated their preferred solution to be settlement elsewhere, either within Afghanistan or abroad, it is important to remain aware that all possible options for durable solutions should remain open for IDPs. Some IDPs and focus group participants indicated that because return was not an option (due to insecurity) and local settlement was too challenging, they intended to move elsewhere, even abroad, if they had the means to do so.

IDPs' views, expressed through both quantitative and qualitative surveys should be heeded. It is hard to determine whether desires to 'return home' or 'have a normal life' in their current location are being communicated without consideration of the practicalities.<sup>95</sup> Thus even though settlement elsewhere is often under-represented in quantitative findings, it should always remain an option for members of displaced communities.

"I will never return to Qaysar... I do not think a time will ever come that it will be safe in Afghanistan. The only solution is to leave one day. I want to go to Uzbekistan or to Pakistan. Anywhere is better than here. There is nothing in this country for us. It is filled with only fighting and Taliban ... We have no money to go anywhere else. Otherwise, I would leave this country right now." *Male focus group participant*

**Graph 26. impact of Humanitarian Assistance on Willingness to Return**




### HLP and Durable Solutions


Access to land is a key consideration for those opting for both local settlement and return. A large number lack a title deed or other proof of ownership. Unsurprisingly, a larger proportion of those respondents hoping to locally integrate do have one.

Looking at the type of dwelling in relation to preferred solutions revealingly demonstrates that shelter is a key problem for respondents choosing to return or settle locally as many currently reside in temporary shelters. Interestingly those who own single/shared residences prefer to settle locally, while those renting are interested

**Graph 27. Proof of Ownership and Preferred Solution**



**Graph 28. Type of Dwelling and Preferred Solution**



in return. These findings, alongside previous analysis of IDPs' income and employment, should help inform programmes in support of durable solutions.

IDPs' understandable preoccupation with housing and tenure (in)security reflects nationwide concern about access to land and shelter. A number of initiatives have tried to address this, including most notably the government's Land Allocation Scheme (LAS) under Presidential Decree 104.<sup>96</sup> The extent to which these initiatives have benefited IDPs is questionable since identity documentation is required and the allocated areas often lack access to water, basic services and income-generation opportunities.<sup>97</sup> Moreover, the land allocation scheme has benefited mainly returning refugees over returning IDPs. A major shortcoming in the LAS is that it only pro-

vides for land in areas of origin, a strategy undermined by the fact that only 23.3 per cent of our respondents expressed interest in returning to their place of origin.<sup>98</sup>

During the research we heard many instances, albeit anecdotal, of threats of forced eviction. Field assessments by UNHCR and other organisations have confirmed this reality. A May 2012 World Bank workshop on Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement emphasised the need for policy makers to plan ahead in instances of development-induced displacement. The lessons learned from World Bank experience supporting development-induced IDPs can be generalised to all IDPs.

Regardless of where IDPs are to be found national authorities must be made aware of the importance of

guidelines for resettlement of affected and displaced families. These must include recognising principles of social impact assessments and consultation with all parties so as to build fair processes of compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement. This will ensure that the decisions are well received by communities, increase prospects of sustainability and ensure the situation of IDPs is not worsened by the interventions of national authorities. The challenge is to eschew policies which add yet more vulnerability to the experiences of those already forcibly displaced.

In this regard, the efforts of the HLP Task Force at the central level are an example of good practice. Under the leadership of UNHCR and NRC, a workshop hosted in Kabul in October 2012 sought to increase awareness, and receive feedback from ministry representatives, on the draft Afghanistan Protection Cluster guidelines to prevent forced evictions and to facilitate discussion around government-promoted relocation plans. Such good practice, and other stakeholder initiatives in terms of analysis and response to protection needs, will be discussed in detail in the following chapter on stakeholder mapping.

Formulating the IDP policy for Afghanistan requires defining conditions and benchmarks for durable solutions which take these findings into account. The IASC Framework on Durable Solutions may serve as a good starting point in the development of policy to promote durable solutions.

# 5. Actors: coordination and response

## Introduction

A focus on stakeholders is particularly relevant to framing discussions on the profiles, challenges and coping strategies of IDPs. This report has analysed the dynamics of displacement and how to meet ensuing protection needs. This chapter goes further, reviewing what is currently being done, in terms of coordination, analysis and response to observed needs. This chapter will first look at the existing structures and actors who shape patterns of assistance to IDPs, before delving into the specificities of stakeholders' protection programmes. Proposing guidelines for future action, it identifies stakeholders, describes and analyses current coordination mechanisms and the way in which state and international agencies understand and achieve protection programmes.

As this report is being written, a policy process is under way to develop the country's first *National Policy on Internal Displacement*, or Afghan IDP Policy. The Terms of Reference of the Afghanistan IDP Policy Working Group state that "the absence of a national policy is most evident in the limited coordination with and between government entities, civil society and the international community on addressing prevention of internal displacement; coordination

of assistance and protection interventions; as well as concerted approaches towards sustainable durable solutions for IDPs".<sup>99</sup> Forging a vision to address these shortcomings will require analysis of IDP protection needs and identification of stakeholders best poised to promote change.

The key messages from this chapter are:

- protection is not mainstreamed into response procedures in Afghanistan
- data remains disaggregated between humanitarian actors
- there is regrettable disparity in various actors' (in Kabul and the field) understanding of what protection of IDPs means.

This chapter will map stakeholder engagement within the parameters of:

1. **Outline of Stakeholders and Coordination Mechanisms** – identifying who the main stakeholders are
2. **Protection Know-How and Analysis** – focusing on stakeholders' understanding of protection programming, information collection and data management
3. **Response** – assessing the nature of the assistance provided and the coverage of protection activities for IDPs in Afghanistan.



Recently displaced with her family from Kunar Province, Gulsoma holds her brother Mawaz inside their tent in Muslim Abad district of Jalalabad Province, Eastern Afghanistan. (Photo: NRC/Farzana Wahidy, June 2012)

## Stakeholder Landscape and Coordination of IDP assistance

Protecting the rights of IDPs is, first and foremost, a national responsibility. Ensuring national ownership and empowering the government at all levels to protect and assist IDPs has taken on new urgency amidst the challenges of increasingly fragmented widespread conflict and the uncertainty of transition. In view of the still-limited capacity of national actors, international organisations and national civil society organisations remain crucial to maintaining assistance to IDPs.

Three categories – government agencies, international humanitarian organisations and national NGOs– will be discussed in this chapter. Due to time constraints and limited access to information, it remains a challenge to get a comprehensive and clear picture of all actors involved. It is also important to note that the main focus will be on the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation (MoRR), as it is the lead ministry on internal displacement.

### 1 Government Actors

#### *At the Centre*

**MoRR and the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA).** MoRR is the ministry with designated responsibility for the protection of both conflict-induced and natural disaster-induced IDPs. ANDMA coordinates natural disaster relief activities. It is an independent body sited within the National Commission on Disaster Management which reports directly to the President’s office.<sup>100</sup>

**Sectoral Ministries.** Alongside MoRR and ANDMA, other ministries also provide assistance to IDPs. These specifically include the Ministries of Rural Rehabilitation and Development; Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled; Public Health and Women’s Affairs. Additionally, the Ministry of Education directly works with programmes implemented by humanitarian actors. While not specifically targeting IDPs, their interventions have assisted those IDPs who meet beneficiary selection criteria.

#### *At the Sub-National Level*

Provincial structures mirror those in Kabul. Both MoRR and ANDMA have offices in each provincial capital as do sectoral ministries. The provincial office of MoRR,

the Department of Refugees and Repatriation (DoRR), represents central government on issues around returning refugees and IDPs. It is they who are meant to report back to MoRR on numbers of returnees and IDPs. Within each DoRR office there is an IDP focal point through which the government can discharge its responsibilities but this function is not being optimally implemented. Officials in DoRR offices are not themselves implementors. Many line ministries are implementing initiatives that reach IDPs in the provinces through area and community based approaches. Their national and provincial networks can be used by MoRR and other stakeholders to gather information and plan national and sub-national interventions for IDPs.

Other constraints impair the efficacy of government ministries and agencies that currently operate within the community of IDP responders:

**Policy Framework.** Afghanistan lacks a policy framework on internal displacement and any national legislative or statutory protection mechanism for IDPs. The absence of a policy framework has led to varying interpretations within the Afghan civil service when defining an IDP. While, formally, MoRR states adherence to *The Guiding Principles*, practical challenges in identifying IDPs remain. This is especially visible in provincial DoRR offices where officials struggle to define IDPs and fail to recognise their rights of assistance and protection.

The government commitment to the drafting of the National IDP Policy is a very significant step in filling gaps in understanding and responding to IDP needs.

**Roles and Responsibilities.** There is lack of clarity regarding IDPs and roles and responsibilities at two levels.

1. **MoRR and ANDMA.** The role and terms of reference of MoRR and ANDMA are unclear, failing to clarify how MoRR and ANDMA relate to each other and to other government ministries. While the MoRR-ANDMA relationship may be self-evident to some at central level this is not reflected lower down the hierarchy. On the ground this gives rise to constant back and forth on ‘who is responsible for what’ whenever there is an emergency that either induces displacement or affects those already displaced. In an emergency time is often wasted on efforts to resolve these inter-ministerial mandate discussions. It should be borne in mind that it is the DoRR offices and provincial offices of ANDMA which are the points of contact for IDPs,

rather than the Ministry in Kabul. It is thus extremely important for them to know precisely where their responsibilities begin and end.

**2. MoRR and other ministries.** Adding to the confusion is the ambiguity around the MoRR's role as a coordinator, or as a potential implementer. It has been challenging for MoRR to undertake coordination responsibilities by bringing together various ministries to discuss current interventions for IDPs. This has to be a collaborative and coordinated whole-government approach. For its part, MoRR needs to clearly enunciate a mission statement towards IDPs in order to help it develop clear areas of responsibility, especially in the event of the adoption of a national IDP policy. The Afghanistan National Development Strategy clearly outlines a state role and responsibility towards IDPs. In reality, however, this has largely been forgotten. Drafting the IDP policy provides an opportunity to restate the role and responsibilities of MoRR itself, in relation to those of ANDMA and other ministries, and provincial and municipal authorities. It is hoped the emerging IDP Policy will foster emergence of an inter-governmental coordination body.

**Capacity.** Like other government ministries, MoRR and ANDMA suffer from insufficient resources and low capacity. This is evident in the challenge of dealing with the backlog of IDPs and the increasing number of new cases. Efforts by humanitarian actors to boost capacity in both ministries are yet to yield concrete results.<sup>101</sup>

ANDMA remains a particularly important national stakeholder with specific expertise on the emergency protection components of food security and livelihoods support. However, despite being the national focal point on internal displacement and coordinating the Provincial Disaster Management Committees (PDMCs), ANDMA has received fewer resources and less capacity building support than MoRR.

Identified capacity-building needs include additional training, particularly on international humanitarian law and human rights. Such is the temporary nature of previous capacity building initiatives that they have been described as capacity injection rather than sustainable capacity building. Examples include a \$500,000 scheme by one agency to hire 30 consultants at MoRR, starting in the summer 2011, whose contracts were not renewed past the initial deadline of December 2011. These consultants were responsible for the launch of a number of thematic research and pro-

gramme initiatives that were either aborted, stalled or postponed. Other examples, at the provincial level, include the training of DoRR staff in specific issues of finance management but without any accompanying protection training on how to align national administration procedures with meeting the needs of vulnerable populations. Government actors feel that the capacity building support they have received has been limited to building operational skills rather than on acquisition of technical expertise. Moreover, capacity building has often focused neither on protection nor on IDPs.

In view of future uncertainties attached to transition, and the potential ongoing rise in the number of IDPs if security conditions do not improve, it would be advisable for international actors to strategically consider approaches they can take to increase immediately the technical capacity of the government to better coordinate responses to IDPs across the country.

## 2 International Humanitarian Actors

As well as the government, there is a plethora of humanitarian actors working in Afghanistan. For the purposes of this research, actors were identified on the basis of their mandate, focus on IDPs and protection expertise.

UNHCR is the cluster lead to assist IDPs and address protection concerns. It has long standing relations with MoRR. IOM focuses on natural-disaster induced IDPs. NRC, which began operations in Afghanistan in 2003, is also an important actor targeting assistance and protection to IDPs, as well as acting as the Deputy Chair of the Afghanistan Protection Cluster. Other INGOs, including the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and the International Rescue Committee (IRC) focus programme interventions towards IDPs, including protection-related livelihood and infrastructure support to the increasing number of IDPs in the slums and informal settlements of Kabul.

Other international actors work on HLP, gender and child protection issues, health and sanitation, education and food assistance as well as blanket targeting of vulnerable populations. Though interests are often more thematic than IDP-focused, returnees and IDPs feature strongly in most organisational strategies. For example, UNICEF and Save the Children are important agencies supporting child protection in the provinces. Their programmes reach IDP populations. WFP provides food support and can draw on additional ICRC food supplies in an emergency, for winterisation assistance to displaced families



Two boys, whose families were recently displaced by conflict, look on inside their temporary home in Herat Province Western Afghanistan. (Photo: NRC/Farzana Wahidy, June 2012)

and emergency response to natural disasters, floods or droughts. Many other organisations provide non-food items (NFIs) and hygiene packs as part of an emergency response package. Organisations such as the Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees (DACAAR) and the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA) are implementing projects related to water, sanitation and health (WaSH) and infrastructure while the Danish Demining Group (DDG) and MACCA are engaged in demining activities. All these organisations work with vulnerable populations but few have programmes specifically targeting IDPs.

### 3 National NGOs (NNGOs)

Another category of actors has recently emerged as a key player in terms of capacity and access, where other entities are not as effective. These are national NGOs (NNGOs) who began filling the vacuum created by shrinking humanitarian space due to increasing insecurity, notably since 2006.

National NGOs work on thematic areas that touch on key protection issues. These include working with local communities to provide education, vocational training, water

and sanitation and hygiene facilities. NNGOs such as the Afghan Women's Educational Centre (AWEC) and Women for Women International (WfWI) are among those providing vocational training and literacy to women.

These NNGOs share a number of similarities in relation to protection:

1. **Absence of protection understanding.** For these actors, conceptual understanding of the theory and practice of protection is absent. Activities are generally project-based, targeting certain population groups (not IDPs specifically).
2. **Humanitarian principles versus accessibility.** Some NNGOs work as implementing partners. They respond to needs of projects that have to be implemented, providing valued accessibility. During our interviews, field staff of these organisations were often unaware of broader thematic issues with a poor grasp of what protection concretely means for IDPs or differences between a traditional humanitarian organisation with its humanitarian principles and that of a civil-military contractor whose projects may overlap and target the



same populations. These NNGOs were not bound by mandates and were willing to accept military-funded humanitarian and development projects without necessarily understanding the risks entailed. Often, such decisions are driven by cost-benefit analysis and NGO strategies to survive by contracting to deliver specified services.

**3. Capacity.** The capacity of NNGOs or national implementing partners is usually lower than that of international actors. However, in view of increasing constraints on access, only they may be able to get to those in need.

In recent years, discussions on remote management and monitoring have increased within the international humanitarian community in Afghanistan. In situations of last resort, where access is viewed as impossible, many see little alternative to remote management of programmes if they are to reach those in insecure areas. International organisations are currently monitoring pilot projects to deliver cash to remote populations through mobile transfers (World Bank / USAID / DFID).<sup>102</sup>

More fundamentally, the issue of remote management raises ethical and conceptual questions:


- Is it possible to provide humanitarian assistance without direct contact with beneficiaries?
- Is it desirable if organisations cannot monitor and check the impact of their actions?
- Remote management may transfer security risks to other partners – often national NGOs who find themselves taking risks that others are not willing to take, sometimes because they have the contacts and networks necessary to do so but often because of financial considerations.

These and other ethical questions must be more specifically discussed and considered by humanitarian and other agencies before remote management can truly be seen as a viable option in Afghanistan.

#### 4 Stakeholder Coordination

Figure 1 below shows the lines of engagement between key actors who assist IDPs. It may be noted that while both primary and sectoral actors engage with each other, there is little interaction between MoRR and ANDMA and with sectoral ministries.

Figure 1 Snapshot Engagement Map of Key Actors



\*IPs – Implementing Partners composed of both national and international organisations that implement projects advancing protection of IDPs.

