DISPLACEMENT DYNAMICS
IDP Movement Tracking, Needs and Vulnerability Analysis
Herat and Helmand Afghanistan
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1. Introduction

1.1. Background

This study presents the results of IOM’s IDP Movement Tracking and Needs and Vulnerability Analysis Exercise conducted in December 2013 by a research team at Samuel Hall Consulting. It seeks to provide IOM – and its migration and displacement partners – with field-based evidence of issues that negatively impact both conflict and natural disaster-induced IDPs in Afghanistan. The focus of this report is on the provinces of Herat (West) and Helmand (South), pre-selected by IOM and identified in OCHA’s humanitarian overview as provinces that ranked highest on vulnerability indicators collected by clusters1. As such, this exercise serves a dual purpose – providing IOM with internal programming recommendations specific to these provinces and providing the humanitarian community in Afghanistan with information upon which to build displacement-sensitive and local programming.

It is foreseen that through this exercise, an all-inclusive (conflict and natural disaster (ND) -induced IDPs combined with other factors inducing internal displacement) baseline data on internal displacement will be presented which future assessments can build from. The survey tool used is derived from the standard IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), adapted to the Afghan context by the research team at Samuel Hall with contributions on specific sectorial issues from key actors and stakeholders within the humanitarian community. The DTM is an IOM institutional information management tool used to gather cross-cutting baseline information on displaced populations. It has been rolled out in over 30 countries including Haiti, Pakistan, Mali, The Democratic Republic of Congo and the Philippines. IOM hopes to build on this first pilot in two provinces to launch the DTM in the remaining 32 other provinces of Afghanistan, in order to provide a nationwide assessment, as well as comparative and longitudinal data, to inform future IDP programming.

This exercise falls at a time of increasing conflict, insecurity and internal displacement in Afghanistan. In a report from November of 2013, 905 families were reported as newly displaced. 40% of this displacement took place in the months of October and November 2013 alone2. These recently profiled IDPs increase the total to over 620,000 IDPs across the country, with about 20% (just above 117,000) displaced in 2013. The trend of increase in recent migration includes conflict displaced IDPs forced to flee unsafe provinces as well as natural disasters affecting livelihoods and nomadic routes.

242 natural disaster incidents were recorded as affecting population flows in Afghanistan in 2013. Droughts, floods and heavy rainfall affected over 13,000 families, all across northern, north-eastern, southern, south-eastern, western, eastern and central parts of the country3. Of these 1,517 families became IDPs during the course of last year. Drought in Ghor and Badghis provinces forced 677 families to migrate to Herat province.

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1 Afghanistan Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CAHP) 2013 p.17 Afghanistan Needs and Vulnerability Analysis
2 UNHCR, Conflict Induced Internal Displacement – Monthly Update, November 2013, Afghanistan
In addition to the new IDPs are the protracted cases, and those suffering from multiple displacements. In August 2008, UNHCR reported that 20% of all IDP families were returned refugees\(^4\). Of these, 20-30% were displaced for a second time, as they attempted to return to their place of origin or a third location. These include movement away from Pakistan and Iran due to closure of refugee camps and deportation of irregular migrants. Their particular migration through the western border has resulted in 32,000 returnees (individuals) as part of the IDP caseload. The UNHCR has also indicated that the 2013 continued to see trends in secondary displacement and displacement of returned refugees.

In such a context of increasing internal displacement, and repeated primary, secondary and tertiary displacement, the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) covers a set of questions that enquire about IDP families’ history of movement. It records through the responses, the family’s destination, type, year, duration, and reason of displacement starting from the place of origin. The DTM also provides a specific focus on IDPs who may have previously been returned refugees or deportees.

1.2. Objectives and Research Questions

The objectives of this research are two-fold:

1. Conduct a quantitative survey among IDP households in Helmand and Herat, and collect additional qualitative data through key informant interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs).

2. Assess the IDP households’ socio-economic and demographic characteristics, displacement history and movement patterns, basic needs and vulnerabilities, assistance and durable solutions to inform IOM programming and more broadly for the humanitarian community’s programming and response.

The research answers the following questions about IDP movement to these locations:

1. **Migration profile and Movement intentions.** What are the movement patterns, migration background and intentions of IDPs in Helmand and Herat?

2. **Protection profile.** What are the protection issues IDPs – male/female, adults/youth – are faced with in Helmand and Herat?

3. **Needs and vulnerability assessment.** What are the needs of IDPs, their ability to fulfil these needs (existing coping mechanisms) vs. existing vulnerabilities that need to be addressed by the assistance community?

4. **Durable solutions.** What are the prospects for local integration, return and/or resettlement?

\(^4\) UNHCR (2008), *National Profile of Internal Displaced Person in Afghanistan*
2. Methodology

The study used a mixed methods approach to reach the objectives defined above. This Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) report is a first for IOM Afghanistan with the intention to improve the methodology and process to further roll out the DTM research to other provinces in Afghanistan.

To frame the analysis, a desk review of past reports on IDP movement was conducted for an initial context and knowledge of the location. Following that, secondary research was also used to corroborate findings from the field in the final report (see bibliography). This methodology sections will delve in the site selection criteria, quantitative and qualitative surveys conducted by the research team at Samuel Hall.

2.1. Site Selection Criteria

Field visits to Helmand and Herat provinces, in both rural and urban areas were planned to cover a range of IDP household profiles and needs. The two provinces were pre-selected by IOM.

In each of the two provinces, the team selected three Primary Sampling Units (PSUs):

- PSU 1: Urban IDP location
- PSU 2: Peri-urban IDP location
- PSU 3: Rural IDP location

The selection of respondents was based on a random sampling techniques where interviewers started from a landmark (mosque, community centre, community leader’s house or school), then moving to cover all four directions of the camp. Every third household was selected in order to keep the sampling random. The respondents were either head of households or their spouses.

The selection of specific sites under each PSU was done with the help of IOM field staff who were able to direct the research teams towards distinctly representative settlements. While choice of two to three settlements were provided by the IOM staff, the research team zeroed in on the sites based on corroboration from other agencies and its own secondary research to be able to get the most representative settlement.

The fieldwork in Herat and Helmand will on-going simultaneously and will follow the same fieldwork process as detailed below.

- Day 1 – 2: First PSU covered – starting with an urban PSU
- Day 3 – 4: Second PSU covered – continuing with a rural PSU
- Day 5 – 6: Third and final PSU covered – ending with a semi-urban PSU

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Peri-urban is defined as pertaining to a district adjacent to the district center – i.e. sharing one border with the district center
2.2. Research Tools

2.2.1. Quantitative Survey and the DTM: A total of 720 IDP households surveyed

IOM has developed its Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) tool, which has been active in more than 15 post-crisis situations or emergencies globally to enhance its operational response. While IOM Afghanistan has been the lead organization on natural-disaster induced displacement and a key actor in the IDP task force and National IDP Policy working group, activation of DTM in Afghanistan will allow IOM to regularly capture, process and disseminate complex information to provide a clear understanding of the changing location, vulnerabilities and needs of affected populations throughout IDP situations.

A standard DTM quantitative survey questionnaire was adapted by the research team at Samuel Hall to reflect the local specificities of internal displacement in Afghanistan. The survey form covered the following sections:
- Ethnic characteristics
- Housing
- Family migration and displacement history
- Household composition and socio-economic characteristics
- Income and livelihood
- Basic needs (food security and nutrition, shelter, water, hygiene and sanitation, health, education and protection)
- Property
- Durable solutions: Return, Local integration and Resettlement
  o Return module
  o Local integration module
  o Resettlement in a third location module
- Family assistance and community assistance

Quantitative fieldwork with identical sampling techniques was conducted across the selected cities where IDP camps/settlements were to be found. The quantitative fieldwork also allowed teams to observe the IDP camps and take notes regarding surroundings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Location (Village/camp)</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Herat</td>
<td>Padshan</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Ishaqabad and Kamarkalaq</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peri-urban</td>
<td>Karizak and Shaidayee</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helmand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Kakaryan, Mayoben and Tapa-e-bolan</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peri-urban</td>
<td>Faqiran and Qala-e-khona</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Mukhtar Camp</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>720</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The training for the fieldwork, in the presence of two team leaders and twelve interviewers, was conducted in Kabul on December 9 and 10, 2013 with a pilot test and debrief on Monday December 10, 2013. The training and pilot test allowed the research team to refine the survey tools both on

- **Content** – rewording questions, checking translations and deleting questions that could be better captured in the qualitative fieldwork and tools. As a result, the number of questions was drastically reduced with the prior approval of IOM, to be able to reach a target of 10 interviews per enumerator per day in the field.
- **Format** – the Dari and Pashto formats were improved, removing the English script initially kept by IOM, which prevented having a thorough translation and proper Dari and Pashto layout for the field teams.