Figure 1 highlights a complex and uncoordinated picture of IDP stakeholders:

1. **Diversity of Actors.** Stakeholders assisting IDPs have a diversity of mandates and sectors that they target. Some assist IDPs directly, while others operate within wider criteria of vulnerability.
2. **Lines of Engagement** between various actors towards IDPs are not straightforward or uniform. While all the actors mentioned come into contact with IDPs, alliances between the organisations themselves are formed on a project/needs basis only. This is despite the fact that most see the issue of protection of IDPs as a cross-cutting concern and acknowledge the need for a collaborative response.
3. **Lack of a coordination mechanism between MoRR and other ministries.** There is no platform for MoRR to engage with sectoral ministries in a systematic manner, whether on coordination or on implementation.

Figure 2 Process of an IDP Task Force intervention



**4. Varied Capacities and Accessibility.** The level of capacity to provide and manage assistance varies among government actors and NGOs. The level of access to insecure areas (a critical factor in Afghanistan) also varies from organisation to organisation. Both these factors influence the impact and nature of their engagement.

All these actors come together through various coordination meetings, the key ones being the Cluster system, the Humanitarian Country Team meeting and the National and Provincial Disaster Management Committees. The National IDP Task Force is mandated to lead on IDP operational response.

#### *The Cluster System and the IDP Task Force*

The cluster system, introduced into Afghanistan in 2008, aimed to bring greater coherence, predictability and accountability to humanitarian response. A National IDP Task Force was subsequently established together with accompanying Regional IDPs Task Forces (in central, southern and western regions).

The cluster system is often co-led by government agencies and humanitarian actors. The Afghanistan Protection Cluster (APC) however, is meant to be independent of government agencies (in view of the sensitive nature of its work and the need for neutrality and independence). UNHCR is the Chair (with NRC acting as Deputy Chair) for the APC and Co-chairs the IDP Task Force (with MoRR). However, the structure is often blurred at central and sub-national levels.

#### *How the Regional Task Forces work*

The way the system presently works is represented in Figure 2. DoRR offices and/or local officials receive preliminary information, which is then transmitted to the IDP Task Force. A meeting is convened which is followed by a joint assessment of interested stakeholders. A rapid assessment form is filled out by the joint assessment team, which is then reported back to the meeting. Allocation of

assistance responsibilities is based on the needs identified in the joint assessment. Beyond this stage, assistance is provided but lines of monitoring and follow-up remain indeterminate. These are dependent on the efficacy of the organisation providing assistance and the strength of the IDP Task Force as a coordinating committee.

In reality, this procedure is variously implemented. Power and influence of actors vary, and with it, response times between learning of an emergency and arrival of assistance. These intervals can range from a week to three months.

### **Protection Know-How and Analysis**

As noted above, ‘protection’ entails a rights-based approach that includes physical security and integrity, realisation of the right to basic necessities of life (including food, water, health and shelter), civil and political rights and such other socio-economic rights as access to property, livelihoods and education. The understanding of protection as protection of human rights and protection of civilians (PoC) falls outside the scope of this study. Henceforth, all references to protection (information and activities) do not include human rights and PoC.

At the heart of coordination problems is the absence of consensus on who IDPs are and what protection assistance entails or is needed in Afghanistan. In the course of the research we identified:

- 1. Interventions without calling it protection.** A number of actors were engaged in activities that would fall within the definition of protection used in this research, but these activities were often uncoordinated. During the July 2012 JIPS-led recommendations workshop a representative from ACBAR – the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief – highlighted the fact that some organisations and members of civil society in Afghanistan “do protection without calling it protection”.
- 2. Varied understandings of ‘protection’.** When asked about the issues that they thought IDPs faced, the

responses of government staff typically referred to land and documentation. Issues like violence against women and child exploitation were not cited as matters of immediate concern. This shows that, while structural issues that affect IDPs and returnees alike were recognised, there was no understanding of a link between displacement and protection. Protection was seen as a cross-cutting issue rather than as a key area of priority or concern in itself.


3. To some actors it implied more generic protection of material and physical security; to others it meant access to HLP, education, sanitation and documentation. A third, more specific understanding included the protection of human rights of IDPs and their protection as civilians irrespective of their status as displaced people.

4. **Absence of national policy on IDP protection.** Lack of a national policy has prevented attempts to develop an understanding of IDP protection issues especially within the government. This means that protection of IDPs is an extremely nascent concept for government agencies. Staff are not presently sensitised to the concept of protection, indicating the need for capacity building at multiple levels.

5. **Absence of a consolidated approach to protection.**

Some stakeholders have a specific protection mandate in Afghanistan. For example, while UNHCR is the global lead of the Protection Cluster, recently NRC has become an important actor contributing specialised technical programmes that provide legal assistance to IDPs. DRC too deploys field protection monitoring teams through UNHCR. UNICEF implements child protection monitoring programmes. UNFPA is the lead agency for gender-related protection issues. However, these interventions are not uniform in their geographic coverage in the country or in efficacy of impact. This is largely because insecurity limits access and the way that information is currently collected stymies analysis.

6. **Protection as an emergency response.** Presently, most actors discussed in this chapter focus on providing emergency assistance. Certain areas of protection that fall within the definition are not covered at this stage either in analysis or response. Information collected by the IDP Task Force does not capture comprehensive information on protection that can inform mid- or -longer-term protection for IDPs.



10 years old displaced girl Nasrin finds a spot to study under the sun in her IDP settlement, Bagrami district of Kabul. (Photo: NRC/Farzana Wahidy, June 2012)

**7. Protection as a mid/long term response.** Once the first stage of emergency assistance is over, coordination between agencies becomes blurred and restricted to individual programming. There is an absence of strong networks of referrals and monitoring after emergency assistance is provided. This lack of follow-up increases vulnerabilities of IDP populations, especially children and women.

Most of the above observations hinge on inadequacies of engagement between stakeholders, poor systems of accountability and, most importantly, weak analysis which is needed for informed decision-making. Government officials have not yet acquired an informed understanding of IDP concepts. With such a diversity of stakeholders the significance of proper information collection and sharing cannot be underestimated. Who is collecting what information? Who should be analysing what information? Who is responsible for making information available to both stakeholders and the public? Who should keep track of assistance being provided? Should it be the government? These are important questions that will be addressed through the next section that discusses information sharing, tools and analysis.

## 1 Collection and Analysis of Information that Informs Response

We have indicated that protection responses are fragmented and shaped by actors' mandates. Even though humanitarian actors have established coordination mechanisms, it is a struggle to obtain verified and evidence-based information about beneficiaries. Given the division of responsibilities related to conflict-induced IDPs and natural disaster-induced IDPs between UNHCR and IOM, there is no single source providing cumulative information on total numbers of IDPs. OCHA currently struggles to provide information owing to ongoing challenges in collating data provided to them by UNHCR and IOM. In short, information is not available in an analytical framework that presents a holistic picture of a displacement, including details of pre-displacement conditions. This is a subject of much debate between donors and actors involved.

This section, which discusses analysis or lack thereof of information, argues that:

1. Operational/numerical data is being collected, but there is a lack of sufficient comprehensive analysis and conversion to substantive information. While

comparable information is available, it is not yet being collected from a wide range of sources, including those agencies not primarily focused on IDP response.

2. Information on protection is not being collected in the detail that is required to make an informed decision on protection issues through the coordination mechanisms. Individual programmes like NRC's Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance (ICLA)<sup>103</sup> may be collecting such information, but there is no mechanism yet to allow it to be shared in a common forum of protection actors. This further prevents any substantive information reaching Kabul to feed into policy and shape analysis of cross-cutting issues or overarching decisions on IDP protection. An opportunity to tap existing information is being wasted.

Before the IDP Task Force was initiated in 2008, humanitarian actors used programme-specific means to collect information, thus giving rise to both duplication and absence of data. Without a common forum, information about internal displacement did not come together either to feed into a consolidated operational exercise or advocacy. Now, the IDP Task Force seeks to monitor and collect information on IDP profiles. However, as a Brookings-Bern report has pointed out, "while task force data are used for planning purposes, it is commonly accepted that the data do not accurately reflect the displacement situation in Afghanistan."<sup>104</sup>

This raises three questions of fundamental importance

- Is information about internal displacement available?
- If not, why not?
- If it is available, why is it not being analysed in a comprehensive fashion?

### *Is Information on IDP Protection Available?*

Currently, information about IDP protection issues is collected through various individual agency assessments conducted in the field for emergency response and programmatic interventions. These assessments are typically shared at the Regional Protection Cluster or IDP Task Force meetings and informs humanitarian assistance coordination.

The drawback here is that these assessments do not contain questions that capture protection information in detail. Therefore, if a protection concern is identified, the process of follow-up referrals and responsibilities is vague.

### *Standardised Tools Used by the IDP Task Force and APC*

Most information is collected through assessment forms, questionnaires and checklists. These tools, which inform emergency response planning within the IDP Task Forces, collect general/preliminary information about various aspects of displacement.

### *Why is Information not available?*

In order to know why incoming information is not being analysed, it is important to know what happens to it after it is recorded. This section will trace the flow of information from the field to the national level, analysing what happens to the data at every stage.

### *Current Flow of Information (Collection, Assessment, Analysis and Output)*

Even though rapid assessment forms have a protection component to them and the APC has designed a protection checklist, most humanitarian actors have assessment tools specific to their own programming interests. While the protection checklist filled out by actors who do the joint assessment feeds into the protection cluster or IDP Task Force, the information that is being collected on specific programmes still remains within the agencies which generated it. To a large extent, this information is more specific and in cases like GBV, often confidential. There is also no mechanism to share this information and allow it to be analysed.

Generally speaking, information goes through the following stages:

- **Stage 1:** IDPs come to DoRR, ANDMA or a district council who then report this to DoRR, amounting to a basic registration. Given DoRR's weak capacity the information collected at this stage is very basic.
- **Stage 2:** Following the joint assessment conducted by humanitarian actors and the government, information collected through rapid assessment forms is discussed in the IDP Task Force. The provincial offices then identify key needs on emergency shelter, non-food items and food items. The information collected is brought back and fed into individual agency systems rather than analysed to forecast potential mid-long term or even short term protection concerns that fall beyond food security, shelter and NFIs. This is the first gap where capacity exists but analysis is not taking place, despite the availability of information. A preliminary reason identified for this was that it is a substantial operational burden on field offices.

Just addressing monthly caseloads seems to be taking up time, which if managed better, could free up time for analysis to identify other key issues.

- **Stage 3:** Information is then sent to the respective national offices of the actors that receive data from all over the country. The sheer volume of data received presents its own challenges to data management and analysis.

Tracing this data management process demonstrates that while information is being collected, critical analysis is not taking place because the whole operation has become embroiled in numbers and caseloads, overburdening staff and leading to lack of coordination.

Ideally, information analysis should be done initially at the provincial level and then at the national level (in the APC and national IDP Task Force) where it can be compared to other external sources of information in order to fill in the gaps. For example, in the event of a displacement caused due to conflict, not only should information be collected from IDPs themselves, but also from the military, UNDSS and NGOs such as the Afghanistan NGO Security Office (ANSO). This would provide the IDP Task Force with security- and conflict-related contextual information to facilitate contingency planning (predicting potential further displacements from the same region). This analysis is as critical at the provincial level as it is at the national level. It is important to remember that at the Kabul level, the use of this information is not limited to operations but also for resource allocation, advocacy and strengthening the broader understanding of IDP protection issues in the country.

### *Referral Process and Monitoring*

In the absence of protection monitoring and with the basic coordination mechanism not working to its full capacity (due to lack of critical reflection, information analysis and availability of information in a simple format), the process of referral remains ad-hoc. Most implementing organisations refer cases to other agencies, such as WFP for food, or those who have access on a case-by-case basis.

## **2 Bridging the Information gap: Challenges and Best Practices**

This section will highlight efforts and best practice being undertaken to meet the challenges of information collection and analysis.

**Analysis of information: Nangarhar IDP Task Force.**

Across Afghanistan, all organisations share information from their IDP assessments with UNHCR and/or DoRR in order to coordinate response. In practice this typically means Regional IDP Task Force or Protection Cluster meetings focus mainly on numbers without sufficient analysis of trends and incidents. The Eastern Region IDP Task Force in Nangarhar has made important steps to analyse and present information that better helps reflect the holistic picture – causes of displacement, vulnerabilities due to displaced conditions – all relevant information required to make an informed decision. This analysis goes a long way towards accurately judging the gravity of a situation as shown by the Kamdesh example in box 9.

**Data collected is largely emergency-related and not protection specific.**

The tools that the agencies are trying to standardise capture information for emergency assistance, but increasing efforts should be made to render them protection specific. Organisations are currently confronted with difficulties in including child protection and GBV in emergency response. These issues are thus sidelined. UNICEF is planning on piloting a questionnaire on Child Protection in Emergencies in certain provinces in late 2012. Similarly the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) and the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MoWA) are in the process of establishing a data collection system focusing on GBV, with inputs from UNFPA. These processes are at a preliminary stage, tools are not yet finalised and the initiatives need to be supported.

**Towards harmonisation.** There have been efforts by implementing organisations to improve and coordinate information collection and management UNHCR began harmonising its data in late 2011, which has essentially meant verifying numbers provided by DoRR offices by going back to recorded IDP groups. This exercise, called the PMT (Population Movement Tracking), aims to systematise the data collected from joint assessments of conflict induced displacement caseloads. Still in its early stages, the PMT aims to collect both statistical data on population size and demographic make-up as well as protection related challenges faced by displaced communities.

IOM has established the Humanitarian Assistance Programme (HAP) database which receives information collected by their field offices using the HAP rapid assessment tool. This captures information primarily on natural disaster-affected populations including IDPs.



Nekmorgh and her family have been displaced from their village in Badghis Province for four months and are now residing in Taizon district of Heart Province, Western Afghanistan. (Photo: NRC/Farzana Wahidy, June 2012)

There are plans to expand these into a single system that will bring together data collected from conflict and natural disaster-induced displaced communities. By focusing on a minimum set of data fields, it should provide for the first time a comprehensive overview of internal displacement in Afghanistan. Led by MORR in partnership with UNHCR and IOM, it is in the early stages of development. As it will not immediately capture (and might not be suited to capture) detailed protection information, humanitarian actors need to focus on alternative ways to improve this information.

**Response: Nature/Type of Response**

This section will discuss protection response through the prism of emergency response, early recovery and advocacy.

*Emergency Response*

Emergency assistance is presently the most structurally coordinated response. The tools for emergency re-

sponse assessments have been increasingly standardised through the cluster and Task Force systems. Joint assessments have meant that response is discussed among actors and assistance provided on a needs basis, thus targeting immediate protection needs.

NFI kits, food items and winter assistance packages dominate emergency responses in Afghanistan. Information on protection concerns that is collected is cursory.

The critical aspect of emergency response is the decision in Kabul or a provincial capital whether to classify a situation as emergency or non-emergency. Regional IDP Task Forces are often better able to gauge the gravity of a situation than when information moves up the ladder. This is why it is critical for provincial and regional level actors to analyse the situation that they are addressing and send a thorough report to the national level, rather than just numbers. This is reflected in the case of Kamdesh discussed in box 9 below.

Emergency response to IDP protection issues is also largely disaggregated in Afghanistan. While emergency needs are being coordinated through the cluster system and IDP Task Force, prolonged needs still requiring humanitarian intervention, are not being addressed in a consolidated manner. Strengthening referral systems and conducting protection monitoring would help ensure longer-term protection and assistance benefits IDPs.

Currently, the emergency response package of programmes include WaSH, health and nutrition interventions, vocational training for women and children, education, shelter and livelihood support. These embrace a range of protection priorities and challenges highlighted in the findings of this report. They are implemented by various actors but not one interviewee identified their projects to be a tangible protection intervention, indicating a misunderstanding of what protection means in practice and in the context of humanitarian assistance

#### *Early Recovery*

Early recovery is defined by the IASC's Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery (CWGER) as a multi-dimensional process to restore the capacity of national institutions and communities to recover from a conflict or a natural disaster, enter transition or 'build back better.' It is a comprehensive process encompassing the restoration of basic services, livelihoods, shelter, governance, security and the rule of law, environmental protection and

### **Box 9. Kamdesh, Nuristan**

Kamdesh had no IMF presence from 2010 to June 2012. AOGs have reportedly imposed morality police, blocked food delivery and destroyed water sources. Escalating conflict has led to displacement of people from Kamdesh to the provinces of Kunar and Nangarhar. AOG checkpoints and the threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) along the road from Nari – a neighbouring district located in northeastern Kunar – have cut the people of Kamdesh off from humanitarian actors.