To analyse the data, the research team relied on SPSS to draw descriptive statistics, mainly frequencies, crosstabs and binaries. Beyond these descriptives, correlation analyses were used to determine the significance and strength of the relationships between primary factors involved in migration and local integration. The variables investigated were chosen based on different theoretical hypothesis resulting from the presumed impact shown in preliminary analyses. Certain relevant variables were not successfully tested through correlations analysis due to limited variance in sample. Depending on the type of variable computed, T-tests, chi-square tests, Pearson’s correlations and ANOVA tests were used. The results considered statistically significant are those where the \( p \) value was lower than 0.05, i.e. with a 5% chance of being wrong in rejecting the null hypothesis. In all the other cases the null hypothesis could not be rejected.

### 2.2.2. Qualitative Survey: 15 Focus Groups and 10 Community Leader Interviews

#### 2.2.2.1. Focus Groups

Qualitative fieldwork was conducted through 15 focus group discussions and 10 community leader interviews with IDP and host communities and a total of 11 key informant interviews with implementing/operational partners, United Nations agencies, government and national stakeholders.

Focus group discussions were composed of an average of six participants per group, disaggregated by gender (male/female) and age (adult/youth). Community leader interviews consisted of one-on-one interviews with representatives of around 30-40 families per settlement. They were asked questions on the community’s standard of living in the place of displacement, the history of their interaction with government authorities and international agencies, their relations with the host communities and finally, the challenges of the community leaving in the current location.
Table 2.2: Qualitative Fieldwork Breakdown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tool</th>
<th>Respondent Category</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Peri-urban</th>
<th>Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Herat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGDs</td>
<td>Adult Male</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adult Female</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comm Leader</td>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Host</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Helmand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGDs</td>
<td>Adult Male</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adult Females</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comm Leader</td>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Host</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2.2.2. Key informant interviews

Key Informant Interviews with a range of stakeholders: practitioners, government representatives and coordinating agencies in Kabul, Herat and Helmand to gather perspectives of those mandated to respond to the needs of IDPs.

The key informant interviews were compiled based on list of agencies that were active in humanitarian assistance, development programmes, coordinating agencies and government representatives. The profile of respondents ranged from project/field officers delivering assistance on field, to regional and country heads of agencies. As such the interviews were conducted by the field teams in Herat, Helmand and Kabul from the list compiled by IOM’s network of partner agencies. There were three kinds of stakeholders based on which the KII questions were based:

1. *Implementing and operational partners* – Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Danish Refugee Council (DRC), International Relief Committee (IRC), Welthungerhilfe / German Agro-Action (WHH), Humanitarian Action for the People of Afghanistan (HAPA)
3. *Government agencies and national stakeholders* – Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation (MoRR), Directorate of Refugees and Repatriation (DoRR), Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA) and Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC).
2.3. Limitations and Constraints

**Questionnaire design.** Overall, the questionnaire currently being used for DTM and vulnerability assessment by the IOM requires some restructuring in order to be more user/surveyor friendly in Afghanistan. The first phase of survey in Herat and Helmand gave insights as to how the questionnaire may be modified to suit the local context better and be surveyor friendly.

**Field specificities.** In Helmand, cultural sensitivities prevented the teams from surveying women in the quantitative assessment. As such the field teams could not carry women enumerators. Although most proposed sites could be surveyed, there were instances in Helmand where field teams had to change locations of survey due to security reasons.
3. Migration Profile & Movement Intentions

Herat and Helmand share dynamic migration profiles: the data collected through this survey highlight the multiple displacements and migration experienced by IDPs now residing in Herat and Helmand provinces. A considerable share has previously crossed the border South and West to Pakistan and Iran. Considering both provinces’ proximity to the borders with these two countries, and the traditional coping mechanism of migration regionally for economic or social purposes (whether for short or long-term jobs, medical care or visits to families and relatives on the other side of the border), the migration profile of IDPs are complex: some migrated voluntary or by force before and after being displaced internally. As such, a large share of returning migrants and returning refugees from Iran and Pakistan merge with a population forced to move internally, due to conflict or natural disasters, due to the onset of droughts and dry spells in locations of origin. Migration continues to be a precursor to and a way to cope with forced displacement and the lack of livelihoods in the locations of displacement. The main patterns of migration that were observed among IDPs surveyed were:

1. **Deportee – IDPs**: Individuals who had moved to Iran but were deported back to their places of origin. Subsequently they moved into displacement due to insecurity at home

2. **Refugee returnee – IDPs**: The second group were people who had been refugees in Iran and Pakistan, returned to their places of origin or the district centre and then eventually moved to districts in Helmand and Herat as a way to cope with physical and economic insecurity at home

3. **Secondary displaced**: The third group consisted of households who moved internally from one district to another (mostly only intermediary district within the same provinces), and, depending upon where assistance was being provided or the presence of relatives, subsequently moved to another district in Helmand or Herat.

4. **First time IDPs**: Finally, there were people who moved directly to urban areas in Helmand and Herat due to conflict, natural or human-made disasters or a combination of the above.

Herat and Helmand share a clear urbanization trend: in addition to the overlap between returnee and IDP categories, the survey reveals that IDPs are in search of better opportunities with a mix of push and pull factors leading them to migrate to urban areas. IDPs are part of the mass of populations that have moved towards safer cities with better economic prospects, at a time of increasing physical and human insecurity in Afghanistan in 2013. As a result, IDP inflows to the cities have added pressure to the absorption capacities of Herat and Helmand and continue to be a challenge for stakeholder response to their needs.

Lastly, **IDPs in Herat and Helmand do not consider resettlement as a viable option**. When considering moving, most respondents considered either moving back or not moving at all. There was very little evidence to support the claim that households would accept to move to another location from their current location. Harsh economic conditions and the debt of the first few initial moves do not allow households to have sufficient resources to move to a new location. IDPs do not want to move any further, primarily due to two reasons: First, they were being allowed to stay in the area. Second, the security situation made them feel safer than going back to their place of origin or anywhere else.
This chapter will:

- First review current IDP trends in Herat and Helmand, as recorded in the PSUs visited for this research, with a focus on inter and intra provincial displacement as well as secondary displacement.
- Second move to a discussion around the reasons for displacement and
- Third, discuss movement intentions relevant to planning for assistance and response.

3.1. Mapping current IDP trends in Herat & Helmand

The movement recorded is divided between intra-provincial and inter-provincial movement patterns. Intra-provincial migration is reflected in movements from the periphery towards the centre of the province, the economic hub and the administrative capital. Inter-provincial movements have guided people directly to the centres in Herat and Helmand, from other provinces, based in part on the availability of social networks, perceived physical and economic security and the assistance from international agencies and government. These considerations have led to dynamic profiles of movement to the two centres.

The example of Helmand province is illustrative of the different flows. Our research shows the following layering of movement:

1) Intra-provincial movement:
   a. IDPs from Marjah and Nawa districts of Helmand first move to Iran, then back to their own districts, before being forced to move to the centre of Helmand.
   b. Families who had moved to the centre of Helmand were either from surrounding districts of Helmand itself or from neighbouring provinces. The districts of Helmand where they came from were Musakala, Marjah, Nadali, Kajaki, Nawzad, Washir, Sangin, Baghran, Desho, Baghlai, Khanishin and Nawa districts.

2) Inter-provincial movement:
   a. IDPs from Kakaran village of Shiberghan province, who move to Chaman in Quetta, Pakistan, before moving back to Nawa, Helmand, then Kakaran village, and now Faqiran, Helmand.
   b. IDPs from Ghazni, who first moved to Iran, then back to Marjah district of Helmand, then further displaced to Faqiran village, Helmand.
   c. Adjacent provinces from where migration to Helmand took place were Kandahar, Uruzgan, Farah and Ghor.