Two years after the conflict began, the Eastern Region IDP Task Force was convened in Jalalabad on 23rd May 2012 to discuss the estimated 100 – 150 families in six Kamdesh villages who had been displaced. The families are in dire need of shelter, water, food and medicines. UNHCR, the International Medical Corps (IMC) and ICRC have confirmed there is a grave emergency.

Due to lack of access by road members of the IDP Task Force discussed the possibility of delivering aid with a helicopter provided by the Afghan Ministry of Defence (MoD) after UNAMA had indicated its inability to provide one. An IMF helicopter delivered supplies but there was no information about who had received them. This gave rise to fears that the supplies had not been delivered to the displaced families. No interim or substitute solution was found to address IDPs' urgent humanitarian needs.

In mid-2012 AOGs stepped up attacks in Kamdesh, burning down villages and killing women and children. Yet, these events were not discussed at the national level APC meeting held on 20th June 2012. Nor was it discussed at the June IDP Task Force meeting. Discussion was postponed to the following month, meaning that the issue had not been addressed for almost four weeks.

While the gravity of the crisis was at times unclear, events in the following week showed that the situation had been misread at the Kabul level due to a lack of critical analysis of the security situation and humanitarian crisis in Kamdesh.

reintegration of displaced population. It is an important aspect of humanitarian work to promote durable solutions for displaced populations.

Among certain stakeholders in Afghanistan, there is growing realisation that apart from emergency assistance, medium- and longer-term concerns of IDPs need to be

addressed and many of the protection priorities identified in this report are present for IDPs well beyond the initial emergency phase of their displacement. Currently assistance is emergency oriented. Some organisations feel that activities like construction of schools and shelters for women are on the border of humanitarian assistance and development. There is acceptance that these are critical to reduce vulnerabilities of displaced populations and advance progress towards durable solutions.

As the government works towards the development of a national IDP Policy to give responses greater coherence and legitimacy, humanitarian actors are looking for greater state engagement. The message our researchers noticed coming from the field offices of certain humanitarian actors is that they would like to see the government respond more independently to protection needs. This possibly also reflects the expectation of reduced budgets and funding for humanitarian actors.

Instead of simply responding to emergency short-term needs, medium-term protection needs of IDPs need to be addressed in a more concerted manner. Building early recovery capacity into the cluster system at the national level could be an important means of ensuring comprehensive and integrated relief and development response by the international community, the Afghan government, the UN and other relevant national and international actors.

### *Advocacy*

Advocacy is related to the quantity and quality of information. During the course of interviews for this research, many agencies expressed the difficulty of advocating for IDP protection as their main challenge. This was attributed to a lack of information: without the proper protection assessments or baseline data on protection needs, actors cannot do effective advocacy to raise awareness of specific displacement-related protection risks facing IDPs, mobilise resources and improve responses. There is a recognised absence of baseline data to support sensitive issues such as linkages between gender-based violence and displacement, or child protection and specific protection concerns facing children in displacement.

Many of the issues highlighted in government agencies - lack of protection mainstreaming in emergency response and ambiguity of definitions - also apply in some measure to the humanitarian actors providing assistance to IDPs. There are a multitude of actors at the Kabul level involved in different areas of advocacy, policy decisions and coordi-

nation. In the field, there are many who are implementing specific programmes in specific areas and are more concerned with operational challenges. Based on interviews conducted in the field, the following observations emerged:

- Some Kabul actors, such as UNFPA, lack field representation or have a presence only in certain provinces.
- A number of field implementing partners are unaware of broader thematic issues of IDPs.
- The actors in the field often do not target IDPs specifically but vulnerable populations in general.
- Links between the field and national offices of an organisation appear to be either weak or excessively centralised.

There is scope for information gathering and analysis through existing networks and structures. These are the clusters, line ministries and protection-related programmes implemented by humanitarian actors who collect information. The HLP Task Force in 2012 initiated a mapping exercise to identify key regional HLP issues and constraints in order to better understand the gaps. It involves a questionnaire that is to be filled out by the regional HLP Task Forces based on their local knowledge.

It is important to heed lessons learnt from previous interventions:

- Start small: Premature nationwide roll-out risks ending in a dead-end. An exercise like this should be tested in one region before being rolled out to the rest of the country.
- Clarify objectives: Those who frame questions need to know exactly what kind of information they want from the field and its end purpose.

Mapping exercises from each cluster would not only serve to inform the protection cluster, but also increase its network and allow for information gathering on areas where there is no coordination mechanism.


## **1 Disparity in Coverage: Where are the Stakeholders' Protection Activities?**

The final shortcoming identified in the coordination of protection assistance of IDPs was a disparity in the geographical coverage of protection interventions. The field research identified four important disparities:

- i. in cluster coverage
- ii. in the number of actors operating in provincial centres as compared to districts
- iii. in the number of actors operating in secure as against insecure provinces
- iv. in the efficacy of the work of individual organisations from one province to another.



Figure 3 Cluster coverage (number of actors present) according to the 3Ws of OCHA<sup>105</sup>



*i. Disparity in cluster coverage*

OCHA Afghanistan maintains a regional list of who is doing what, where (3Ws). These 3Ws provide the following information per cluster: province, district, and the name of actors covering the activities of a cluster per district. From this, the number of actors representing a cluster both in a province and each of its districts can be ascertained.

The charts in Figure 3 show the coverage of all clusters except protection in the five provinces under study. They denote the number of unique actors who cover particular activities in each province.

Information on protection (human rights and PoC specifically) is missing in Figure 3. This was because the names of the actors engaged in protection were difficult to acquire due to concerns over the sensitivity of their work and staff safety. All the data reflected was the number of agencies per district in every province that were engaged in protection. There is no way of knowing how many agencies are actually implementing protection activities that fall under the protection cluster's responsibility in a particular province. It is also unclear whether these agencies target IDPs or not.


The following observations can be made from Figure 3:

- Herat has one actor engaged in nutrition.
- Nutrition is also poorly represented in Nangarhar and Faryab.
- Health is most represented in all but Faryab where the Food Security and Agriculture cluster is better represented.
- Education in Kabul is poorly represented.

*ii. Disparity between provincial capitals and districts*

Another interesting finding from this data was the disparity between the number of actors in the city of Kabul and in other districts of Kabul Province. Even in other provinces, the provincial capital was consistently better represented than any other district in the province. This was also corroborated by the quantitative survey, which found that rural IDPs were less likely to receive assistance than urban and semi-rural IDPs (31.2% as compared to 47.6 and 53.8).

Figure 4 Disparity in coverage between the city and districts of Kabul Province



*iii. Disparity between actors in secure and insecure provinces*

The survey also found that there was significant disparity in the number of people who had reportedly received assistance between provinces. For example 11.3 per cent of respondents in Kandahar (considered to be an insecure province) had received assistance as against 94.5 per cent in Kabul. This is reflected to some extent in the graph below revealing the substantial difference in numbers of actors operating in the cities of Kandahar and Kabul.

It should be noted that OCHA is sceptical about the accuracy of the representation of this data. Of the actors that are mapped, few have IDPs as their target populations. The data maps a few national organisations and ministerial branch offices. But the majority of actors are either UN agencies or international humanitarian actors.

*iv. Efficacy of individual organisations*

The influence and efficacy of individual organisations were found to vary from province to province. While a thorough analysis of the influence wielded by key stakeholders was outside the scope of this study, some observations were made during the course of research.

UNHCR and NRC were found to be the two key organisations in the five field study provinces (except Kandahar for NRC) that provide protection to IDPs. Their efficacy in terms of information collection, analysis and assistance varied. In some provinces where UNHCR had a strong


sub-office (Nangarhar and Kandahar) both analysis and response were strong. This contributed to methodical, informative and analytical IDP Task Force meetings. The manner in which the IDP Task Force in Nangarhar analysed and presented information to its members was holistic. Because this information was available, actors were automatically motivated to discuss important issues, rather than just providing an update on the cases that they had assisted.

In contrast, the sub-office of one agency in Herat was finding it difficult to differentiate between their roles as the chair of a coordinating committee and as a humanitarian organisation. This has led to dissatisfaction among other members of the IDP Task Force. Increasingly, both NRC and IOM were growing in influence and taking the initiative to fill in gaps in terms of organising joint assessments and distributing response duties.

Kandahar presented the most different picture as there is a high level of participation of national NGOs who are UNHCR implementing partners. Given rising insecurity and decreasing humanitarian access, the south has seen the emergence of a number of national NGOs who fill the access gaps.

In Faryab, DoRR staff had very clear insights into the needs and problems of IDPs and were informing the IDP Task Force about not only about the numbers of caseloads but also about IDPs' expressed concerns and potential vulnerabilities. The role of DoRR in providing

Figure 5 Disparity between actor representation in the cities of Kabul and Kandahar



assistance and participating in the IDP Task Forces was poor in all other provinces. Some of this was due to practical reasons like language constraints and lack of resources – where national actors are at a disadvantage compared to international humanitarians. There was also a lack of motivation and initiative to be more constructively involved.

There are varying reasons for this. Security and access in a region play a determinant role in shaping the presence of stakeholders. Some organisations focus only on certain provinces rather than having a nation-wide presence. The effectiveness of an organisation is also dependent on the capacity and skills of its staff. While some room for individual capabilities should be permissible, there should be strong systems in place to ensure that any personal inefficiencies do not lead to field-level impacts. Presently, weak representation (within both state and international agencies) undermines the potential benefits of IDP Task Force meetings and the cluster system. This is a reality that needs to be addressed.

### Conclusion; the Road Ahead

This chapter has drawn attention to broadly inadequate inter-ministerial coordination at the national and provincial levels and the amorphous array of stakeholders focusing on a range of activities from emergency to humanitarian relief and early recovery in relation to IDP response. As noted, there are challenges in collecting sufficient information and protection analysis, and disparities between and within provinces in terms of protection analysis and response.

### Donor dynamics

It is donors who support and fund protection. Their decisions are based on information presented to them in reports and proposals. To continue programming to mitigate protection risks for IDPs, donors need to keep funding and supporting protection actors. However, donors interviewed during the research highlighted the unavailability of protection information from actors and coordination mechanisms. This prevented actors from setting out convincing arguments why they should be eligible for funding. It also made it difficult for Kabul-based donor representatives to advocate on behalf of IDPs at the level of their headquarters. It is also apparent that donors are becoming sceptical of the efficiency of the cluster coordination system at national and sub-national levels.

### Accessibility of Humanitarian Actors

It is an accepted reality among the international community that access to areas with deteriorating security is becoming more difficult. This will likely be worsened by the withdrawal of international troops. Donors are wary of the limited capacity of NNGOs and seeking more accountability in relation to programme monitoring. A report by Tearfund on remote monitoring<sup>106</sup> recommends that actors should focus on developing very clear frameworks for remote monitoring for their implementing partners. This would in, some measure, increase the flow of pertinent information between humanitarian actors and implementing partners who are being monitored remotely.



Five-year-old Waserullah sits amongst other Afghan IDP children recently arrived from Kapisa Province to Bagrami district of Kabul. (Photo: NRC/Farzana Wahidy, June 2012)

#### *Partnership Strategies: Working with NNGOs*

“In the response to emergencies, the heart of the problem lies in the fact that international humanitarian organisations daily question their relationships with their local partners. Is it necessary to have local partners? ... What are the criteria to select them? ... What are the advantages of having such partners?”<sup>107</sup> This report has sought answers to these questions. National NGOs are an important resource for international organisations in areas where they cannot themselves go and a large number of humanitarian organisations now work through implementing partners. However, others are hesitant to follow suit because of the capacity constraints of NNGOs and implementing partners and their difficulty in matching the reporting and monitoring requirements of international organisations. Employing a partnership model which invests in strong and meaningful capacity-building and training of NNGO implementing partners, including through the use of joint office spaces, could be an important means of expanding humanitarian agency coverage to respond to IDPs.

## 6. Conclusion – filling the gaps

This study has attempted to assist stakeholders in addressing the protection needs of IDPs by both prioritising assistance and identifying gaps. Having reviewed protection needs (chapters 3 and 4) and subsequently analysing response mechanisms (chapter 5), this section concludes with lessons learned about the protection of IDPs in Afghanistan. These remarks draw on evidence to challenge assumptions about internal displacement in Afghanistan. Insights into aspects of protection which are often overlooked will, it is hoped, be of relevance to all stakeholders providing assistance to IDPs in Afghanistan.

### A. Supporting a Knowledge Base on Internal Displacement in Afghanistan

This section will review key assumptions and hypotheses on internal displacement confirmed by the findings from this study, and in line with previous reports on internal displacement in Afghanistan.

#### *1. IDPs: A vulnerable population in absolute and relative terms with regards to Employment, Housing, Land and Property (HLP) and Food*

Once living in displacement, IDPs present vulnerabilities far more extensive than the rest of the population – as recognised by stakeholders and a 2011 World Bank / UNHCR study on IDPs in Afghanistan’s urban areas – particularly with regards to three protection issues: employment, housing, land and property, and food needs.

Unemployment rates rise during displacement by six per cent, well above national averages, with those in prolonged displacement showing higher rates of unemployment than more recent IDPs. Shift in employment patterns – from agriculture to the construction sector, from self-employment to day labour – increase the vulnerability of IDP households through sporadic and low-paid jobs and decrease their monthly incomes by 21 per cent. To their lack of skills, their lack of knowledge of their new contexts and their lack of social networks is added a layer of employment-related post-displacement shocks.

IDPs live in informal settlements, urban camps or rural settlements during displacement, where they see a drop in the percentage of those owning dwelling (from 69.7

per cent to 25.6 per cent), a four-fold increase in the numbers of temporary dwellings (from 9.9 per cent to 39.2 per cent) and nine per cent of IDPs having experienced forced eviction. Sub-standard housing makes households even more vulnerable to external shocks and natural disasters.

When income decreases, food is often compromised, reducing both quality and quantity of food intakes, an especially worrying issue for children. Over half of the IDP households surveyed spend 90 per cent of their monthly income on food.

The study identified further protection concerns, with vulnerabilities increasing during displacement: violence against women (VAW), child protection issues, health, documentation, physical security, justice and political representation.

The vast majority – 90 per cent - of IDPs interviewed qualified as extremely vulnerable individuals (EVIs). Within this vulnerable population exist sub-groups, the most vulnerable within the vulnerable. Among them are Kuchi IDPs who are either at par with or more vulnerable than other IDPs and thus in need of targeted assistance.

#### *2. IDPs in Urban Settings: Urban vulnerabilities during displacement*

IDPs living in urban settings are additionally vulnerable to the key protection risks highlighted in this report – employment, HLP and food. Urban IDPs, although having lower rates of unemployment, actually rely more heavily on unstable jobs. With skills less adapted to the urban context, IDPs find themselves in irregular and insufficient employment with subsequently lower incomes than the rest of the IDP population surveyed. As a result 46 per cent are more likely to restrict adult food consumption to cope with their lower income levels, higher food prices and lower subsistence levels. On housing and land issues, the threat of eviction is marginally more present in urban and semi-rural areas than other rural areas and lower numbers tend to own the land they live on. However, it should be noted that half of IDPs in urban settings reported receiving assistance compared to only one third of those in rural areas. Urban IDPs also enjoy

better levels of hygiene, access to toilets, and to services such as electricity. The recommendations – chapter 7 – of this report highlight ways to find mechanisms to address some of the ‘urban challenges’ of internal displacement in Afghanistan.

One particularly vulnerable urban IDP group is women. Cities present severe constraints for female-headed households. As noted above, most IDP employment in urban areas is in male-dominated construction, leaving IDP women restricted to such activities as tailoring, sewing and begging. Research findings also show that widows have the lowest income during displacement<sup>108</sup>, at only 588 Afghanis (\$12) a month (53 per cent below the poverty line, followed by Kuchis at 917 Afghanis (\$18) a month.) IDP women are thus most vulnerable to displacement-induced employment challenges, especially in urban settings.

### *3. IDPs: Preference for Local Integration and lack of willingness to return*

The fact that most IDPs simply do not want to return to their places of origin questions default assumptions by national authorities and stakeholders who focus on return and reintegration. It is the responsibility of MoRR to understand and advocate for their right to live in the location of their choice. Actors also need to recognise IDP rights not to go back. This is further supported by legal bases of the right to freedom of movement, most notably within one’s own national territory.