3) Direct movement to Helmand from within or outside of the surveyed province.
BOX 1. Migration dynamics
Faqiran Village, Helmand

“There are around a 100 families living here: IDPs from Marjah, Nadali, Garamser, Asarjo, Nawa districts. We have come here at different points in time – the maximum being 5 years and minimum 2 years ago. We have come here because of droughts and fighting, but mostly because of the conflict between Taliban and government forces. In this area there are people among us who went to Pakistan, then came back to their places of origin and finally migrated here – this is sometimes the third displacement. The land on which we live belongs to the government, but when we came here it was a desert and nobody was living here. We built our houses on our own but none of us possess our land. Our houses back in the places of origin are destroyed, either due to fighting or because we were no longer there to maintain them: the snow falls on the roof and if we don’t clear it then it becomes heavy and falls down.”

3.1.1. Inter-provincial movement: Displacements from outside the surveyed provinces

The survey captured households displaced from districts spread across 13 provinces of Afghanistan. In addition to the intra provincial displacement, IDPs interviewed in Herat in December 2013 can be traced back to Ghazni, Faryab, Badghis, Kandahar, Ghor and Khost and those in Helmand to Ghazni, Balkh, Jowzjan, Faryab, Farah, Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Ghor, Bamyang, Saripul and Daikundi.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.1: IDP Places of origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Current Location</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to UNHCR data released in 2014 on internal displacement to Herat, between October and December 2013, 886 families (over 3,819 individuals) were displaced to Herat due to conflict: 450 families from Ghor and 336 families from Badghis. Overall, out of the 1,361 IDP families, 80%
are currently from Ghor province while the remaining 20% are from Badghis province, the largest inter-provincial IDP flows to Herat in 2013 as verified in the surveyed locations.

### 3.1.2. Intra-provincial movements: Displacements within the surveyed provinces

Intra-provincial displacement from Herat and Helmand were common on account of drought and conflict in Herat, and mainly conflict in Helmand: 24% of the displacement in Herat and 63% displacement in Helmand was from within the provinces (see table 3.1). The higher share of intra displacement in Helmand was due to the conflict in Nawa-e-Barakzai, Nawzad, Baghran, Garmser, Musaqala, Khanshin and Sangin districts. Periphery districts of Herat such as Gulran and Pashtun Zargun have conflict while Koshki Kona and Ab Kamari are where the drought was recorded as a push factor for internal displacement.

Intra provincial displacement captures a different set of demographics of the displaced because they are able to retain their large social networks and familiarity with their location of refuge. It is easier for them to find residence and jobs in the city through relatives, friends and in few cases, business networks. Secondly, the smaller distance to place of origin often means that they may be able to return back to their homes to ascertain the situation and manage property – a trend previously recorded in other studies on urban IDPs (WB/UNHCR 2011).

Intra-provincial displacement also includes, especially in Herat, sedentarised Kuchis displaced from their places of origin due to conflict or drought, having lost their livestock and homes. They seem to unanimously agree to stay in Herat since they no longer have land or property, nor livestock, back in their places of origin.

“During the period of Taliban we immigrated from Babaje in Helmand to Quetta, Pakistan. We lived there for 5 years because of war. The Pakistani government wanted us to leave Pakistan and we directly came back to Babaje of Helmand province and because of internal wars that always happen from Taliban inevitably we come to Lashkargah city to Qala-e-kohna.”

-Adult Female, Qala-e-Khona Village, Helmand

“Originally, we are from Herat. We lived in Koshakkona for twenty years but due to the droughts in Koshakkona we moved to Gulran district of Herat and stayed there for 4-5 years. Due to the fighting between government and anti government elements we shifted to our current location.”

-Community Leader, Noor Zai village, Herat
3.1.3. Secondary displacement: Overlap between returnee and IDP categories

The proximity of the surveyed locations to international borders that have been historically porous and open to forced migration and subject to irregular migration has meant that the survey also captured a percentage of people returned from Iran and Pakistan – whether returning refugees or returning migrants. Broadly speaking, these populations of returnees have different levels of well-being.

For those accumulating migration experiences, the process of migration, return and internal displacement results in increased vulnerabilities. The overlap of return, internal displacement and further migration indicates a mixture of forced and voluntary movement indicative of coping mechanisms sought to respond to either physical or economic insecurities, or both. A few of these families either attempted to return to their places of origin or settle in some other district than the ones surveyed. However, economic hardships have forced these households to move yet again towards urban areas in search of livelihoods.

From the quantitative sample, the rate of secondary or tertiary displacement is limited. According to respondents surveyed, all had been displaced once – but only 8% had been displaced twice, and a further 2% were in their third displacement episode. What the survey did not capture, however, are the multiple coping mechanisms within one family: while the survey questionnaire asked about household movement, in many cases, after an initial first or second displacement, further mobility is defined at the individual level rather than at the household level. The qualitative data gathered shows that heads of households or younger men living in IDP households in Herat or Helmand were likely to cross the border to Iran or Pakistan for work, medical care or other temporary visits. Such mobility patterns are not captured by the DTM that focuses on the household level mobility patterns.

“We are from Helmand province but our forth fathers came to Badghis and lived there for 6-7 years. In 1984 we migrated to Iran and we were there for 10 years and came back in 1994. When we returned to our country first we came to Pashtoon Zarghoon district, Herat province. We purchased lands and livestock and started living in Pashtoon Zarghoon. We were happy there as we had access to basic needs of life but the time came that due to the anti-government groups we obliged to leave the area and sell all our lands and livestock and shifted here. We are living here for the last 3 years.”

-Community leader, Ishaqabad Village, Herat
### 3.2. Reasons for displacement

Multiple migration layers complicate the understanding behind the drivers of internal displacement. As recognized by a UNHCR assessment of IDPs in Herat (January 2014), “multiple reasons for the displacement of these families render it difficult to say what actually triggered the recent displacement”. In the sample surveyed, the co-existence of multiple drivers of displacement was highlighted by IDPs themselves. As a result, when asked what was the main reason why the IDP household had been displaced over time, 55% of IDPs mentioned conflict and insecurity, 32% both natural disasters and conflict, 12.5% natural disasters alone, and 1% human-made disasters.

**Graph 3.1: Drivers of displacement**

There are primarily three reasons – that overlap for one third of the caseload – why IDPs surveyed in Herat and Helmand have been forcibly displaced from their homes:

1) **Natural disasters:** dry spells and droughts in 2013 destroyed the cultivation leaving people in dire economic situations throughout the west, north and south of Afghanistan.

2) **Conflict:** between government and Taliban / anti-government forces, mainly, with a minority only indicating tribal conflicts as the root of the insecurity.

3) **Human-made disasters:** destruction of crops due to spraying of narcotics by foreign troops to kill poppy cultivation, noticeable in the south and in Helmand. Families interviewed mentioned that other crops were also destroyed as a side effect of poppy eradication, forcing them to leave their homes.

In terms of the causes of displacement, the findings of this survey are similar to past studies on internal displacement in Afghanistan\(^6\) and overall available data and statistics made available by UNHCR\(^7\), which indicate conflict as the primary and natural disaster as the secondary reasons for displacement. Conflict was the primary reasons and natural disaster – drought – the secondary

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\(^7\)136 families from Ghor and Badghis to Herat were registered and profiled in November, 2013 displaced due to a combination of conflict and drought. UNHCR, Conflict Induced Displacement – Monthly Update, (November & December 2013)
reason for displacement. However, it is important to note that there were often two reasons for moving. The example of Ghor Province is telling in this regard. There were two reasons for populations from Ghor to move to Herat and Helmand:

1) **Conflict**: Ghor residents had been displaced because of fighting between anti-government elements (AGE) and government forces in Badghis, and tribal conflict in Ghor,

2) **Natural disaster**: A drought was reported in Ghor province where a dry spell in the summer had led to a massive crop failure, forcing people to be displaced because of a lack of livelihood and a lack of food. Most of the first arrivals recorded by UNHCR were indeed displaced mainly because of lack of food, while insecurity and conflict were also cited as the main reason for displacement.

When further prompted for the prevailing situation in the place of origin that led to displacement, a more nuanced set of indicators was provided by interviewees, as illustrated in Table 3.2.