Respondents were asked whether they intended to return or not and upon what conditions their intentions rested. Findings clearly demonstrated that the majority of respondents preferred the option of settling permanently in their current location (76.2 per cent) as opposed to returning to their location pre-displacement (23.3 per cent). Notably, with regards to return, the findings clearly demonstrated that urban IDPs are less interested in this solution: 40 per cent of those who indicated they would like to return were located in urban areas, while almost 60 per cent were in rural locations.

Given the circumstances of forcible departure – often unexpected, traumatising and filled with fear and uncertainty – it is of no surprise that families seek to settle in the places of displacement permanently. The pain of hunger is, after all, preferable to the fear of violent persecution. While stakeholders recognise the need to protect IDPs, there are daunting challenges of consensus, coordination and collaboration. Stakeholders do not

fully agree on who is and who is not an IDP. Stakeholders have had increasing difficulties in providing emergency humanitarian response and mainstreaming protection through these activities.

### *4. IDPs: Conflict is the major cause of displacement and displacement minimises political representation*

Our study supported the belief that conflict-induced IDPs represent the main segment of the IDP population in Afghanistan. The survey showed that 75.6 per cent of respondents were displaced due to conflict, 16.9 per cent due to natural disasters and 6.7 per cent to a combination of both.

The number of conflict-induced IDPs is increasing at an alarming rate in line with both the growing prevalence of conflict and its diversification. It can be inferred – given the contextual analysis provided in chapter 1 – that these numbers will continue to rise during the uncharted uncertainties of transition. IDPs are not being displaced simply by violence between pro- and anti-government elements (though this remains the primary driver), but are also suffering from localised conflicts typically with intertwined ethnic contestations, land disputes and feuds. In assessing the needs of IDPs and planning response stakeholders need to identify all varieties of conflict which may trigger displacement – including land disputes and the impacts of the presence of AOGs, national security forces and international troops.

We have demonstrated that the political representation of IDPs remains low. In Afghanistan, as elsewhere, groups lacking adequate political representation are at a risk of discrimination and marginalisation, which for IDPs prevents their complete integration. Our survey showed that most IDPs understood that they were allowed to vote (91.2 per cent), and that they did not need to return to their province of origin in order to vote (83.3 per cent) but that they were, nonetheless, not represented in local political institutions (58.4 per cent).

## **B. Challenging assumptions**

The assistance planning cycle begins with a thorough analysis of the situation and of needs. Our findings, though only a partial look into a complex issue, questioned several commonly held beliefs. This section is key as it sets out to understand how new information research insights may support policymakers in understanding how to address proven, not simply perceived,



IDP Sadiqa, 30, holds her daughter in her yard in Kabul. (Photo: NRC/Farzana Wahidy, June 2012)

problems and assist them. For starters it is essential to contest the misbeliefs regarding IDPs in Afghanistan:

Our data demonstrate that:

- the primary factor for conflict-induced IDPs is the security of their new location rather than the economic and employment opportunities (about which further research is required)
- duration of displacement is not a valid determinant of vulnerabilities: prolonged displacement is often characterised by IDPs stuck in a cycle of vulnerability and poverty related to the shock of their initial displacement.

##### *5. IDPs: Challenging 'protracted' and time-bound categorisations*

Our findings indicate that IDPs – regardless of their duration of displacement – have not found a way out of their displacement-related vulnerabilities. The field of IDPs is far more diverse than recognised by humanitarian actors who, understandably, generally focus on emergency response. A 2007 Brookings/UNHCR expert seminar on protracted internal displacement noted that protracted IDP situations are those in which the process for finding durable solutions is stalled, and/or IDPs are marginalised

as a consequence of violations or a lack of protection of human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights. This definition is derived from realisation that time and length of displacement is too arbitrary an indicator with which to rigorously judge the vulnerability of IDPs.

We have drawn attention to the impacts of confusion over terminology and over deciphering who is protracted and who is recently displaced. It suggests not attaching over-significance to “protracted” but instead to urge policymakers to refer to the duration of displacement and its history over particular time periods. This research has explored the link between protracted displacement and durable solutions and found that a large number of IDPs in Afghanistan fit the comprehensive definition of “protracted” populations of concern, regardless of the actual duration of their displacement. Families displaced a decade or more ago are struggling just as much as more recently arrived IDPs to meet their family’s food needs or to find regular and sufficient employment. There are very significant vulnerabilities which must be acknowledged and addressed by the assistance community. Populations who currently fall outside of the scope of assistance should be reconsidered, regardless of whether they live in highly visible camp or camp-like settings.

## 6. IDPs: Low trace of multiple displacement patterns

We have shown that the number of IDPs who have experienced multiple displacements is limited and that these IDPs do not exhibit more severe protection needs. As stakeholders begin to focus on the issue of secondary or tertiary displacement, they must keep in mind the need to step back and analyse the situation. There may be a tendency for IDPs not to report multiple displacements. Tracing a history of multiple displacements is complex. We need to build national research capacity able to deliver evidence-based findings of how IDPs have come to be where they are and proposals to advance progress towards durable solutions.

## 7. IDPs: Missing linkages between documentation and displacement

We have presented evidence to counter the assumption that documentation is directly linked to displacement. We have demonstrated that this is essentially a national structural challenge in a country where large numbers of people, particularly women, lack personal ID. It is important to examine the role of identity papers in relation to education, land, political rights, labour migration, women's rights, and basic access to assistance. In practice, implications will vary considerably from place to place. Stakeholders generally think that the lack of documentation is a priority, as non-possession is even more of a problem for IDPs than it is for non-displaced Afghans. Greater access to documentation would help stakeholders provide assistance and more readily identify who is, and who is not, an IDP.

Identification can become particularly problematic when host communities display vulnerabilities similar to displaced populations. Stakeholders often understand that this can further lead to tensions between the two communities. Surprisingly, our study found that IDP communities typically had very positive relationships with their hosts, either because host communities are themselves made up of former IDPs or because they have entered supportive social networks built on traditional coping mechanisms. Host communities are described by IDPs as being welcoming, supportive, lending money, and assisting in the provision of food and water as needed.

## C. Adopting a Protection angle: New insights from this research

Stakeholders have often been faced with information

challenges in Afghanistan. Our study has attempted to provide additional insight in areas where information was scarce or hard to come by. Many of these thematic areas require further, and focused, research to fully explore their link with displacement or simply understand the breadth of the challenges briefly surveyed in this research.

## 8. IDPs: A link between VAW and Displacement?

Stakeholders have long supposed a link between displacement and violence against women, but robust research-based confirmation has been lacking. This study attempted to explore the possible link between VAW and displacement. Although the link was neither conclusively stated nor denied, our findings show the impact of displacement in worsening women's vulnerabilities and associated susceptibility to VAW.

The qualitative data from this research showed increased vulnerabilities to VAW during displacement. There is still a general lack of global information on linkages between VAW and displacement, but especially in contexts like Afghanistan. There are very few specific programmes targeting VAW issues among returnee or IDP populations – the only notable one identified through this research has been NRC's ICLA programme for family cases. This is coupled with weak coordination on VAW issues at an inter-agency level, hence contributing to a glaring gap between need and response.

## 9. IDPs and Health: Access and Quality?

IDPs have more access to health care facilities than was initially expected, but findings point to concerns over the quality of health treatment, rather than questions of access. Findings show that IDPs often seek professional medical assistance: less than three per cent of IDPs reported not seeking treatment for a sick household member in the previous three months. Though IDPs often sought medical attention, they expressed criticisms about the quality of their health services. IDPs explained that they often felt their trips to clinics were not helpful in solving their ailments.

Due to chronic food shortages and shortages in quality and quantity of food, IDPs' health and daily lives are adversely affected during displacement. It is especially concerning for children of IDPs who are likely to face nutritional deficits. Closely related to food shortages, IDPs also suffer from reduced access and quality of



water post-displacement. While IDPs use water sources similar to non-displaced populations, they continue to have less access to safe drinking water, leaving them vulnerable to health risks. Sanitation facilities were also limited, with most IDPs using traditional covered latrines (62.3 per cent), designated toilet facilities lacking a pit (24.5 per cent) or resorting to open fields or bushes (11.5 per cent). Overcrowded conditions, in conjunction with the lack of adequate sanitation facilities, can produce serious health concerns on a daily basis.

Hence, although IDPs state having access to health facilities, there are two key issues to keep in mind for future assistance: the lack of quality health care (especially affordable medication) and the lack of sufficient nutrition, sanitation and hygiene assistance, all of which combine to negatively impact health levels of all household members, especially children.

#### 10. IDPs: Old caseloads of natural disaster induced IDPs

In addition to the vulnerability of IDP women and girls, our study found a surprisingly significant presence of old caseloads of natural disaster-induced IDPs. The presence of these old caseloads casts light on a population of IDPs who have traditionally not been included in stakeholders' beneficiary groups. Our findings indicate that they both exist in significant numbers and also that they present protection needs in line with the rest of the IDP population. IDPs who are repatriated refugees – a recognised significant portion of the overall IDP population - are often assumed to be better-off than other IDPs. Our findings tentatively question this assumption, demonstrating that such individuals do have protec-


tion needs in line with the rest of the IDP population. These pockets of entrenched assumptions present worrying implications for policy makers, stakeholders and researchers.


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The findings of this study clearly highlight the over-arching gap between the needs and the response that is reportedly being provided. It shows that currently two of the three main priorities identified as needs by IDPs themselves – jobs and HLP issues – are receiving scant attention from the government, donors and operational agencies as most actors continue to focus on emergency response (see graphs below representing current challenges and assistance reportedly received).

As the Government of Afghanistan works to draft and implement the National IDP Policy, stakeholders and policy makers should be cognisant of protection priorities and the gaps in response. They should also consider the constraints and limitations of data on IDPs in Afghanistan. The information that is known is as crucial to programming as information that is not yet known. Understanding this balance allows stakeholders to bridge gaps between the bottom-up and top-down perceptions of IDP needs. Whether agencies are mandated to address the protection needs of displaced populations, or whether they provide specific thematic programming activities that impact some IDPs more generally, areas of responsibility should be carved out.

The increasing presence of NNGOs is a positive development. Most are very young and will require sustained





support, capacity building, training and strategic direction. A shrinking humanitarian space for international organisations – whether UN agencies or INGOs – has opened up a vacuum for NNGOs to expand their presence and activities. They are at the moment an extension of the strategies and wishes of the former, but could, in due course and with sufficient resources, bridge the gap between protection needs and national strategies. In order to do so, proper attention to the issue of protection, along with greater specialisation on internal displacement and protection, will be required of all implementing and operational partners – an issue of particular importance at this time of transition.

Any discussion of durable solutions has to take into account the inevitable and growing urbanisation of the country. It is politically sensitive and there are those who may seek to deny but it has become a stark reality. Recognition should be given at national and provincial levels of all three durable solutions for IDPs (local integration, return and resettlement elsewhere). Local integration will overwhelmingly occur in towns and cities. IDPs should be supported to secure durable solutions in line with their rights and preferences, based on good information about options available. The final chapter will proceed to make actionable recommendations on the basis of this study's qualitative and quantitative fieldwork and observations, and highlight further areas of research.

# 7. Recommendations

This chapter draws together the IDP Protection Study's key findings and conclusions and makes a range of recommendations to address the major protection challenges faced by Afghan IDPs.

Recommendations are structured as follows:

- I. Recommendations to the Government of Afghanistan, aimed at informing the on-going development of the National IDP Policy
- II. Recommendations to the Government of Afghanistan, the United Nations and other humanitarian and development actors, aimed at strengthening responses to key displacement-specific protection concerns.
- III. Recommendations to key national and international protection actors, aimed at improving analysis of IDPs' needs and strengthening coordination and response.

A number of the recommendations outlined were developed and discussed at an inter-agency workshop hosted by the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation on July 18, 2012 in Kabul and attended by key IDP protection actors in Afghanistan (Annex 3).

## I. On the development of the National IDP Policy

*To the Government of Afghanistan*

- **Consult widely with IDPs** during development of the policy and subsequent adoption and implementation.
- **Ensure active engagement of all line ministries in development of the policy** by assigning institutional focal points on internal displacement tasked with contributing to relevant areas.
- **Establish an inter-ministerial coordination mechanism on IDPs led by MoRR.** To address the lack of inter-ministerial coordination, establish a forum through which key line ministries can ensure the effective coordination of current government programmes relevant to IDPs
- **Adopt an IDP definition** based on the internationally recognised definition set out in the *UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*, while taking into account the complexity of differentiating IDPs from other vulnerable groups with closely related similar vulnerabilities and needs.
- **Focus on and address the key displacement-specific needs**

- of IDPs. As identified above, these relate to livelihoods, access to food and water and housing, land and property.
- **Promote the full range of durable solutions and agree measures for assessing when displacement ends in line with international standards**, including the *UN Guiding Principles and the Framework on Durable Solutions*. All settlement options must be left open and IDPs must be informed about the full range of options, including local integration and resettlement as well as return to their homes or communities of origin.
- **Prioritise the most vulnerable IDPs regardless of the duration of their displacement.** Ensure that the rights, needs and vulnerabilities of IDPs are clearly identified in the emerging national policy and that assistance and protection is guaranteed on the basis of agreed definitions of Extremely Vulnerable Individuals.
- **Commit to conducting outreach activities and undertake measures to raise awareness** across Afghan society about the existence of IDPs and the nature of internal displacement.
- **Ensure that IDPs themselves are also aware of their rights.**
- **Invest in building the capacity of DoRR.** Provincial DoRR staff will need to be trained periodically on protection and the human rights of IDPs and to be sensitised to the conceptual and operational planning issues related to IDP assistance.
- **Safeguard humanitarian principles and guarantee access by humanitarian organisations to IDPs and safe, unimpeded access by IDPs to humanitarian assistance.** The National IDP Policy should enshrine humanitarian principles of independence, neutrality and impartiality and ensure these are clearly related to the role of humanitarian actors in protecting the right of IDPs to access assistance.

## II. On improving responses to key displacement-specific protection concerns

*To the Government of Afghanistan, the United Nations and other humanitarian and development actors*

### Employment and Livelihoods

- **Prioritise early recovery programmes for IDPs** focusing on interventions supporting income-generation and livelihoods activities which are adapted to local contexts.

- **Identify longer-term vocational training programmes for IDPs.** Develop and implement a pilot project to provide long-term vocational training for IDPs with a view to assessing the viability and sustainability of such initiatives to address IDPs' livelihood insecurity.
- **Support IDPs to develop linkages to employers based on skills taught or existing skills.** Develop and implement a pilot project to provide long-term vocational training for IDPs with a view to assessing their viability.
- **Support IDPs to develop needed pre-employment skills** by implementing adult literacy and vocational training programmes in order to assist IDPs access the labour market.
- **Implement programmes aimed at bridging the gaps between IDPs' existing skills and those required to enter the labour market in their place of displacement.** These should include vocational training to permit IDPs to learn skills while marketing products or services.
- **Develop targeted livelihood programmes for women** designed to improve livelihoods and food security: such initiatives might include improved poultry raising and market gardening.
- **Develop awareness-raising programmes around early and forced marriages** and support economic and livelihood programmes targeting vulnerable households to help reduce incentives for such marriages.
- **Ensure a more systematic response to VAW** through programmes of awareness-raising, counselling and psychological support. Establishing an independent hotline where women could talk about abuse and receive advice should be considered.

#### Health and Education

#### Food / Water

- **Support the development of community-based schools** to help improve IDP children's access to education. The Ministry of Education should collaborate with MoRR to augment monitoring of schools attended by IDPs so as to ensure that sufficient educational materials are provided.
- **Train teachers in how to identify trauma and deliver in-school psychological support** to help mitigate psychological traumas suffered by IDP children.
- **Strengthen coordination to ensure that IDPs' basic health needs are routinely assessed and followed-up.** Ministry of Public Health mobile teams could be regularly despatched to places of IDPs' residence in order to address complaints about the quality of care received.
- **Implement information campaigns** to ensure IDPs are aware of local health care services in the area of displacement and are able to access them.
- **Take steps to ensure that needs for emergency food and potable water are immediately met** within the initial phase of displacement.
- **Prioritise post-emergency implementation of food-for-training and food-for-education programmes** in order to better link responses to the related problems of unemployment and food insecurity.
- **Encourage the government to establish a food and nutrition secretariat** to ensure that this key protection priority of IDPs is addressed systematically in a coordinated manner.
- **National and municipal authorities should take concrete steps to promote more sustainable water provision** and to ensure availability of safe and affordable water in camps and other sites on government-owned land.

#### Housing, Land and Property

- **Consult IDP communities and representatives on durable solution preferences.** Their views should be fully reflected while planning and implementing the National IDP Policy.
- **National and provincial authorities should acknowledge the full range of durable solutions** – return to place of origin, local integration and settlement elsewhere. They should desist from promoting or enforcing return that is not voluntary or able to take place in conditions of safety and dignity.
- **Establish resettlement guidelines to inform decision-making on land allocation procedures for those IDPs unable to integrate locally or to return.**
- **MoRR, in consultation with provincial authorities, should ensure designated resettlement sites meet basic human rights standards.** The authorities should undertake robust feasibility assessments ahead of any resettlements in order to avoid repeating past practices of resettling families in areas which lack access to basic services and livelihoods opportunities.
- **Local integration plans must be developed by government** and supported by national and provincial authorities. Wherever possible, donors should support the gov-
- **Review Presidential Decree 104** with a view to ensuring the future eligibility of IDPs (in their province of displacement and not just of origin) for the Land Allocation Scheme (LAS).
- **Take pro-active measures to ensure inclusion of women's rights to housing, land and property** in all land and shelter programmes.

#### Gender-based Violence

- **Conduct further research into linkages between displacement and gender-based violence** so as to inform improved GBV programming for IDPs.

ernment and humanitarian and development actors to support programmes targeting the needs both of IDPs and host communities.

### III. On improving analysis of IDPs' needs and strengthening coordination and response

*To the Government of Afghanistan, the United Nations, other humanitarian and development actors and donors*

#### Develop consensus on key definitions and needs

The Afghanistan Humanitarian Country Team should request a comprehensive IDP profiling exercise. This should provide disaggregated information on the causes and patterns of displacement, conditions during displacement, protection needs and intentions for durable solutions.

- **MoRR should** establish a national system for the collection of data, **disaggregated by age, gender and other key indicators**. Compiling basic data on internal displacement should help foster consensus, coordinated planning and response and national responsibility.

#### Strengthen coordination to improve IDP response through enhanced IDP Task Forces

- Develop a strategy to build the capacity of IDP Task Forces at the provincial and district levels. Particular attention should be given to ensuring an effective role in coordinating IDP profiling, monitoring and response
- Address barriers to effective participation of UN agencies, NGO and provincial authorities at IDP Task Force meetings. This might entail investing in dedicated DoRR coordinators, building their capacity and ensuring translation support is available.
- Expand the membership of IDP Task Forces so as to ensure they are more representative of all actors involved directly and indirectly in IDP assistance: these may include local and municipal authorities, governors' offices and provincial offices of ministries.

#### Use the IDP Task Force to improve protection assessments

- **Support IDP Task Forces** to institute a capacity-building programme to support protection mainstreaming designed to ensure that all response actors at regional and provincial level have improved awareness around a) the objectives of collecting information on protection issues and b) the methodologies and purposes of the assessment and data collection.

- **Promote through IDP Task Forces** the use of standardised tools and questionnaires in order to capture information on critical protection issues to inform improved referral processes.
- Train and sensitise IDP Task Force member agencies on protection priorities specific to IDPs and ensure initial rapid and joint assessments are followed up with routine site visits and needs assessments with stronger protection indicators.

#### Enhance delivery of IDP programmes and assistance: operationalise response

- **Clearly define, at national and provincial level, MoRR's role and relationship with other government actors** (line ministries, provincial governors and municipalities and ANDMA). It is particularly important to define MoRR's operational coordination and assistance function so that it may better contribute to national humanitarian responses.
- **Encourage international development actors (such as the UN Development Programme) to support and participate in the national IDP Task Force** in order to ensure targeted early recovery programme support to IDPs is available wherever necessary.
- **Strengthen early warning systems and social safety nets for IDPs** by means of better work linkages between MoRR and other relevant government ministries and agencies. This is particularly important in food insecure or disaster-prone areas which require a dual displacement prevention and harm mitigation policy.
- **Promote through the national IDP Task Force the facilitation of emergency responses** to reported IDP caseloads. When assessment and assistance during the initial phase of displacement does not occur the IDP Task Force needs to identify the reasons and address them immediately.
- **Task IDP Task Forces with ensuring effective and practical follow-up on the delivery of assistance**. It is essential to assess whether vulnerabilities have been addressed through instituting a clear referral framework system linked to ongoing monitoring.
- **The Afghanistan Humanitarian Country Team should support efforts to help expand humanitarian access** for actors seeking to meet the emergency needs of all IDPs and displacement-affected communities in insecure or inaccessible areas. This should include encouraging all parties to the conflict to respect humanitarian principles and promote safe, unimpeded and timely access for humanitarian actors so as to ensure unmet humanitarian needs of IDPs are effectively addressed.

**Undertake further research to address knowledge gaps**

- **Provide an improved evidence base** for practitioners and policy makers on internal displacement in Afghanistan. Further research is needed to fill the key knowledge gaps identified by this study and inform improved programming for IDPs during all phases of displacement. Research should particularly focus on:
  - gender-based violence before and during displacement, including female exploitation
  - specific displacement-related vulnerabilities for IDP youth populations and related child protection risks
  - specific displacement-related vulnerabilities faced by older persons and those with disabilities
  - IDPs' nutritional status and access to quality health services
  - socio-economic profiling of IDPs during displacement and on return.

# Annex 1 Methodology

Having discussed the importance of building evidence to support policies in the introduction, this annex presents the methodology behind this study. It explains how the design of the study aimed at achieving the objectives laid out in the introduction and outlines the limitations and constraints of the study's analysis.

## The research process

The IDP Protection study builds on two levels of analysis:

At the individual and community levels, the methodology grasps the common trends and variations in the profile and needs of IDPs, through a quantitative survey, direct field observations and qualitative interviews and group discussions.

At the institutional and organisational levels, it analyses the responses of different stakeholders, the gaps and overlaps in their action, as well as their capacity to shape and influence IDP response, through stakeholder interviews and a desk review of secondary sources.

## Research Locations

The research team conducted fieldwork in five provinces: Kabul, Herat, Faryab, Nangarhar and Kandahar. Within each of these provinces, the field teams visited two urban, semi-rural and rural IDP populations each.


## Research Framework

In order to cover the scope of these two levels of analysis, we first designed a research framework that would serve as a guiding frame throughout the whole research process. A comprehensive set of tools (close-ended individual questionnaires, open-ended key informant guidelines, focus groups and individual case study guidelines) were developed to address the various components of the research.

The methodology is based on the following components:

## I. Methodology – Desk review and comparisons


The research team conducted a thorough desk review of the existing information on the topic of internal displacement in Afghanistan to a) frame this research's



## Research Framework

Causes of displacement	<p>What does 'internally displaced' mean in Afghanistan?          What are the direct and indirect effects of conflict and their impact on displacement?          How do IDPs perceive the conflict?          Who do IDPs consider responsible for their insecurity?          What are the various trends between conflict-induced IDPs and natural disaster IDPs?          To what extent is internal displacement a multi-causal phenomenon?</p>
Profile and vulnerabilities of IDPs in Afghanistan	<p>What are the various profiles of IDP populations in Afghanistan?          Is there a relation between the duration of displacement and the vulnerabilities of IDPs?          Is there a relation between the settlement patterns and the vulnerabilities of IDPs?          How do vulnerabilities of conflict-induced IDPs compare with those of natural disaster-induced IDPs?</p>
Protection Priorities	<p>What are the protection priorities of IDPs in Afghanistan? In each local/provincial context?          What comparisons and contrasts can be drawn between the protection needs of, among other indicators:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conflict-induced vs. natural disaster-induced IDPs</li> <li>• Protracted and recent/new IDPs?</li> <li>• Rural, semi-rural and urban IDPs?</li> <li>• Male and female IDPs?</li> </ul>
Coping Strategies	<p>What type of coping strategies have IDPs developed in response to their situation?          What are the effects of IDPs' coping strategies on the situation and well-being of their households?          Should protection actors try to prevent/encourage some coping strategies?</p>
Displacement-affected communities	<p>What are the reactions of host communities to the presence of IDPs?          What are the positive and negative impacts of IDP settlements on host communities (social, economic, cultural, security)?</p>
Assistance to IDPs	<p>Who is responsible for the protection of IDPs in Afghanistan?          What are the main gaps in the protection of IDPs in Afghanistan?          What are the main areas of opportunity for protection actors to better respond to the protection needs of IDPs?          How should the responsibilities be shared and coordinated among national / international actors to enhance the protection of IDPs?          How are national stakeholders addressing the protection needs of IDPs? What are potential key areas of improved collaboration for protection actors? What are potential key areas of collaboration for protection actors and national authorities on IDP response?</p>

Figure 6 Summary of Research Methodology





methodology<sup>109</sup>, b) inform the stakeholder mapping exercise and c) to use it for comparative analysis. Among the various sources of information, two key resources were used to provide a basis for comparison of the findings in this survey.

1. *The National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) of 2007/2008*, a nationally representative survey of Afghan households. The NRVA is a comprehensive multi-topic household survey which collected data on a sample of 20,576 households in 2,572 communities. The salient feature of this data is its coverage; the data was collected from all 34 provinces over an entire year. Given that this data was collected in 2007/2008, comparisons are limited (see limitations section below).
2. Original database from the *2011 WB / UNHCR Study on IDPs in Urban Settings*, conducted by the same field teams. Similarities in the sampling methodology and the questionnaire design allowed for an easy comparison of data on IDPs' socio-economic profiles and protection needs. Its focus on urban IDPs also facilitated comparison to the current study's rural sampling focus.

## II. Methodology – Quantitative survey

A survey of 1,015 IDPs was conducted during three weeks of fieldwork by two teams of four male and two female interviewers each directed by team leaders with experience working on migration and displacement research.

### Questionnaire Design

The WB-UNHCR study on IDPs in urban settings, carried out by Samuel Hall researchers in 2010/2011, offered a solid basis to design the research tools and augment them with protection-specific assessments and tools. In addition, a peer review of the questionnaire was administered ahead of the training and pilot test, with feedback from practitioners and academics, based in Afghanistan and abroad, and from the main agencies with field level programmes responding to displacement.

An important aspect of the questionnaire design was to ask IDPs for their self-identified protection concerns. This component is crucial to understanding the methodology and the analysis behind the key findings of this report, and further supports the “bottom-up” approach adopted by the research team.

### Sampling: Stratified Random (1,000 targeted households)

The methodology was based on a selection of IDP “pocket” locations in urban, semi-rural and rural areas, within which a mixed random selection of IDP household members (heads of household or their spouse) were interviewed, based on the community feedback given the lack of household listings. This section outlines the different steps of the methodological approach used.

This is a reasonably representative sample with a five per cent error margin and 85 per cent confidence level, based on the numbers of conflict-induced displacement published by UNHCR in February 2012. Table 6 presents the breakdown of the sampling by province for a final total of 1,015 respondents (a higher number than was originally targeted).

**Table 6** Geographic Distribution of Survey Sample

Province	Sampling
Kabul	199
Herat	204
Kandahar	204
Nangarhar	204
Faryab	204
<b>Total</b>	<b>1015</b>

These five regions were selected in accordance with the following criteria:

1. Numbers of IDPs: These regions have important concentrations of IDPs as illustrated by UNHCR's 2012 map of conflict-induced IDPs by districts of displacement.<sup>110</sup>
2. Varied IDP profiles: Presenting different profiles of displacement dynamics.
3. Programming: Of interest to protection partners' present and future programming
4. Security: An acceptable level of security for our teams to conduct a survey.

Within each province, three areas were selected:

1. Urban: the *markaz* (provincial capital) systematically selected in all five provinces
2. Semi-urban / semi-rural: one district randomly selected out of the districts that have a common border with the provincial capital.
3. Rural: One district randomly selected out of the districts that have no common border with the provincial capital.

Table 7 Identification of locations by province, district and town/village

Province	Locations		
	Rural	Semi-Rural	Urban
Kabul	Tapa Awal	Bagh Dawood Gul Bota	Chaman Babrak Chahari Qambar
Heart	Naw Abad/Karokh Molkiha	Noor Abad Maslakh Camp	Shalbafan Naw Abad (11th district)
Kandahar	Nawi Kali Tajikan	Haji Arab village Haji Aziz village	Mirza Muhammad Khan Loy Wayala
Nangarhar	Ghazgi Chamtala	Muslim Abad Salam Poor	Farm Ada - Omid Abad Behsood
Faryab	Qara Shekhi Timor Kaprok Almar Centre	Naw Abad Tor Pakhtu Qaisar Centre	Karte General Dostum

In the field, local branches of state agencies (DoRR/ANDMA), as well as NRC and UNHCR, provide lists of IDPs locations and information on the type of settlements. The final sampling allowed us to equally cover each type of location, offering a good basis to compare the various kinds of protection needs of our sample of IDPs (of whom 33.8 per cent had rural origins, 33.5 per cent a semi-rural background and 32.7 per cent lived in towns and cities IDPs).

To provide a more comprehensive view of internal displacement, the research decided to include both conflict-induced IDPs and natural-disaster induced IDPs in the sampling. Both prolonged and more recent IDPs were sampled. No quota system was used to balance these categories; rather interviewers were asked to follow a purposive-random sampling. In the absence of household listings, our sampling method was to follow and replicate the composition of the selected communities based on the information provided by local elders. The team leaders were in charge of identifying the profiles of IDP communities in each location to have an indication of the breakdown for each group. The sampling then followed this breakdown.

### III. Methodology - Qualitative survey

#### *Focus Group Discussions (FGD) and Individual Case Studies*

Focus Groups were organised to test a typology of protection concerns with a group of IDP household representatives – men, women, and youth with a specific focus on issues related to VAW and child protection, as per NRC’s request. We also assessed protection needs

at the community level through focus groups with community leaders of the IDPs.

Individual case studies were used to go into more detail on sensitive subjects such as VAW, child protection and relationships to host communities, to get a better understanding of the experience of displacement and of protection concerns among IDPs. When accessible, NRC’s information was used to identify specific VAW cases to help cover this sensitive and notoriously under-reported protect concern.

To assess the positive and negative interactions between IDPs and host communities, focus groups were also organised with community leaders of surrounding communities. With two to five focus groups per province and a total of about 20 FGDs (each with five or six participants), we sought to obtain an essential source of information to complement the quantitative fieldwork and to complete the typology of IDP and protection priorities.

### IV. Methodology – Stakeholder mapping

A key objective of this study was to look at ways in which humanitarian organisations are responding to displacement and protection concerns in Afghanistan. This was to complement the field-based IDP survey in order to find out the gaps between the needs of IDPs and the response of stakeholders. To get an idea of the actors involved, both in the field and at the policy level, a stakeholder mapping exercise was conducted alongside the quantitative and qualitative surveys in the same provinces.

**Table 8 Breakdown of qualitative fieldwork**

Provinces	Individual case studies	Focus groups
Kabul	5	5
Herat	14	4
Nangarhar	4	3
Faryab	3	2
Kandahar	0	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>19</b>

We have used the following definition of a stakeholder:

a governmental or non-governmental entity with an interest or mandate to act on the topic of concern – i.e. IDPs and protection – in Afghanistan and whose participation and support are crucial to IDP protection and assistance

### Mapping Process

During the course of the stakeholder mapping exercise, a four-step process was followed:

- Step 1** Preliminary key informant interviews (KIIs) in Kabul before the fieldwork
- Step 2** Development of a KII interview guideline based on key research questions
- Step 3** Field Interviews with key stakeholders in Kabul, Herat, Nangarhar, Faryab and Kandahar
- Step 4** Development of a stakeholder matrix to map key stakeholders

For the purposes of this study, we divided the stakeholders into four categories – Government representatives, international organisations, NGOs, and donors.