### 3.2.1. Conflict-induced displacement: Primary reason for displacement

Table 3.2 describes the reasons of displacement according to the provinces of origin. Conflict and insecurity continue to be the primary cause of displacement for 87% of respondents. Indeed, 83% of the population surveyed was displaced due to armed conflict while 4% indicated displacement due to generalized violence. In a past study conducted by Samuel Hall Consulting (2011) in Herat, Kandahar and Kabul in 2011, armed conflict was cited as the reason for displacement by 83% of population8.

IDPs originating from Ghor and Badghis show a specific profile of conflict-induced displacement marked by the prevalence of:

- **Persecution and violent retaliation** – respectively 56% for Badghis and 59% for Ghor
- **Extortion from armed actors (mainly AGEs)** – respectively 72% and 77% for Badghis and Ghor.

The rates of persecution, violent retaliation and extortion from armed actors are between 2 to 4 times higher than the rates seen in other provinces of origin.

### 3.2.2. Natural disaster induced displacement: The second reason for displacement

19% of the respondents said they were displaced due to natural disasters predominantly over other factors. Onset of drought in Gulran, Khosht and Pashtun Zargun districts in Herat and Shahrak and Pasawand district of Ghor saw considerable displacement of households. Table 3.2 shows that the highest number of drought-driven displacement occurred from Ghor (25%) and from Herat province (40%). The drought, affecting a number of other districts also had effect on the Kuchi nomadic population who lost their livestock due to lack of drinking water and destruction of pasture lands. The drought eventually eroded the traditional means of livelihood for these people. These also contributed to the 20% sample that cited economic reasons for displacement.

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8Ibid
Ghor is one of the most severely affected provinces by the dry spell and failed harvest – apart from the pledged amount of WFP food rations, the food promised by the government had not reached the population in Ghor. Displacement can therefore continue to be anticipated in Ghor unless food aid reaches the area – not just for the vulnerable households but also more widely for all populations affected by the dry spell as the lack of food is believed to be one of the main reasons for the recorded mass displacements to other provinces such as Herat and Helmand.

In 11 cases from Helmand, the respondents identified themselves as Kochi nomads from Ghor, Saripul, Jawzjan and Helmand who were now residing in Mokhtar and Bolan IDP camps. These nomads were conflict/drought displaced now settled in Helmand. In addition, IDPs from the districts on the periphery of Herat province, such as Koshk and Gulran indicated the loss of traditional circuit of movement (which they used as nomads) as their reason to converge towards the provincial centre.

3.2.3. Inter-community relations: ethnicity and host community

Tribal and ethnic affinities are often one variable weighing in on the choice of destination. 79% of the IDPs in Helmand are Pashtun as opposed to 34% of Pashtun IDPs in Herat. 99% of the IDPs in Helmand were settled in with Pashtun host community. As opposed to that, Herat is a more multi-ethnic with a majority of Tajik IDPs (60.5%), followed by one third of Pashtun IDPs (34.2%), and a minority of Hazara (4.2%) IDPs. Most importantly, the population of Pashtun IDPs recorded in Herat is for the most part composed of Kuchis forced to become sedentarised due to conflict and natural disasters that disrupted their nomadic lifestyle. This points to the growing need to recognize the Kuchi as a vulnerable population among the IDP caseloads in the West – with different needs than the rest of the IDP population given the disruption in age-old traditions and coping mechanisms.

Furthermore, examining more closely the breakdown by ethnicity, the inflow of Tajik IDPs was recorded in the past year (2012/2013): indeed, 89% of the Tajik IDPs were displaced in the past year, as opposed to the majority of Pashtuns (57%) who were displaced between 2006 and 2011 and over one third (39%) displaced before 2006. The Tajiks stand out in the sample surveyed as the more newly vulnerable populations of internally displaced – highlighting a trend of forced displacement in Afghanistan less focused on the Southern provinces and districts and traditional conflict, and reflective of other sources of conflict, and their combination with natural disasters, in non-Pashtun areas.

The increase in newly displaced IDPs to Herat is also a consequence of pull factors according to key informants interviewed in Herat: it is widely believed, notably among the host community and other national stakeholders, those IDPs are driven to Herat because of the assistance provided there, especially in the winter. The better security condition, coupled with a more stable economic context and greater multi-culturalism has resulted in Herat becoming a more attractive destination for IDPs seeking security.

“Actually Herat has a factor of pulling people here. There are more opportunities here. If we compare them to other provinces, the situation is completely different. If a person comes from those provinces to Herat it is almost like switching countries because Herat is more developed. And this province is multi-cultural. That is why a lot of people can fit into the culture here. We have Shias and Sunnis; we have all ethnic groups from all Afghanistan here. These are the pull factors.”

-Key Informant Interview, Herat
TABLE 3.2: Reasons of displacement by provinces of origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Values</th>
<th>Badghis</th>
<th>Ghor</th>
<th>Helmand</th>
<th>Herat</th>
<th>Sari Pul</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Grand Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># of households</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Armed conflict</strong></td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic discrimination</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political discrimination</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious discrimination</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persecution / violent retaliation</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extortion from armed actors</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of mines, IEDs, UXOs</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extortion from armed actors (anti-government elements / AGEs)</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extortion from armed actors (Afghan forces)</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Natural disaster</strong></td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme/Harsh Winter</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drought</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Man-made</strong></td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack / destruction of land</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack / destruction of housing</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cessation of traditional circuit/movements (nomads)</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Situation of generalized violence</strong></td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear from the effect of armed conflict</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic reason</strong></td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No access to arable / pasture lands</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No access to water</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No access to food</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No access to education</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No employment opportunities</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3. Profiles by duration of displacement

In this sample, IDPs displaced over 10-15 years ago were more likely to experience secondary displacement. This could be on account of migration and deportation from Iran and Pakistan, which led households to resettle in intermediary districts or to return to their place of origin, before being further displaced. Either continuing conflict or natural disasters have played a role in displacing them for the second and third time. On the other hand, the newly displaced IDPs witness a direct migration to the location of displacement, attracted to this destination by the news of assistance being provided to IDP families from international and government agencies. The selection of destination is also determined by the ethnic and cultural affinity to the host communities of the respective areas.

3.3.1. Duration of displacement: focus on a protracted caseload

The survey captured families that had been displaced from their location of origin since 1963 due to conflict. Upon displacement they took refuge in Iran and returned to the country only in 1973. Upon return partly settled in Gulran district and Pashtun Zargun district in Herat province. These families were subject to secondary displacement due to conflict and moved to Herat centre between 2007-2009. Some of these families had established themselves in the districts of return by buying land and setting up agriculture.

Protracted cases from Nawa-e-Barakzai and Nawzad district of Helmand took refuge in Pakistan. These families upon return attempted resettlement back in the place of origin before being displaced a second time towards the provincial centre.

The return of cross border migrants was most often on account of deportation from the country. These people were deportees and returnees having experienced displacement multiple times before settling in the current location. Thus, from among the protracted respondents, several were cases of secondary and even tertiary displacement.

3.3.2. Newly displaced: from the individual to the community

The new IDPs displaced from the recent onset of drought along with active conflict were mainly captured in Herat province. For instance, respondent from an FGD in Shaidayee camp in Herat said: “We are from Ghor province, we have been residing here from the last one month. We came due to natural disaster”. Other FGD members from this camp also experienced displacement 1-3 months back. Movement of new IDPs to Helmand was scarce.

The inter-provincial differences were on account of more assistance being offered in Herat. Casual interviews with residents of the new IDP camp informed that one individual from the village travels to Herat and upon confirmation of assistance available send word to bring their own family and the community to come in.

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9 Migration was facilitated from the Chaman Quetta border, still used by individual members of these families to cross periodically every year for work and income.

10 As informed by a development practitioner and key informant for this research, the truck drivers that operate between Herat and other provinces are the initial source of information for the families. Through them, the families learn of the kind of assistance being provided following which they are transported by these drivers itself. Often the information about the amount of assistance is exaggerated by these truck drivers to induce people to travel with them so that they can be charged for the transportation.
FIGURE 2.2: Displacement of households by most recent year of displacement
3.3.3. Three tier risk categories

On the basis of the mapping done above, the districts have been classified under three tier risk categories. Figure 3.3 describes classification of districts/provinces of displacement according to these risk categories.

- The high-risk category consists of districts from where the sample captured at least 20 people moving out with displacement occurring till last year. One district from Badghis (Jawand), three districts from Ghor (Shahrak, Cheghcheran and Du layna) and two districts from Herat (Khoshk and Gulran) are high-risk districts. All these districts are afflicted with conflict and natural disaster.

- The second tier medium risk category consists of all districts, which have seen instances of displacement over the last four years. However, the outflow from these districts captured by the sample is not as high as the first category. Districts from Badghis, Ghor, Helmand, Herat, Faryab, Sari Pul and Uruzgan are identified in medium risk category. The remaining districts are low risk with the latest displacement captured being more than four years old.

- The low risk categories of district are the residual from the first two, i.e., isolated or small number of cases from provinces such as Bamyan, Khost and Daikundi.
FIGURE 2.3: Classification of district/provinces by risk of displacement\footnote{For definition on the three tiers of displacement see section 2.3}
3.4. Movement intentions

At an individual level, cross-border movement for work characterizes IDPs’ movement intentions, with heads of households or single adult males crossing the border and leaving their families behind – rather than at the family level. For the most part, men migrate to Iran for work, sending remittances back to their families. In Herat, they are unable to find jobs in the city as they blame the lack of market information and the lack of job opportunities as a hindrance to their ability to secure temporary or permanent livelihoods, beyond casual day labour.

At a household level, families’ migration intentions remain largely focused on local integration: this desire to integrate with the local community increases with the duration of settlement in the current location, while financial considerations (debts incurred towards migration and cost of migration and return) are the main obstacle for other durable solutions for the more newly displaced. As a result, in Herat, most respondents interviewed do not intend to go back to their place of origin regardless of improvement in the security situation. Some consider going back if transportation assistance is given to them. In Helmand, only a small number interviewed intend to go back if security stabilizes. Overall, the only condition upon which they would consider going back is two-fold: improvement in security coupled with provision by the government or aid organization for their transport and resettlement.

3.4.1. Intermediate and Secondary movement

Only 15% people from Herat and 6% people from Helmand said that they had migrated to an intermediate location before coming to live in the current location of residence. Districts on the periphery of Helmand namely, Nawa, Garmser and Nadali were districts where migration took place between 2002-2009. IDPs coming to Herat temporarily relocated themselves in Gulran and Pashtun Zargun before coming to the centre. Besides these, there were instances where people had migrated to the centre of provinces such as Nimroz and Paktika before landing up in Herat and Helmand.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Move to</th>
<th>Herat</th>
<th>Helmand</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate Location</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directly to Current Location</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>720</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 3.3: Intermediate/direct migration to place of origin
3.4.2. Specific patterns and profiles of migration

In cases of protracted movement to these provinces through cross border migration, households were often able to establish some kind of network or opportunity for return to Iran/Pakistan. Iran, which has historically offered better economic opportunities for Afghans now hosts individual members of IDP families settled in Herat for purposes of livelihood. IDP households in Helmand have access to the Pakistan border, with male members of family often travelling to Quetta for jobs on a periodic basis.

I have traveled outside of Afghanistan alone. I have gone to Quetta, Pakistan for work. Each of my travel takes 6 months. I go once a year to Pakistan for job. Because of my bad economic situation my family and I directly came to this location. We have been living in this location for 11 years.

-Male, 26 years, Mukhtar IDP camp, Helmand

I traveled with my family to Pakistan and we had lived in rental houses in Peshawar. I was at Pakistan for about 4 years. After Pakistan I came back to Marja district but left because of war. We came from Marja to Helmand and it’s been about 8 years since we are living here. There was both war and drought in Marja. Our land and house got destroyed in Marja and we became refugees.

-Male, 50 years, Faqiran IDP camp, Helmand

We are from Helmand province but our forth fathers came to Badghish and lived there for 6-7 years. In 1984 we migrated to Iran and we were there for 10 years and came back in the 1994. When we returned to our country first we came to Pashtoon Zarghoon district, Herat province we purchased lands and livestock and started living in there. Due to the anti-government groups, we were obliged to leave the area and sell all our lands and livestock and shift here.

-Male, >55 years, Kamarkalaq (Ishaqabad village) IDP camp, Herat

3.4.3. Migration intentions

The households were classified based on the time since they had been living in the current place of location into three tiers: new IDPs who arrived in their current location in 2012/2013, IDPs migrating anytime between two and seven years and protracted IDPs living here for more than seven years. The critical point to note is that return to place of origin or resettlement is not considered an option by 99% of the IDPs without inter city difference between Herat and Helmand. As such, the overwhelming majority of people do not want to return, as seen in previous studies on IDPs in Afghanistan.

However, one finding can be newly added in this sample: the majority of the people (61%) are undecided about their decision to settle locally or to move again. With time, local integration becomes the preferred option as people form networks, establish livelihoods in the current location and invest their money in building homes. However, our findings show that most people remain undecided because they are either not given the opportunity to integrate or do not know how this option could be viable. As such, the majority of IDPs are undecided as to what to do: locally integrate or move further. Their preference is the former, but they are doubtful as to the feasibility
of this option given a structural context that is not conducive to IDP integration into host communities or urban settings. As will be seen in the livelihoods section of this report, the lack of skills and local knowledge are important impediments to IDPs’ economic integration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intentions</th>
<th>Last Year</th>
<th>2-7 Years</th>
<th>&gt; 7 Years</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Return place of origin</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resettle in third location</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locally integrate</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waiting on other factor</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>720</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.4.4. External migration

The data reveals a statistical correlation between the likelihood of having migrated externally and the number of displacement episodes and the duration of displacement. First, IDPs who have migrated abroad (combining both internal and international displacement) have a statistically significant longer duration of displacement than those with no cross-border migration experience (12.0 +/− 9.7 vs. 4.7 +/− 6.3 years). Second, IDPs who previously migrated abroad had a higher average number of displacements (2.2 +/− 0.7 vs. 1.0 +/− 0.2).

The correlation with the number of displacements seems intuitive – those with an added layer of cross-border displacement on top of their current internal displacement will have a greater number of overall recorded displacements. More interesting is the link to the duration of displacement – these episodes are not shorter, instead they extend the duration of displacement of those with prior cross-border migration experience. Those IDPs who were previously displaced outside of Afghanistan are a specific sub-group to be identified in programming response.
3.5. Durable Solutions

3.5.1. Lack of ability to make an informed decision

A ‘durable solution’ to displacement in urban areas is reached when the needs specifically linked to displacement no longer exist. These solutions may be launched either in the place of settlement, in place of origin or a third location. As seen in the previous section, having to choose between three durable solutions – return, local integration or resettlement – IDPs rule out the former. However, they recognize not having enough information to make an informed decision. When specifically asked whether households had enough information to make a decision about return, local integration or resettlement to a third location, 90% of respondents declared not having enough information. The numbers matched in Helmand and Herat indicating that this is not dependent on the local context but a structural gap in the information available to IDPs. They are not sufficiently well informed about their options, nor do they feel sufficiently supported – or represented – by national stakeholders, whether community leaders, local authorities or government stakeholders.

When further prompted to choose between one of the three durable solutions, the answers given were directed towards local integration rather than resettlement or return, as illustrated below. Those living in Herat are reportedly more undecided than their IDP counterparts in Helmand, who speak more readily of local integration as their stated preference. One reason for this is the important Kuchi population in Herat. As was observed in Herat, Kuchis who do not have a permanent or specific residential place are undecided due to their habit to move seasonally. Having lost their livestock due to droughts, these coping mechanisms are now being questioned.

### Graph 3.2: Durable solution preferences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Return</th>
<th>Resettle</th>
<th>Local integration</th>
<th>Waiting</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Helmand</td>
<td>1,1</td>
<td>0,6</td>
<td>41,7</td>
<td>7,2</td>
<td>49,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herat</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>13,1</td>
<td>13,9</td>
<td>72,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0,7</td>
<td>0,4</td>
<td>27,4</td>
<td>10,6</td>
<td>61,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The main obstacles to resettlement are three-fold: these are dependent on the duration of displacement, initial investments in permanent shelter infrastructure and land and property issues. IDPs who have been settled for years in their current location and have permanent shelters are the ones who do not want to return to their place of origin nor ready to move to government allocated plots of land. IDPs are not willing to leave their current locations and settle in government allocated...
plots because, in part, due to their lack of money to construct a new shelter on those locations. They also believe that resettlement options offered to them – such as the ones in Herat – will move them further away from the city, without sufficient logistical support whether in the form of decent roads to the city or affordable transportation options to the city. Lastly, in Helmand notably, IDPs who already know that they will not return are those whose homes have been destroyed. IDPs from Sheberghan, Ghor fall within this category. As reported by one community leader in Bolan camp, Helmand, “we do not have homes in Sheberghan, so where could we go?” Return no longer means anything for IDPs when land and housing have been destroyed. Return becomes an inexistente concept – return to what? With no resources to rebuild their homes or money to spend on a move, return becomes an abstract and intangible concept.