### Stakeholder Coordination Matrix

A stakeholder matrix is presented in chapter 5 to illustrate the capacity and role of the stakeholder in coordinating response to the IDP situation in Afghanistan, according to a set of indicators:

- Indicator 1** Stakeholder key performance areas
- Indicator 2** Role in coordination of projects/response to IDPs
- Indicator 3** Capacity for coordination
- Indicator 4** Potential steps to streamline coordination


## V. Limitations and constraints

The main limitation of this sampling, which uses neither a nationwide nor random methodology, is that it does

not allow for extrapolations and generalisations to the IDP population as a whole. It is designed to be indicative of IDP protection concerns in Afghanistan. Other limitations include:

- **Information sharing:** Our sampling was based on information and data provided by various stakeholders in each of the five provinces selected. Time and availability constraints did not allow the research team to develop a comprehensive overview of all stakeholders nor to access all information available on IDP protection issues.
- **Security:** The sampling was constrained by security considerations, which limited access to secure areas, hence leaving out IDPs settlements in insecure areas or in those that required transit through insecure areas. In particular, this factor constrains the analysis of security and displacement links given that the survey was mostly conducted in secure areas.
- **'Invisible' IDPs:** An important proportion of IDPs choose to settle among the host community within Afghan cities. These 'invisible' IDPs are very hard to capture as they are dispersed around the city.
- **Ethnicity:** In our random sampling, ethnicity was not a set criterion. This explains a certain under-representation of the Hazara community with 0.8 per cent of respondents, against 59.3 per cent Pashtun interviewees, 20.2 per cent Tajik respondents and 11.7 per cent Uzbek respondents. The under-representation of Hazaras in our sampling is also due to the fact that Hazaras mostly belong to IDP communities in prolonged displacement, which constitute only one section of the sample.
- **Availability and accessibility:** A central aim of this research was to survey the main stakeholders, to understand their capacity to analyse and respond to protection needs. However, the information ultimately gathered was from a non-exhaustive group of international and national actors (national authorities, international NGOs and national NGOs, and a few donors as indicated in Annex 3).
- **Comparative constraints:** Two main sources of comparison used for this research are the WB/UNHCR 2011 Study on Urban IDPs (2011) and the NRVA (2007/2008). The former is relatively recent and was based on a similar methodology despite its different focus, making comparisons straightforward. The latter, however, provides data collected at the national level in 2007/2008, utilising some different definitions and indicators. Comparison to NRVA data, while very revealing on many points, was undertaken with these limitations in mind.

# Annex 2 Coordination structure



This comprehensive coordination structure mapping was provided by OCHA.

# Annex 3 Recommendations workshop

## Agenda

When: Wednesday 18<sup>th</sup> July 2012, 8am to 5.30pm

Where: Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation Conference Centre, Kabul

Breakdown of qualitative fieldwork

Time	Session	Facilitator
8.00 – 8.30	Welcome, Introductions and Workshop objectives	MoRR and JIPS
8.30 – 9.00	Introduction to IDP Protection Study and use for IDP policy	NRC and IDMC
9.00 – 10.15	Presentation of key findings	Samuel Hall and JIPS
<b>10.15 – 10.30</b>	<b>BREAK</b>	
10.30 – 12.00	Group work: discuss and develop recommendations	JIPS and guest roving facilitators
<b>12.00 – 13.00</b>	<b>LUNCH</b>	
13.00 – 16.00	Discuss and adopt recommendations	Individual group feedback (5 mins) JIPS facilitates discussion to revise and adopt recommendations
<b>16.00 – 16.15</b>	<b>BREAK</b>	
16.15 -17.00	Wrap up/achievements and next steps	JIPS
17.00-17.30	Concluding remarks	MoRR



## IDP PROTECTION STUDY KEY STAKEHOLDERS RECOMMENDATIONS WORKSHOP CONCEPT NOTE

When: Wednesday 18<sup>th</sup> July 2012, 8am to 5.30pm

Where: Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation Conference Centre, Kabul

### Background and objectives

The aim of this workshop is for key protection stakeholders working to address the situation of internally displaced people in Afghanistan to discuss and reach consensus on the recommendations derived from a recent

IDP Protection Study commissioned by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). Given the current momentum to develop a national IDP policy, initiated by the Government's Ministry for Refugees and Repatriation (MORR), the collaborative workshop will also frame its discussions and outcomes to feed into this process.

### NRC/IDMC IDP Protection Study

In 2012, NRC/IDMC commissioned a study on IDP Protection in Afghanistan to provide NRC Afghanistan, MORR and protection partners with an enhanced understanding of the dynamics of internal displacement and protection concerns during displacement and upon return. Undertaken by Samuel Hall, the study has employed a methodology combining a review of secondary sources as well as household interviews, group discussions, individual and key informant interviews across 5 provinces in the country (Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, Nangarhar and Faryab). Locations were selected to present a range of displacement profiles in urban, semi-urban and rural settings and to represent around one third of the population of Afghanistan.

With 1,000 households interviewed (200 in each province), 19 focus group discussions, 26 individual IDP case-study interviews and a wide range of key stakeholder interviews held, the research methodology covered IDPs across rural, semi-rural and urban environments and includes different durations of displacement as well as those recently displaced due to conflict and natural disasters. Field research is now complete and a comprehensive analysis is underway.

NRC Afghanistan has received the support of MoRR for this piece of research, which has been facilitated cooperation of DoRR at national and sub-national levels during field research stages. The research has also benefited from wide consultation with key stakeholders including (though not limited to) UNHCR, IOM, OCHA, national and international NGOs and AIHRC. An informal technical peer review group has also been established incorporating UNHCR, NRC, IDMC and JIPS.

### MoRR National IDP Policy Process

At the request of the Afghan government and through the MoRR, the National IDP Task Force has established a Working Group to support the development of a National IDP Policy for Afghanistan. A key activity of the MoRR-led Working Group is the development of a common understanding of the causes and conditions of the internally displaced in Afghanistan, as well as the challenges they face. It is envisaged that the findings of the IDP Protection Study will provide an up-to-date and reliable analysis of the IDP protection situation to inform relevant parts of the policy development process. The National IDP Policy process was launched at a national stakeholders' workshop, hosted by MoRR, on 14th and 15th July 2012.


### Key Stakeholders Recommendations Workshop

To facilitate these objectives of building consensus on the study's recommendations and feeding its findings into the development of the National IDP policy, NRC has requested JIPS to support the MoRR-led Working Group by facilitating an inter-agency workshop on the findings of the IDP Protection Study. This workshop will take place following the MoRR Practitioners' Workshop launching the development process of the National IDP policy. It will host participants from MoRR, the Afghanistan Protection Cluster and sub-cluster groups and representatives from IDP communities around the country.

The recommendations workshop objectives are therefore, to:

1. Present and discuss key findings from the IDP Protection Study;
2. Agree upon key protection priorities for IDPs in Afghanistan;
3. Draft and reach consensus on realistic and impactful recommendations based on the study's findings and the experience and expertise of participants; and
4. Determine next steps for MoRR's National IDP Policy Working Group of how to incorporate the study and workshop outputs into the policy development process

Supported by:



# Annex 4 List of graphs, tables, figures and boxes

## Graphs

- Graph 1. Causes of Displacement
- Graph 2. What was the main reason you came to the place where you live now?
- Graph 3. Did you return to Afghanistan voluntarily?
- Graph 4. Currently, what are the 3 greatest problems your household faces?
- Graph 5. Distribution of Employment Sectors Post-Displacement in Urban Settings Among Provinces
- Graph 6. Household Income by Province and Type of Location
- Graph 7. Average Monthly Income for Male v Female IDPs (in Afghanis) by Type of Location
- Graph 8. Average Monthly Income Difference Pre- and During Displacement
- Graph 9. Pre- and During Displacement Housing Arrangements
- Graph 10. Percentage of Households' Monthly Income Spent on Food
- Graph 11. Most Common Food Coping Strategies
- Graph 12. Primary Water Sources
- Graph 13. Most Commonly Reported VAW Acts
- Graph 14. Reported Reasons Children Do Not Attend School
- Graph 15. Sectors of Child Labour
- Graph 16. Type of Medical Care Used
- Graph 17. Do you think you / members of your household need psychological support?
- Graph 18. Tazkera Ownership by Gender
- Graph 19. IDP – Host Community Relations
- Graph 20. Is your IDP community represented in local political institutions?
- Graph 21. Types of Assistance Received
- Graph 22. Self-identified protection priorities of those hoping to locally integrate
- Graph 23. What is your plan for the future?
- Graph 24. Desire to Return and the Duration of Displacement
- Graph 25. Impact on Economic Situation on Willingness to Return
- Graph 26. Impact of Humanitarian Assistance on Willingness to Return
- Graph 27. Proof of Ownership and Preferred Solution
- Graph 28. Type of Dwelling and Preferred Solution
- Graph 29. Currently, what are the 3 greatest problems your household faces?
- Graph 30. Types of assistance received

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- Table 1. When did you leave your place of origin?
- Table 2. Unemployment Rates
- Table 3. Average Monthly Incomes
- Table 4. Have you needed to borrow money since you arrived here?
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- Table 6. Geographic Distribution of Survey Sample
- Table 7. Identification of locations by province, district and town/village name
- Table 8. Breakdown of qualitative fieldwork

## Figures

Figure 1. Snapshot engagement map of key stakeholders

Figure 2. Process of an IDP taskforce intervention

Figure 4. Cluster coverage (number of actors present) according to 3Ws of OCHA

Figure 5. Representation of disparity in coverage between city centre and districts of Kabul province

Figure 6. Disparity between actor representation in Kabul city and Kandahar city

Figure 7. Summary of research methodology

## Boxes

Box 1. Experiences of multiple displacement

Box 2. Returnee / IDPs: common and similar needs

Box 3. Internally displaced Kuchis

Box 4. Defining violence against women

Box 5. Lacking traditional social protective mechanisms

Box 6. Cold 2011 winter for IDP children

Box 7. IDPs' relationship with other nearby IDP communities

Box 8. Four core criteria for durable solutions

Box 9. Kamdesh, Nuristan



# Annex 5 Household questionnaire

<p>Hello. My name is _____. I would be grateful if you could spend about forty-five minutes answering my questions. This research will help us better understand the situation of men and women who like you have experienced displacement. This research has been commissioned by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) to help them improve their programmes and future advocacy for internally displaced populations. Our work as researchers is not to provide any assistance or direct help but to make sure that your concerns are voiced upwards, to those who can help you.</p> <p>This interview is anonymous and your name will not be mentioned in any report or document. You are not obliged to answer any question, and you can stop at any moment you want. I thank you for accepting to help me. Do you want to ask me anything about the interview before you decide to participate?</p>		
<p><b>FILTER QUESTION 1.</b> Did you come to this location directly from exile?</p>	<p>Yes STOP THE INTERVIEW No, I am internally displaced</p>	
<p><b>FILTER QUESTION 2.</b> Verify if the interviewee is an IDP and the causes of his/her displacement</p>	<p>The interviewee fled conflict, violence and persecution The interviewee migrated because of a natural disaster (drought, flooding, avalanche, winter, erosion ...). The interviewee suffered from both conflict and natural-disaster The interviewee left because of a human-made disaster The interviewee was not directly forced to leave its former place of residence STOP THE INTERVIEW</p>	
<p><b>FILTER QUESTION 3.</b> When did you leave your location of origin? DO NOT PROMPT: One Answer Only</p>	<p>_____ Year  Before the fall of the Taliban regime (End of 2001) Between 2001 and 2004 Between 2005 and 2009 After 2009</p>	
Questionnaire Number		
N°.	Questions	Answers
A.	Interviewer Name (Code between 1 and 12)	
B.	Date of interview	1. .... May 2012 2. .... June 2012
C.	Province	Kabul Kandahar Herat
		Nangahar Faryab
D.	District	.....
E.	Name of village (if rural) / neighbourhood (nahie if urban)	.....
F.	Name of settlement	.....
G.	Type of location	Urban Semi-rural Rural

SECTION 1: INDIVIDUAL PROFILE			
1.	Interviewee Name	.....	
2.	Phone Number	-----	
3.	Age	..... years old	
4.	Gender	Male Female	
5.	Marital status DO NOT PROMPT: One Answer Only	Single Engaged Married	Divorced Widow/Widower
6.	What is your ethnicity? DO NOT PROMPT: One Answer Only	Pashto Tajik Hazara	Uzbek Turkmen Other: .....
7.	Does your household belong to one of the following communities? PROMPT: One Answer Only	Jogi Chori Frosh Kuchi Jat None of the above	
8.	What is your level of education? PROMPT: One Answer Only	Illiterate Literate (no schooling) Primary School Secondary School	High School University Other: .....

SECTION 2: MIGRATORY PROFILE					
9.	Province of origin in Afghanistan NB: Province of origin is the place of birth; not the place of ancestral origin. DO NOT PROMPT: One Answer Only	Kabul Kapisa Parwan Wardak Logar Ghazni Paktia Nangahar Laghman	Kunar Badakhshan Takhar Baghlan Kunduz Samangan Balkh Jawzjan Faryab	Badghis Hirat Nimroz Farah Helmand Kandahar Zabul Uruzgan Ghor	Bamyan Paktika Nuristan Sari Pul Khost Panjshir Daikundi
10.	District of origin	Name: .....			
11.	Did your family live in urban or rural areas in your province of origin?	Urban Rural			
12.	Before your displacement, had you ever fled to another country? PROMPT: Multiple answers possible	Yes, to Iran Yes, to Pakistan Yes, to another country: ..... No SKIP to Q.21			
13.	What was your status during your exile? PROMPT: One Answer Only	I was an asylum seeker I was a legal refugee I was an illegal migrant			
14.	For how long did you stay in exile?	..... Years			
15.	Did your family live in urban or rural area while in exile?	Urban Rural			
16.	Did you live in a refugee camp while in exile?	Yes No			
17.	Did you come back to Afghanistan voluntarily ?	Yes SKIP to Q.19 No			

18.	If NO, what happened? PROMPT: Multiple answers possible	We left under threat We left because we were harassed We left because the camp was closed down My family was deported back to Afghanistan I was deported alone back to Afghanistan, my family is still there in the country of exile I was deported alone back to Afghanistan, my family joined me later on Other: .....			
19.	Did you go back to your location of origin upon return?	Yes SKIP to Q.21 No			
20.	If NO, why not? DO NOT PROMPT: Multiple Answers	It was too insecure There was no job opportunities there Our land/house/assets had been grabbed We preferred moving to a city Other: .....			
21.	Did you/your family come directly to this place?	Yes SKIP to Q.23 No, we migrated to another location in Afghanistan before settling here. No, we lived in 2 or more other locations before settling here. Other: .....			
22.	Where in Afghanistan did your family migrate before coming here? DO NOT PROMPT: Multiple answers possible	Kabul Kapisa Parwan Wardak Logar Ghazni Paktia Nangahar Laghman	Kunar Badakhshan Takhar Baghlan Kunduz Samangan Balkh Jawzjan Faryab	Badghis Hirat Nimroz Farah Helmand Kandahar Zabul Uruzgan Ghor	Bamyan Paktika Nuristan Sari Pul Khost Panjshir Daikundi

### SECTION 3: PROTECTION FROM DISPLACEMENT: REASONS FOR DISPLACEMENT

23.	What were the five main reasons that forced you to become an internally displaced person? RANK from 1 (main reason) to 5 RECORD UP TO 5 RESPONSES	Armed Confrontation – Hostilities Human Rights violations Fear from the effect of armed conflict Persecution – Violent retaliation Confiscation of land Death or Injury of family member Extortion from armed actors Blood feud Cessation of traditional circuit/movements (nomads) Presence of mines, IEDs or other UXOs Because of the drought Because of flooding Because of harsh winter Because of soil erosion Because of avalanche Because of an earthquake Lack of land / housing No access to arable/pasture lands No access to water No access to food No access to health services No access to education No employment opportunities Other: ..... I don't know
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24.	If you were displaced by conflict, what type of conflict was it? DO NOT PROMPT: Multiple answers possible	Anti-government insurgents vs ANSF Anti-government insurgents vs International military forces Local armed groups vs local armed groups Ethnic conflict Inter-tribal conflict I was not displaced because of a conflict Other: _____
25.	Who do you consider as the main responsible actor for your displacement? PROMPT: One Answer Only	ANSF ALP IMFs Taliban /AOGs Local armed groups A rival tribe A rival ethnic group Other : _____
26.	What was the main reason you came to the place where you live now? DO NOT PROMPT: One Answer Only	Geographic proximity Presence of relatives/friends Ethnic ties Better security situation Better economic/employment opportunities here Better access to service here (health, food, education) I had heard of assistance being given in this location I had heard of the existence of IDP settlements here Other: _____
27.	What could have been done to support you so that you would not have to be displaced? DO NOT PROMPT: Multiple Answers	Protection from armed conflict Protection from tribal conflict Protection from persecution and human rights abuses Protection from violence Protection from drought Protection from hunger or famine Protection from poverty Protection from landslides Protection from flood Protection from harsh winter Protection from avalanche Other:_____
28.	What intervention, if any, could have protected you and your household from displacement? DO NOT PROMPT: Multiple Answers	Emergency assistance (food, water) Shelter assistance Medical assistance Livelihoods generation assistance Assistance to our children (food, health, clothing) Assistance to our women (food, health, clothing) Security operations Nothing Other:_____