As for those who may still have land and housing in their location of origin, the stated reason for knowing that they will not go back is linked to the fact that their life was no better in the location of displacement – and that they could, at least, in their current location receive assistance from the government and international aid organizations.

### 3.5.2. Desire to local integrate, return or relocate

From table 3.5, there are five important findings that emerge.

1. **Only five families out of 720 responded said that they wanted to return to the place of origin.** Despite economic vulnerability, the small number of families who want to move back indicates the lack of option to do so for many. This may stem from threat to life from conflict or economic deprivation.

2. **Merely three families said they would like to relocate elsewhere.** This indicates a resistance of the families to move. Every transfer that the households make takes considerable economic resources. Multiple moves frequently add to the debt burden besides other problems.

3. **As the duration of stay in the place of displacement increases, the share of families who decide to remain in the current location increases.** This is apparent as longer the families stay, the more robust their network with the locals become.

4. **Overall, 61% of the families were undecided about their intentions.** Overall 62% of this population said they were waiting for the economic or the security situation back home to improve. However, this majority of this section comes from the new IDPs of Herat, who were still living in temporary shelters.

5. **The greater the causes of displacement – i.e. if more than one cause are present, such as both conflict and natural disaster induced displacement occurring at the same time – the greater the willingness to locally integrate and avoid the traumas of further movement or displacement.**
### Table 3.5:

Household intentions to migrate/settle according to reason of displacement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intends to</th>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Natural Disaster</th>
<th>Both</th>
<th>Man made</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Return to place of origin</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resettle in third location</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locally integrate</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waiting on one or several factor</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>395</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>720</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 3.5.3. Local integration – Investigating correlations

The preference of IDPs is to locally integrate. As stated previously, preference for local integration increases with the duration of stay and with the number of causes of displacement. These hypotheses were further tested using a common method of correlation (Pearson correlation coefficient) and regression analysis to assess dependence between different sets of variables and the choice to locally integrate. For instance, data collected does not show any statistical relationship between the cause of displacement (whether conflict or natural disaster induced displacement) and the intention to locally integrate. Yet, other significant relationships were drawn. This section will reveal these significantly statistical ties.

There are six notable correlations between the preference to integrate locally and:

1. Duration of displacement
2. Number of household members
3. Number of active household members (i.e. meaning of working household members)
4. Nature of employment (i.e. casual, temporary or permanent jobs)
5. Housing and agricultural land ownership (negative statistical relationship)
6. Access to health care and clean water.

**Correlation between the duration of displacement and intention to locally integrate**

The research finds that respondents who stated that the final intentions of the family were to locally integrate had a statistically significant longer duration of displacement than those who did not state that intention (6.8 years +/- 0.5 vs. 4.6 years +/- 0.3).

**Correlation between household size, number of active members and intention to locally integrate**

Those who stated the intention to integrate locally not only have a statistically significant larger household but also a great number of people working in the household. Indeed, people who stated
the desire to integrate locally were found to have significantly greater number of active household members. As a result, local integration is positively linked to both household size and number of people working in the household.

Correlation between types of livelihood and intention to locally integrate
The data shows that there is a statistically significant correlation between nature of employment (permanent, temporary or casual / day labour) and the desire to integrate locally. Those with the most unstable jobs, that are daily or casual labour, were less likely to want to integrate locally (64%), while those with permanent (78%) or temporary jobs (82%) showed a greater trend towards local integration.

Correlation between housing and land ownership, and intention to locally integrate
When looking at home ownership – with or without actual deeds – the data reveals a strong statistical correlation between housing ownership and the intention to locally integrate. More specifically, this is a negative relationship whereby those who own housing at place of origin are less likely to state a preference for local integration. The same correlation is noted between agricultural land ownership and the intention to locally integrate. Yet, the sample of those owning land for agriculture at the current location of displacement was too low to analyse its impact on local integration, showing that most IDPs have very limited access to agricultural lands in displacement as opposed to their situation in the location of origin. This shows a disadvantage and limited resilience capacity in displacement, further impacting women in displacement as they often were able to work on agricultural lands prior to displacement.

Correlation between health care and clean water access, and intention to locally integrate
While testing relationships between different vulnerabilities and the willingness to locally integrate, the data reveals the strongest ties between two sets of vulnerabilities and the desire to locally integrate. These are (i) a statistical relationship between access to clean water covered by income and the desire to integrate, and (ii) between functioning health facilities covered by income and the desire to integrate locally. This means that IDPs are highly influenced in their choice of durable solution by the access that they have, and the ability that they have to cover their health needs and safe water needs with their income in the location of displacement.

What do these correlations mean in terms of programming for IDPs?
These six correlations reveal an important potential for stakeholders to identify the determinants of local integration and the factors that can be influenced (type of employment, access to health care and safe water) to diminish vulnerabilities and enhance the potential for local integration. These findings will be used in the recommendations section to highlight specific programming activities. Programming geared towards influencing the numbers of active household members, their employment profile (or nature of employment), and their access to and ability to pay for services (with a focus on health care and clean water), will provide the highest chances of sustaining a positive local integration process from the IDPs’ perspective. However, these are naturally to be sustained through an enabling structural environment, or top down approach, by encouraging the government to see its role from both economic and services angles to enhance contributions of IDPs in local integration.
3.5.4. Process of return

Given the few number of families that picked the option of resettlement and return, there is no substantial evidence as to why the family wants to relocate or return and what is the reason behind the households wanting to relocate. The answers depend from case to case. A sample of randomly picked cases indicates the following:

1. A household from Sangin district in Helmand province would like to return to his place of origin from Helmand centre. Although the household has not decided when to move, they said their tribal affinities draw them back and that they would like to reclaim their property there. Currently they had no housing there. The head of the household would move first and then the rest of the household would follow. However, none of the family members had attempted to move back yet.

2. Family from Herat centre would like to move to Qarabagh district in Herat. They did not have confirmed housing available in the place of resettlement and hence had not decided when they would move. The reason to move away from Herat district was the extreme economic hardship and the hope that the new location would provide better employment opportunities and living conditions. The respondent mentioned that when they move, the entire family would move together.

Settlement

The households who chose settlement were asked the reason as to why they would not like to return to their place of origin and the answers were remained to be in the realm of security, economic difficulties and lack of housing. Correspondingly, the reasons for wanting to remain in the current location were availability of proper living conditions, better employment opportunities and better education for their children. Thus for some IDPs the relocation does offer opportunities better than the place of origin, however, the probability of that only increases slowly with the duration of stay in the current location. Consistent to this 73% of these families said that they face no hindrance in integrating in the current location.

3.5.5. Information and decision-making

In general, IDPs were on the look out for two types of information:

1) Information on assistance from international agencies; and
2) Information regarding the situation in their place of origin.

The sources for such information and news were quite different in the two provinces. 93% of the sample in Herat said they get their news from their family and friends. Networks have traditionally played an important role for transfer of information in Afghanistan and the same feature is retained by IDPs. This may also be due to the lack of modern methods such as radio and television. Communities and religious/political groups also help in information transfer. 10% of IDPs in Herat also said they get their information from the public notice board. In Helmand, access to information is through television and radio sets followed by friends and family and then communities.
The decision-making process is generally led by the adult male member of the family. The majority of male respondents answered either themselves or their father, while the women responded saying father or spouse. In 17% of cases, the male respondents answered that their spouses took the decision, but this may be interpreted as a mutual decision as this option was missing from the response options.

89% of the IDPs said that they did not have enough information yet to make their decision about settling/relocating/returning. 82% of the respondents in Herat were looking for information about livelihood and work opportunities in the intended place of destination. Naturally, 37% of the sample from both provinces was also looking for more information on the security situation in the place of destination.