**PROTECTION DURING DISPLACEMENT**

**SECTION 4: SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE**

29.	How many individuals are living in your household? Including yourself PROMPT: One Answer Only	1. Male Adult (18 and over)	
		2. Female Adult (18 and over)	
		3. Male Children (under 18)	
		4. Female Children (under 18)	
		TOTAL = 1+2+3+4 =	

30.	Does one or more of these descriptions fit with the description of your household? PROMPT: Multiple Answers possible	Unaccompanied Elderly (over 60) Unaccompanied minor (under 18) Physically Disabled Female Head of household Elderly-Headed Household Child-Headed Household Chronically ill Gender-based violence survivor Large family (5 or more children and no livelihoods) Very low income Single Parent Missing children No community links None		
31.	Which of the following describes your household? PROMPT: Multiple Answers possible	One or more members of my family are currently living abroad (and have been for at least 3 months) One of more members of my family are returnees (whether returned refugee, return migrant or deportee) None of the above		
32.	What was your main income-generating activity in your last place of residence? PROMPT: One Answer Per Column	ACTIVITY SECTOR Agriculture/Livestock Mining / Quarrying Road construction Construction Manufacturing Transportation/communication Wholesale Trade Retail trade Health Education Public Administration/Government NGO/Intl. organisation None / Unemployed Other: .....	POSITION Day labourer Salaried worker (private sector) Salaried worker (public sector) Self-employed Employer Unpaid family worker None / Unemployed	
33.	What is your main income-generating activity today? PROMPT: One Answer Per Column	ACTIVITY SECTOR Agriculture/Livestock Mining / Quarrying Road construction Construction Manufacturing Transportation/communication Wholesale Trade Retail trade Health Education Public Administration/Government NGO/Intl. organisation None / Unemployed Other: .....	POSITION Day labourer Salaried worker (private sector) Salaried worker (public sector) Self-employed Employer Unpaid family worker None / Unemployed	
34.	Please estimate the average monthly contribution to the household income of each category PROMPT		Number	Monthly income
		1.Male adults (18 and over)		AFA
		2.Female adults (18 and over)		AFA
		3.Male children (under 18)		AFA
		4.Female children (under 18)		AFA
<b>Total income = 1+2+3+4=</b>			AFA	

35.	Does your household own any of the following? Prompt: Multiple answers possible	A fridge A television A radio A gas oven	A bicycle A motorcycle A car None of the above
36.	What percentage of your monthly income do you spend on food expenses?	----- %	

**SECTION 5: ENVIRONMENT (ASSISTANCE-HOST COMMUNITIES)**

37.	Since you settled in this area, have you received any assistance? Do not prompt: One Answer	Yes No SKIP to Q.40	
38.	If yes, from whom did you receive assistance? Prompt: Multiple Answers	Government International organisation: Specify: _____ Local/Afghan organisation: Specify: _____ Personal / Family support network	
39.	If yes, which type of assistance did you receive? Prompt: Multiple Answers	Emergency assistance: Water, Food, Transportation Shelter / Housing Medical treatment Financial Support Information, Counseling, Legal Assistance Training courses: Specify: _____ Job placement Business start-up grant Education Other / Specify: _____	
40.	Currently, what are the 3 greatest problems your household faces?  Prompt: THREE Answers RECORD UP TO 3 ANSWERS	Insecurity Unemployment / underemployment Lack of marketable skills Lack of identity papers Lack of education certificate Lack of land title Lack of savings Access to food Access to water Access to housing / shelter Access to land	Access to electricity Sanitation facilities Access to health services Lack of social network Limited access to credit/loans Lack of local knowledge Conflicts, fear of persecution Social discrimination Corruption Other / Specify: _____
41.	How would you qualify the behaviour of local communities towards you and your family? Prompt: One Answer only	Very welcoming – very supportive Welcoming – supportive Not welcoming – not supportive SKIP to Q.43 Aggressive SKIP to Q.43 Violent SKIP to Q.43	
42.	If welcoming/very welcoming, why? Prompt: Multiple Answers  THEN SKIP TO Q.44	They shared food with us They shared water resources with us They shared their shelter/house with us They gave us advice to ease our arrival They lent us money They treated us kindly They did not insult us They did not assault us Other:_____	

43.	If NOT welcoming, aggressive or violent, why? Prompt: Multiple Answers	They did not share food with us They did not share water resources with us They did not share their shelter/house with us They did not give us advice to ease our arrival They did not lend us money They did not treat us kindly They insulted us They assaulted us Other:_____
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**SECTION 6: PROTECTION NEEDS (I) – PHYSICAL INTEGRITY**

44.	Do you feel physically secure within the location where you currently live?	Yes SKIP to Q.46 No
45.	If NO, why not? Do not prompt	Because of the risk of bombing or armed attack Because of the risk of verbal harassment Because of the risk of physical harassment Because of the risk of physical assault Because of the risk of kidnapping Because of the risk of robbery Because of the risk of being hit by a car Because of the risk of getting lost Other: _____
46.	Have you or some members of your family suffered from any of the following forms of violence or natural disaster since your arrival? Prompt: Multiple answers possible	Insults and persecution Threats of violence Armed violence Non-armed violence Presence of military forces Bombing – Air Shelling Rape Kidnapping Disappearance Mines Unprotected holes Dry river beds Landslides Floods Avalanches Excess snow / rain Large development projects Other: _____
47.	Do you feel threatened by outsiders infiltrating the location / community where you live?	Yes No SKIP to Q.49
48.	If YES, by which kind of outsiders?	Other IDPs Members of local communities Police Government official (specify) : _____ Insurgents Enemies from area of origin Thieves Criminals Animals (dogs, wolves...) Other: _____
49.	Do you feel protected by the police within the camp/informal settlement? Prompt one answer	Yes No, they do not protect us (neutral) No, I feel scared of the police I don't know

50.	Have you already relied on one/several of the following strategies to ensure your physical security? Prompt: Multiple answers possible	Seeking for the protection of the local police Seeking for the protection of a local powerful member of the government Seeking for the protection of a local powerful member of anti-government groups Organising intra-community armed protection group Organising intra-community non-armed protection group Other: ..... None SKIP to Q.53
51.	Were you satisfied with this source of protection?	Yes SKIP to Q.53 No
52.	If NO, why not? Prompt: Multiple answers possible	Because the protection offered is not sufficient Because this protection is not reliable Because we have to pay to be protected Because of this protection, we are threatened by the government Because of this protection, we are threatened by anti-government groups Other: .....

#### SECTION 7: PROTECTION NEEDS (II) – MATERIAL SECURITY AND HEALTH

53.	How often in the last year did your household have problems satisfying its food needs? Prompt: One Answer	Never Rarely (1 to 2 times) Sometimes (3 to 6 times) Often (a few times every month) Mostly (this happens a lot)
54.	Has your household had to rely on the following strategies? Prompt: Multiple answers possible	Reduce the quality of the food Reduce the quantity of the food Entire day(s) without eating Restrict consumption by adults in order for small children to eat Borrow food from relative or friend Purchase food on credit Harvest immature crops Consume seed stock held for next season Send household members to beg Send children to work / earn money None
55.	How often in the last year did you have to borrow money (loans) to pay for food purchases? Prompt: One Answer	_____ Number of times
56.	What is your main source of drinking water for your household? Prompt: One Answer	Public well Well inside compound Public hand pump Hand pump inside compound Spring water
57.	Do you have access to safe drinking water? Prompt: One Answer	Yes, we boil water Yes, free potable water Yes, we buy potable water No
58.	How far is the nearest clinic or hospital? PROMPT: One answer	< 15 minutes walking 15-30 minutes walking 30 min-1 hour walking > 1 hour walking Other (specify)
59.	Was any member of your household sick or injured in the last three months? Do not prompt: One answer	Yes No SKIP TO Q.62



60.	What was the main type of health provider that this household member used in the last three months? Prompt: One answer	None Clinic / mobile clinic SKIP TO Q.62 Hospital SKIP TO Q.62 Traditional healer SKIP TO Q.62 Traditional birth attendant SKIP TO Q.62 Private doctor SKIP TO Q.62 Other: _____ SKIP TO Q.62
61.	If someone from the household was sick or injured in the last three months, why did he or she not use any health services? Prompt: Multiple answers	It was not a serious illness Too expensive Too far No available services Other: Specify _____
62.	Have you or members of your household received any psychological or counselling support from a community worker, social worker or other professional from any organisation since your arrival?	Yes No
63.	Do you think you/members of your household would need some forms of psychological support? Prompt: Multiple answers	Yes, myself Yes, the male adults Yes, the female adults Yes, the male children Yes, the female children No, no one. SKIP TO Q. 65
64.	If YES, what kind of psychological support would be useful? Prompt: One Answer	Specify: _____ I don't know
65.	If psychological assistance were to be provided to your community, would you want your household to benefit from it?	Yes, for all (men, women, and children) Yes, for all adults (men and women) Yes, for men only Yes, for women only Yes, for children only No, we don't need psychological support No, it is not culturally appropriate

#### SECTION 8: PROTECTION NEEDS (III) – DOCUMENTATION

66.	Do you currently have any identification document?	Yes, the passport SKIP TO Q. 71 Yes, a tazkera SKIP TO Q. 71 Yes, both a passport and a tazkera SKIP TO Q. 71 No
67.	Have you ever in your lifetime had an identification document? Prompt: One answer	Yes, I lost it back when living in my place of origin Yes, I lost it during displacement Yes, I lost it once arrived here No, I never had an identification document SKIP TO Q. 70
68.	Have you tried to get them back or renewed?	Yes No, I never tried to get it back or renewed SKIP TO Q. 70
69.	What happened? Do Not Prompt: Multiple answers	I was told I had to return to my place of origin to get new documentation Local authorities refused to issue new documents I gave up because the procedure was too complex I gave up because the procedure was too expensive I gave up because the procedure was too long Other : .....

70.	What are the consequences of not having ID? Do Not Prompt: Multiple answers	It constraints my movements It reduces my access/the access of my children/relatives to education It reduces my access/the access of my relatives to health services It reduces my access/the access of my relatives to employment It exposes me to harassment from local authorities It prevents me/my relatives from renting or buying a house/land It prevents me from voting or getting registered to vote Other: .....
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**SECTION 9: PROTECTION NEEDS (IV) – LIVELIHOODS**

71.	How do you consider the current economic situation of your household compared to before your displacement? Prompt: One answer	Far worse Worse Same Better Far better	
72.	Please estimate the income of your household for each source of income before displacement?	Source of Income	Income/month
		1. Land rental Income	_____ AFA/month
		2. House/Flat rental income	_____ AFA/month
		3. Salaries (employment)	_____ AFA/month
		4. Income coming from the sale of agricultural/livestock production	_____ AFA/month
		5. Remittances	_____ AFA/month
		6. Zakat	_____ AFA/month
		7. Other	_____ AFA/month
	TOTAL	_____ AFA/month	
73.	Please estimate the current income of your household for each source of income?	Source of Income	Income/month
		1. Land rental Income	_____ AFA/month
		2. House/Flat rental income	_____ AFA/month
		3. Salaries (employment)	_____ AFA/month
		4. Income coming from the sale of agricultural/livestock production	_____ AFA/month
		5. Remittances	_____ AFA/month
		6. Zakat	_____ AFA/month
		7. Other	_____ AFA/month
	TOTAL	_____ AFA/month	
74.	Have you needed to borrow money since you arrived here?	Yes, repeatedly but not able find loans Yes, rarely, and unable to find loans Yes, I received loans from my relatives Yes, I received loans from members of the IDP community Yes, I received loans from members of the local community Yes, I received loans from shopkeepers Yes, I received loans from (other) _____ No, never needed to borrow money	

SECTION 10: PROTECTION NEEDS (IV) – POLITICAL REPRESENTATION & ACCESS TO JUSTICE		
75.	Are you allowed to vote? Prompt: One answer	Yes No I don't know
76.	Do you have to go back to your place of origin to participate in national elections? Prompt: One answer	Yes No I don't know
77.	Is your IDP community represented in local political institutions? Prompt: One answer	Yes No I don't know
78.	Have you tried to resort to the formal (national) justice system to set up a conflict or a violation of your rights?	Yes No SKIP TO Q. 80
79.	If YES, what happened? Do Not Prompt: Multiple answers	My case was normally treated Local justice institutions refused to consider my case because I am an IDP I could not get the support of a lawyer I was unfairly treated by local justice institutions because I am an IDP Other: .....
80.	Is there an informal justice system that you can rely on?	Yes No SKIP TO Q. 82
81.	If YES, which informal justice system have you used	Community elders Local leader Religious leaders/Mullah Male Shura Female Shura Other: _____ I never had to use it
82.	Which system of justice do you prefer relying on? Prompt: One Answer	Formal justice institutions Informal justice institutions Other: .....

SECTION 11: PROTECTION NEEDS (V) – HLP		
83.	What was your housing arrangement before your displacement? Do not prompt: One Answer	We owned a single family house We owned a single family apartment We rent a single family house We rent a single family apartment We owned a house that we share with other households We owned an apartment that we share with other households We rent a house that we share with other households We rent an apartment that we share with other households We lived in a camp dwelling We lived in a tent We lived in a temporary shelter / shack Other / Specify: _____

84.	<p>What is your current housing arrangement?</p> <p>Do not prompt: One Answer</p>	<p>We own a single family house</p> <p>We own a single family apartment</p> <p>We rent a single family house</p> <p>We rent a single family apartment</p> <p>We own a house that we share with other households</p> <p>We own an apartment that we share with other households</p> <p>We rent a house that we share with other households</p> <p>We rent an apartment that we share with other households</p> <p>We live in a camp dwelling</p> <p>We live in a tent</p> <p>We live in a temporary shelter / shack</p> <p>Other / Specify: _____</p>
85.	<p>How did you find this dwelling?</p> <p>Do not prompt: One Answer</p>	<p>Built it ourselves – without any outside help</p> <p>Built it ourselves – with outside help / assistance</p> <p>Inherited</p> <p>Purchased</p> <p>Tenant</p> <p>Relative</p> <p>Friend owner</p> <p>Abandoned home/building we are squatting</p> <p>Other / Specify: _____</p>
86.	<p>Do you have a deed (<b>evidence of ownership or lease agreement</b>) recorded anywhere for this house?</p> <p>Do not prompt: One Answer</p>	<p>No</p> <p>Yes, in court / mazkan</p> <p>Yes, in local official records</p> <p>Yes, elsewhere</p> <p>Don't know</p>
87.	<p>Do you have access to <b>electricity</b> in your house?</p> <p>Do not prompt: One Answer</p>	<p>Public electricity</p> <p>Personal generator</p> <p>No electricity</p>
88.	<p>Do you have access to <b>sanitation / toilet</b> facilities in your compound?</p> <p>Do not prompt: One Answer</p>	<p>None / open field / bush</p> <p>Area in compound but no pit</p> <p>Traditional covered latrine</p> <p>Flush latrine</p> <p>Shower</p> <p>Other / Specify: _____</p>
89.	<p>How would you rate the standard of the housing you live in today?</p> <p>Prompt: One Answer</p>	<p>Very poor</p> <p>Poor</p> <p>Average</p> <p>Good</p> <p>Very good</p>
90.	<p>How does your current housing condition compare to the house you forcibly left?</p> <p>Prompt: One Answer</p>	<p>Worse</p> <p>Same</p> <p>Better</p>
91.	<p>What is the main assistance you would need to improve the standard / conditions of your dwelling?</p> <p>Do not prompt: One Answer</p>	<p>More space / additional rooms</p> <p>Proper door / window / roof</p> <p>Better quality mud / cement</p> <p>Latrine inside house /compound</p> <p>Adequate piping / water system</p> <p>A generator</p> <p>A standard kitchen</p> <p>Stairs leading to the house</p> <p>Paved road leading to the house</p> <p>None</p> <p>Other: _____</p>