Graph 3.3: Assistance required by respondents

It is difficult to generalise what sort of assistance would be considered in case of return/relocation since the number of respondents in favour of return was low. However:

1. For return, all five families said they required food security, employment and education for their children.
2. For relocation, three families included combination of factors from food security and employment to shelter and accommodation
3. To locally integrate, 197 families said their biggest concern was the employment and education for their children followed by food security and shelter.

3.5.6. Limited response capacity

Taking the example of Herat, UNHCR’s mandate is currently to disburse emergency assistance to conflict-induced IDPs – but not addressing protection needs as the local DoRR has asked UNHCR to stay away from IDP locations so as not to provide an incentive – meaning to prevent assistance from
becoming a pull factor to Herat. Indeed, the government representatives in Herat have not been keen on providing assistance to IDPs as they maintain that providing assistance increases dependency on external help, further limiting natural coping mechanisms. However, improvements have been noted with DoRR constructing wells to increase access to potable water for IDPs.

Furthermore, there are still misunderstandings or negative views held by national stakeholders towards IDPs, which result in attempts to keep them away without due regard to their safety and wellbeing. Government stakeholders repeatedly highlight their frustrations in the identification of ‘genuine IDPs’ from non-IDPs. They blame community leaders for submitting highly inflated numbers, as well as trends where families split to receive more assistance, fake cases especially in old settlements, and ‘recycler IDPs’ i.e. families already assisted by trying for additional assistance by changing their identity or splitting their family. The limited capacity or tracking mechanism in place results in such trends to become more pronounced as the government and its directorates at the local level have a limited capacity to respond, and lack clarity as to the division of responsibilities between stakeholders. This highlights the need to regularly monitor movement intentions and advocate for voluntary and safe return, by providing an information base to IDPs in their location of displacement.

*Finding the solution in displacement or at the source?*

Government representatives and coordinating bodies interviewed for this research said that the solution to the increasing internal displacement trends lay not in Herat (at the location of displacement) but at the source of displacement (at the location of origin). While conflict displacement is sudden, displacement due to natural disaster such as drought allows time to consider and forecast solutions.

The conflict displaced IDPs who were farmers before they migrated still had lands back in the places of origin. But the presence of assistance in Herat was an incentive for them to stay. However, once the security situation improves, these people can be sent back to the places of origin by giving assistance there (as an incentive like food and fuel), if they wish to return.

*Immediate vs. Long-term assistance for IDPs*

As indicated previously, there is a unanimous interest expressed to not move any further. In fact, IDPs who had been displaced for four years or more stated that the government and international organizations should help them settle down permanently by focusing first on their shelter needs. However, coordination issues visible at the IDP task force level in Herat, and on the basis of directives by the Government of Afghanistan to reduce development assistance to IDPs to focus on emergency assistance for new IDPs, limited the prospects of having anything more than emergency assistance for IDPs. The only exception noted during the fieldwork was the construction of wells by DoRR in Herat and Helmand to respond to the water needs of IDP households. As for international organizations, they had assisted mainly new families with emergency supplies and winter assistance. Instances of community schools or shelter assistance were anecdotal and not part of a trend or strategy.
4. Protection Profile

Protection issues are endemic to the plight of internally displaced persons, and many are aggravated as a consequence of displacement (NRC/Samuel Hall 2012). Stakeholders now prioritise an understanding of protection to bridge the gap between needs and response, between protection and assistance, at the field level. Yet, a proper conceptualization and definition of protection remains to be provided, especially with regards to IDP protection. This chapter focuses on some key elements of protection – but does not aim for a comprehensive review of these.

This section will focus on the following protection areas: 1) education and documentation; 2) income and livelihoods; 3) property and land issues and last but not least 4) protection challenges for women, youth and children. Wherever relevant, effects of displacement on vulnerable groups such as women and children are highlighted since vulnerability increases (or decreases) across different demographic segments. Other protection challenges, such as food security, health and water and sanitation and hygiene (WASH), will be addressed in the next chapter on Needs and Vulnerability Assessment.

4.1. Household characteristics

The socio economic characteristics of the households are profiled according to the location of displacement and the duration. This helps identify location-specific characteristics and assess how living conditions change over time.

4.1.1. Household size and specific vulnerabilities

Starting with the household characteristics such as family size, which will determine the number of dependents on family income, the average household size for IDPs was nine members per family. The NRVA 2007/8 reports an average household size of 7.3 members per family. The larger size of IDP households is on account of a greater number of dependents, which adds to the vulnerability of the household. The higher number of dependents is due to more number of children below the age of 18 years. Such children (and particularly infants) are vulnerable, most often because of health issues and lower resilience to adjust post displacement. There are however provincial differences with average household size in Herat being seven and in Helmand being 12.

The provincial differences are observed because IDP households surveyed in Helmand had been displaced, on average, for seven years more than families living in Herat and the size of household was correlated with the duration of displacement. Families that were displaced last year had average household size of six members while those displaced for over seven years had 12 members.

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12 For a full review of IDP protection issues in Afghanistan, refer to the 2012 research study by Samuel Hall for NRC/IDMC/JIPS entitled “Challenges of IDP protection: Research study on the protection of internally displaced persons in Afghanistan”.

From past research it was observed that households settled for more than two years had one more dependent on average. Households suffering from disabilities are more vulnerable to fall outs of displacement. In total, 55% families reported they had at least one member suffering from a disability that required special attention. Most were related to physical disabilities, sickness or mental conditions. Additionally, 11% of respondents also indicated the presence of elderly members and 3% reported pregnant women. Families with disabilities were higher in Herat than in Helmand amongst the new IDP cases, many of them requiring medical attention.

In Herat, 57.2% of families reported a disability as opposed to 50% in Helmand. There were more families with physical and mental disabilities in Helmand, while families with members requiring medical attention were more likely to be found in Herat, as illustrated in the graph below. Displaced families are likely to self-select place of destination based on their perceived access to remedial services available in the places of displacement.

Graph 4.1: Household vulnerabilities and disabilities

There were differences observed in the reporting of protections issues that households faced between Herat and Helmand. Helmand reported higher incidence of verbal abuse (19%), domestic violence (13%) and physical violence (13%). However, child labour was the biggest reported protection issue with 16% households in Herat and 11% households in Helmand indicating the same. Interestingly, men reported higher levels of protection issues than women in the sample.

14 Samuel Hall, 2011
4.1.2. Education

The level of illiteracy amongst the surveyed population is indicative of the risks to the human capital endowment of the IDP population: **79% of respondents are illiterate**. There are three complementary reasons for this. First, the nature of displacement is mostly rural to urban and in pre-displacement rural areas, availability of education facilities are rare. Second, during the period of displacement, education is the first need to be forgone – with children being put to contribution towards the household income rather than investing in their childhood development. Third and last, displacement leads to children dropping out of school or not enrolling in school at the standard age, resulting in children being too old to join schools when they reached their final destination.

Only 9% of respondents in Herat and 14% respondents in Helmand said they had had some formal higher education. **The gender disparity was evident with 97.5% of female respondents responding they were illiterate compared to 75% of male respondents.** Access to education for women remains a challenge due to traditional social norms prevalent in most rural parts of the country from where many IDPs originate. Low levels of literacy limit their skills, along with the number of employment and income streams these IDPs can generate after displacement.

**Table 4.1: Education Level**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Herat</th>
<th>Helmand</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literate (no schooling)</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary School</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>360</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>720</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
School attendance for IDP children was higher in Helmand than in Herat. For the elder members of the family, it is often too late to join educational institutes after displacement as employment and livelihood take precedence over education. Hence, the number of families having access to schools for their children provides a good measure of access to education post displacement. In Herat, only one in four families – 26% families in peri-urban Herat – reported sending their children to school, as opposed to 65% in Helmand who sent their children to public community schools, while a few received religious teachings at Madrasas. While school attendance for boys was evenly split (49% attend school, 51% do not attend school), the situation of IDP girls is more concerning: **less than one third of IDP girls in households surveyed attended school.** According to community leader surveys in Helmand, the obstacle is not a lack of willingness to send girls to school but a lack of facilities and teaching staff for girls.

**4.1.3. Household identity and documentation**

Significant provincial differences in the type of documentation held were observed. In Herat, one third (34.7%) said that they held no documents, as opposed to 4% in Helmand. Among the types of documentation held, the most widespread were the **tazkera** (national identity card) and election cards. This points to the potentially strong political force of IDPs in the upcoming presidential elections. The high share of households who have election cards may be a reflection of the impending elections in 2014. Both Herat and Helmand have over 40,000 IDPs settled and as such form an important voter bloc.  