SECTION 12: PROTECTION NEEDS (VI) – CHILD PROTECTION		
92.	Has any child from your household had to work since your household moved here? Do not prompt: One Answer	Yes No SKIP TO Q. 95 No child in the household SKIP TO Q. 99
93.	If YES, what kind of activity is he/are they doing? Do not prompt: One Answer	Begging Street vending Fortune telling Entertaining people Shop keeping Agriculture / Livestock Construction Manufacturing (tailoring, sewing...) Car/Motorcycle mechanics Other: .....
94.	Do children in your household face the following risks while working? Prompt: Multiple Answers	Insult – harassment Physical violence Sexual violence Kidnapping Disappearance Work related health issue Other: .....
95.	Are the children of your household able to go to school? Prompt: Multiple answers	Yes, in the formal education system SKIP TO Q. 98 Yes, in a community-based school SKIP TO Q. 98 Yes but boys only; girls do not attend school SKIP TO Q. 98 No
96.	If NO, why not? Do not prompt: Multiple answers possible Then SKIP TO Q. 98	There is no school in the neighbourhood Children of my household are not accepted in school because of our lack of documents It is dangerous to attend school It is dangerous to walk to school They have to work instead My family refuses them to attend school Other: .....
97.	Why are only boys attending school? Do not prompt: Multiple answers possible	Because girls are not allowed to leave the house Because girls are not allowed to go to school Because it is dangerous for girls to attend school here Because it is dangerous for girls to walk to school here Because there is only a school for boys Other: .....
98.	Are female children (under 18) of your household allowed to go out of your house? Do not prompt: One Answer	Yes, on their own, without restrictions Yes, if accompanied No, never Not applicable

**SECTION 13: PROTECTION NEEDS (VII) – GBV – FOR WOMEN ONLY ; ALL MEN SKIP THIS SECTION**

99.	Have you suffered from one/several of the following forms of violence since your arrival? Prompt: Multiple answers FOR WOMEN ONLY	Verbal harassment Physical beatings Sexual harassment Sexual abuse and exploitation Rape Trafficking Prostitution None Other: _____
100.	Do you know anyone in this IDP community who has suffered from one or several of these forms of violence? Do not prompt: One Answer	Yes No SKIP TO Q. 102
101.	If YES, which forms of violence? Prompt: Multiple answers	Verbal harassment Physical beatings Sexual harassment Sexual abuse and exploitation Rape Trafficking Prostitution None Other: _____
102.	Has anyone under the age of 16, in your household, married since your arrival here? Prompt: One answer only	Yes, 1 girl Yes, several girls Yes, 1 boy Yes, several boys No, it did not happen Not applicable
103.	Has anyone been forced to marry (against his/her will) since your arrival here? Do not prompt: One Answer	Yes, 1 girl Yes, several girls Yes, 1 boy Yes, several boys No, it did not happen Not applicable
104.	Did a badal occur in your family since you arrived here? Prompt: One answer only	Yes, once Yes, several times No
105.	Are female adults of your household allowed to go out of your house? Prompt: One answer only	Yes, if accompanied Yes, on their own No
106.	Has there been some occurrence of domestic violence within your household since you arrived here? Do not prompt: One Answer	No, never Yes, occasionally (once or twice a year) Often (at least once a month) Very often (once a week) Everyday

107.	If YES, is it something that used to happen before your displacement? Do not prompt: One Answer	Yes Not as often No, it never happened before
108.	Have you heard of someone else in your IDP communities who suffered from domestic violence? Do not prompt: One Answer	Yes No

**SECTION 14: DURABLE SOLUTION – RETURN – for men and women**

109.	What is your plan for the future? PROMPT: One Answer Only	I would like to return alone to my place of origin I would like to return with my family to my place of origin I would like to settle here permanently with my family I would like to migrate alone abroad I would like to migrate abroad with my family I would like to migrate on my own to another location in Afghanistan: specify : ..... I would like to migrate with my family to another location in Afghanistan: specify: .....
110.	On what conditions would you consider returning to your place of origin? Do not prompt: Multiple Answers possible	If it is secure If I find a job there If I can get my land/house back Other : ..... Under no condition I want to go back there SKIP TO Q.112
111.	When do you intend to return? Do not prompt: One answer possible	This year Sometime within the next five years Only when the conditions listed above are met Other:.....
112.	Have you ever returned, even briefly, to your area of origin? Do not prompt: One Answer	Yes No SKIP TO Q.114
113.	If YES, why? Do not prompt: Multiple answers possible	To check on our house To check on our land To check on our assets To check on our livestock To get information on the security situation To get information on the economic situation Visiting friends and family Employment / income generating activity Other: .....
114.	Do you know people from your community who tried to return there permanently? Do not prompt: One Answer	Yes No END OF THE INTERVIEW
115.	If YES, did only one member of the household return or did the entire household return? Do not prompt: One Answer	Only one member Some members of the household The entire household I don't know

116.	<p>If YES, do you know what happened after their return? Do not prompt: Multiple Answers possible</p>	<p>Yes, they were able to re-settle there without major problems Yes, they faced security problems there but stayed there Yes, they faced economic – employment problems but stayed there Yes, their house/land had been grabbed but they stayed there Yes, they had to migrate again because of the security context Yes, they had to migrate again because of economic/employment issues Yes, they had to migrate again because their land/house had been grabbed Other: ..... No, I don't know</p>
117.	<p>What challenges do you anticipate facing if you do move from your current location, either back to your location origin or elsewhere? Do not prompt: Multiple Answers possible</p>	<p>Lack of employment, financial challenges Lack of shelter and land Lack of education for my children Lack of access to basic services Lack of medical treatment or facilities Lack of rule of law or justice Conflict and insecurity Violence and persecution Gender-specific risks: Specify: _____ Natural disaster: Specify: _____ Human-made disaster Other: _____</p>

**END OF THE INTERVIEW**



# Annex 6 Focus group guidelines

Field teams utilised four sets of focus group guidelines:

- I. Internally displaced men
- II. Internally displaced women
- III. Host community leaders
- IV. IDP community or female shura leaders

## Internally Displaced Men

1. Where is your province of origin? Where did you leave before coming here?
  - a. What was your life like there?
    - i. What was your main source of income in the area?
    - ii. What type of shelter did you have / what material goods did you own?
    - iii. Did your children go to school?
    - iv. Did you have access to health care, food, water etc?
    - v. What did you enjoy about living there?
    - vi. What were your difficulties living there?
2. What were the reasons for your displacement to this current location?
  - a. How many times were you displaced?
  - b. What is the basic history of your displacement and/or your family's displacement (if different)?
3. Were any of you refugees (legal refugees in Iran, Pakistan or elsewhere) in the past?
  - i. If yes, where and for how long?
  - ii. When did you return?
  - iii. Upon return, where did you go?
  - iv. What were your expectations of return?
4. What is your current state or living condition?
  - a. What is your life like today now that you've been displaced? What are you lacking?
    - i. Food / Water
    - ii. Healthcare
    - iii. Education
    - iv. Finance / Jobs
    - v. Land / Shelter
    - vi. Family and/or community life
  - b. What are some of the major pressures you feel and needs you have?
  - c. What are the largest changes between your life before and after displacement?
5. What are some of the coping strategies you have employed in order to address your protection needs?
6. What is your relationship with the IDP community in the area?
  - a. Do you help each other out? If yes how?
  - b. How does the community leader help you? Does he do anything for you?
7. What is your relationship with your host community?
  - a. Do you interact at all?
  - b. Is this a positive / negative relationship?
8. Has your community received assistance in recent months or years?
  - a. If yes from whom? GoA, UN, NGO? Try to be specific
  - b. What type of assistance? Food, non-food, cash, loans, jobs...
  - c. When? Once, multiple times? Winter assistance?
  - d. Did the community leader distribute it to all households?
9. What are your plans for the future? How long would you like to live here?
  - a. Is this your home for good, or do you plan to move again?
  - b. Do you plan to return to your place of origin / The place you left? If yes, when?
  - c. Has anyone in your community been back there, even briefly, to check on the situation?
  - d. Does your community still own homes, livestock, goods in those areas? Or is there nothing to go back to?
  - e. Are you planning to move elsewhere within the country or outside of the country?
  - f. What aspirations do you have? (Financial, personal, employment, etc.)
10. Do you feel that this displacement was good for you? If yes, if no explain.
  - a. What did you expect your life to be like when you arrived here?
  - b. How is your life different from your expectations?
11. Would you permit us to contact you if we have any follow-up questions? (Yes/No)

## Internally Displaced Women

1. Where is your province of origin? Where did you leave before coming here?
    - a. What was your life like there?
      - i. What was your main source of income in the area?
      - ii. What type of shelter did you have / what material goods did you own?
      - iii. Did your children go to school?
      - iv. Were the women allowed outside their homes?
      - v. What did you enjoy about living there?
      - vi. What were your difficulties living there?
  2. What were the reasons for your displacement to this current location?
    - a. How many times were you displaced? Did you directly come here?
    - b. What was the essential story of your displacement and/or your family's displacement (if different)?
  3. Were any of you refugees (legal refugees in Iran, Pakistan or elsewhere) in the past?
    - i. If yes, where and for how long?
    - ii. When did you return?
    - iii. Upon return, where did you go?
    - iv. What were your expectations of return?
  4. What is your current state or living conditions?
    - a. What is your life like today now that you've been displaced? What are you lacking?
      - i. Food / Water
      - ii. Healthcare
      - iii. Education
      - iv. Finances / Jobs
      - v. Land / Shelter
      - vi. Family and/or community life
    - b. What are some of the major pressures you feel and needs you have?
    - c. What are the largest changes between your life before and after displacement?
  5. What are some of the coping strategies you or your family have employed in order to address your protection needs?
    - a. Have you experienced an increase in violence against you because you are a woman either within or outside of your family? (Possible example: Forced or early marriage, domestic violence, prostitution, etc.)
  6. What is your relationship with the IDP community and your community leader in the area?
    - a. Do you help each other out? If yes, how?
    - b. How does the community leader help you? Does he do anything for you?
  7. What is your relationship with your host community?
    - a. Do you interact at all? Do your husbands or male relatives interact with them?
    - b. Is this a positive / negative relationship?
  8. Has your community received assistance in recent months or years?
    - a. If yes from whom? GoA, UN, NGO? Try to be specific
    - b. What type of assistance? Food, non-food, cash, loans, jobs...
    - c. When? Once, multiple times? Winter assistance?
    - d. Did the community leader distribute it to all households?
  9. How long would you like to live here?
    - a. Is this your home for good, or do you plan to move again?
    - b. Do you plan to return to your place of origin / the place you left? If yes, when?
    - c. Has anyone in your community been back there, even briefly, to check on the situation?
    - d. Does your community still own homes, livestock, goods in those areas? Or is there nothing to go back to?
  10. Do you feel that this displacement was good for you? If yes, if no explain.
    - a. What did you expect your life to be like when you arrived here?
    - b. How is your life different from your expectations?
  11. Would you permit us to contact you if we have any follow-up questions? (Yes/No)
- ### Host Community Leaders
12. Can you give me a brief history of your own community's time in the area as well as that of the IDP community in this area?
    - a. What do you know about the IDP community's decision to settle in your area?
  13. What are your perceptions of the IDP community?
    - a. Do you believe the people who have resettled in the area are IDPs? Economic migrants? Other?
    - b. Do you interact with or speak to the IDPs in your community? If so, how often and under what circumstances?
    - c. Do you consider the IDPs to be a part of

- your community? Do you want them to be a part of your community?
- i. Do you want them to stay or to leave this area? Why?...
- d. What is the impact you believe the IDP community has had on your life? (Have they affected your job, health, education, etc. opportunities?) Ask them to be specific and give as many examples as possible.
    - i. What were your lives like before the IDPs arrived in this area+
    - ii. What are your lives like now that IDPs have settled in this area?
  - e. What are some of the major differences between you and the IDP community?
  - f. What are some of the major similarities between you and the IDP community? (In terms of their ethnicity, province of origin, socio-economic background, but also challenges, needs...)
  - g. What do you consider to be challenges faced by communities in this location – in general – and what are some of the challenges that are specific to IDPs?
    - i. We are here trying to get a sense of where particular vulnerabilities lie and where we have community-wide problems
14. Has your community received any assistance from the government, UN agencies or NGOs in recent years?
- a. If yes, when / what / from whom?
  - b. Has the IDP community received any assistance from the government, UN agencies or NGOs in recent months or years? What do you think of the government and international actors' work with IDPs in the area?
    - i. Has the government tried to forcefully evict IDP families?
    - ii. How do the police treat these IDPs?
15. How can NGOs and the government better help your host community with the challenge of the IDPs?
16. How do you see the future of your community?
17. Would you permit us to contact you if we have any follow-up questions? (Yes/No)

## IDP Community Leaders or Female Shura Leaders

18. What is your province of origin? Where did you live before coming here?
- a. What was your life like there?
    - i. What was your main source of income in the area?
    - ii. What type of shelter did you have / what material goods did you own?
    - iii. Did your children go to school?
    - iv. Did you have access to health care, food, water etc?
    - v. Were the women allowed outside their homes?
    - vi. What did you enjoy about living there?
    - vii. What were your difficulties living there?
19. What were the reasons for your displacement to this current location?
- a. How many times were you displaced? Did you directly come here?
  - b. What was the basic history of your displacement and/or your community's displacement (if different)?
20. Were any of you refugees (legal refugees in Iran, Pakistan or elsewhere) in the past?
- i. If yes, where and for how long?
  - ii. When did you return?
  - iii. Upon return, where did you go?
  - iv. What were your expectations of return?
21. Are any of the household members abroad or elsewhere in Afghanistan at the moment?
- a. Where and for how long?
  - b. What are they doing there?
  - c. What do you hope to get out of this migration?
  - d. Do households here receive remittances from abroad?
22. What is the current state of your IDP community?
- a. Food / Water
  - b. Healthcare
  - c. Education for your children
  - d. Finances / Jobs
  - e. Land / Shelter
  - f. Documentation – do people have a tazkera or passport? Have they ever had one? Have they lost it? Have you tried to obtain one? Is this a big hindrance in your life?
  - g. Family and/or community life
  - h. How are living conditions for women? Esp. as compared to before their displacement

- i. Security conditions? How, if at all, do you ensure the security of your community? What are the greatest protection needs of your community?
  - j. Do you feel that your IDP community is discriminated against? If so, by whom and how?
23. What is your relationship with the IDP households in the area?
- a. What are some of the major challenges you face as an IDP community leader? How do you lead your IDP community? What are the coping strategies you have employed for your community to address their protection needs?
24. What is your relationship with the host / local community that lived here before this IDP settlement was established?
- a. How has the host community interacted with you?
    - i. Have they helped you? If yes, how?
    - ii. Have they not been cooperative? How?
  - b. How can the host community better help your IDP community?
25. Has your community received assistance in recent months or years?
- a. If yes from whom? GoA, UN, NGO? Try to be specific
  - b. What type of assistance? Food, non-food, cash, loans, jobs...
  - c. When? Once, multiple times? Winter assistance?
  - d. Has the local community also received assistance or just specifically for IDPs?
  - e. Was this assistance planned in consultation with you, prior to its delivery?
  - f. Have you been interviewed before to assess your community's needs?
26. What are your plans for the future of your IDP community? What are you doing, if anything, to achieve these aspirations?
- a. How is your relationship with the government, local authorities and the police?
  - b. Have you ever been threatened to leave by any external actor (whether the host community, the government, the police, etc)?
  - c. Have there been any instances of forced eviction? Explain.
27. How long would you like to live here?
- a. Is this your home for good, or do you plan to move again?
  - b. Do you plan to return to your place of origin / the place you left? If yes, when?
  - c. Has anyone in your community been back there, even briefly, to check on the situation?
- d. Does your community still own homes, livestock, goods in those areas? Or is there nothing to go back to?
  - e. What could be done or improved in your area of origin to induce you to return there?
  - f. What could have been done, in your area of origin, to prevent you from leaving in the first place?
28. Do you believe this displacement was good for you? Explain.
- a. What did you expect your life to be like when you arrived here?
  - b. How is your life different from your expectations?
29. Would you permit us to contact you if we have any follow-up questions? (Yes/No)

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