In Herat, the sample from urban and rural areas was composed of new IDPs, whereas the sample from peri-urban areas contained protracted cases. In the peri-urban area, 89% of the households held election cards because, according to the village elder, a politician came to the IDP location to register people for the election cards. In Helmand most people held either a Tazkera or an election card as their identification. Only, 8% of the sample in rural areas and 3% in urban areas held no documentation.

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16 He subsequently collected the election cards to prove to the authorities that he has enough support to be considered as a valid candidate. The election cards were subsequently returned to the community.
The lack of documentation most strongly impacts IDP women: the presence of identity and documentation amongst women was much lower than men. Only, 14% had Tazkeras and 30% had election cards. 65% indicated they had no documents at all. A reason for these lower numbers was the restriction to women from getting identity documents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identification</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Passport</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tazkeras</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth Certificate</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election card</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Documents</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>120</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>720</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Official identification documents are essential for accessing health and education facilities, as well as many employment opportunities. Without identification, IDPs are excluded from many of the services they need the most. As youth in the urban community in Herat informed, they had attempted admission in the nearest public school but had been denied admission on account of their missing identification papers. In addition, government offices in the local provinces require national ID cards for work such as land registration or positions with the government for employment.
4.2. Livelihoods

Livelihood challenges for IDPs are three-fold:

- **First**, changes in the sector of employment from pre- to post-displacement and the nature of employment and income security;
- **Second**, challenges of obtaining livelihoods due to lack of skills, discrimination favouring local people over IDP, and discriminations towards youth seen as unskilled or illiterate (a concern especially raised in Helmand);
- **Third**, the overwhelming importance of debt and loans as coping mechanisms for all IDPs surveyed.

The vulnerabilities of IDP families in this section stem in part from economic deprivation and the inability to afford or pay for services that might be remedial in nature. In addition, the lack of livelihoods leads to coping mechanisms that might be counter productive and increase vulnerabilities in the long run.

4.2.1. Sectors of livelihood and nature of employment

Most IDPs surveyed do not have desirable skills for the urban labour markets because they often come from a rural background. As such, agriculture and livestock rearing were the means of sustenance in the place of origin. The protracted IDP cases that went to Iran and Pakistan, were involved in agriculture wage labour and casual work in construction. Opportunities in the latter eventually led to picking up traits such as masonry. The new IDPs are very much unskilled and as such unattractive in the urban market post displacement.

![Graph 4.4: Main income source in place of displacement (post-displacement)](image)

Figure 3.2 indicates the sectors of employment for IDPs post displacement. There are differences in the employment structure between the two provinces. Herat respondents report 54% unemployment, most of whom are new IDPs between 1-3 months old. Protracted IDP cases from Herat and Helmand have more established networks to help obtain casual labour in the construction sector as load carriers. In addition 16% were employed as masons. Peri-urban camps
in Helmand were settled close to agricultural land owned by host community members on which they could work as wage labourers.

Within the category of others, 6% were employed as street vendors and 3% were into daily wage labour (all families except one were from Helmand). The remaining from this category were involved in activities such as begging, shop keeping and other vocational trades (mechanic, welder, tailor and vegetable sellers).

Herat shows a pronounced disadvantage towards pre and post displacement unemployment figures. Only five families captured from the entire sample were unemployed before they came to the current location. In Herat now, 193 families were unemployed. In Helmand there were none.

**Nature of employment: Unpredictable income streams**

While the nature of employment depended on the sector, almost 70% of IDPs surveyed could manage only ad hoc and inconsistent income streams, whether temporary jobs (one in five) or daily casual jobs (half of the sample surveyed), as illustrated in table 4.3. Overall, 68% of permanent jobs were recorded in the agricultural sector, 81% in services and 58% in trade and transport. Instead, daily or casual labour was mainly recorded in the construction sector (69%), masonry (62%) and in others / vocational jobs (59%). More IDPs in Helmand were employed with sectors with permanent positions than the IDPs in Herat.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Permanent</th>
<th>Temporary</th>
<th>Daily Casual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade/Transportation</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mason</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The immediate nature of displacement results in a drastic shift in labour activity, which presents difficulty in integrating with skills that are not relevant for urban settings. The same integration process takes time – a period when households are at their most vulnerable. The lack of networks in the new locations also adds to the incapability to get even unskilled jobs. The average duration of displacement for unemployed individuals was little over one year. The next closest was residual sectors (“others” consisting mostly of casual labour) in which the average displacement period was five years. This indicates two distinct vulnerabilities. Thus, unemployment problems plague IDP families even after one year of displacement; and even after five years, the families still have to rely on insecure means of income.17

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17 The analysis categorizes duration of displacement in discreet value of years. If the duration of displacement were to be more segmented, the transition period analysis is expected to more prominent.
Similar results are obtained from the survey in Samuel Hall (2011). The study shows that the first two years of displacement are the hardest for the family and the economic situation tends to get worse. However, longer durations of displacement are more linked to improvement in economic conditions.

4.2.2. Challenges to obtaining and sustaining livelihoods

IDPs have a dual challenge to obtain and sustain livelihoods in their place of displacement. There are several layers of disadvantages acting against them in their search for livelihoods.

Overall, IDPs themselves report the following five reasons as being the main obstacles to livelihoods in their place of displacement:

1. The lack of work opportunity (76.4%)
2. The limited and irregular work opportunities (63.6%)
3. Lack and mismatch of skills (46.3%)
4. Lack of information about the local labour market (23.6%)
5. Lack of support from local government (17.4%)

Discrimination against IDPs and minority ethnicities

In Herat, even in villages where men had labour ID cards from the customs department, fulfilling such administrative requirements was not sufficient to have access to local jobs. Due to the presence of middlemen, IDP heads of households had to pay around 2,000 Afghans to obtain ID cards but the wages were very low and preference was given, in Herat, to Tajiks over Pashtuns because of affinities with Dari speakers.

“The men from our village had attempted to get jobs in the city as they were closer to the market. But there were two problems: First, the lack of skills made them good only for casual labour. Second, day labourers were mainly hired from local communities since the employers knew them and trusted them. Our men were unknown to any government or employer who could give them such jobs.”

– IDP community leader, Herat

18 Ibid
19 Samuel Hall Consulting, 2011
Pashtun IDPs interviewed in Herat felt discriminated against on the basis of their ethnicity and due to the fact that they were not represented by local authorities or government representatives. The IDP population surveyed in Herat includes one third of Pashtuns (34.2%), with the remainder being two thirds Tajik (60.6%), Hazara (4.2%) and others including Baluch (1.1%). As a result, a common complaint was about the linguistic and cultural mismatch with their local context.

Beyond ethnic preferences was the preference for local workers, rather than workers coming from other communities and provinces. The lack of trust in IDPs is widespread both in Helmand and Herat, and in both provinces, IDPs felt that the lack of representation or understanding of their plight by local authorities disadvantaged them disproportionately. As reported by the IDP respondents surveyed, the lack of support from the local government (17.4%) is seen as the fifth most important obstacle in finding and securing livelihoods. IDPs expect more from their government than the assistance they have been receiving locally.

*From the lack of to a mismatch of skills*

About half of the sample surveyed (46.4%) stated lacking skills (31.9%) or being unable to find work that matches their skills (14.4%): as a result, the lack of and mismatch of skills ranks as the third obstacle preventing IDPs from securing livelihoods. Specifically, IDP respondents surveyed in Ishaqabad of Herat province summed up their difficulties as follows:

- Nomads who do not have any skill besides caring for livestock,
- Rural Afghans who are not acquainted with urban market requirements,
- Lack of skills forcing IDPs to earn income from low-paid sectors such as street vending, or driving,
- Lack of skills forcing youth to migrate irregularly to neighbouring countries (Iran and Pakistan) in the search for better paid casual labour,
- Lack of skills further isolating IDP women, unable to assist their families.

Furthermore, the locations of residence for IDPs are not conducive to local income generation: they depend on accessing job opportunities outside of their immediate surroundings. For instance, in Ishaqabad, the existence of a one Hectare garden cannot be used as a source of self-sufficient livelihoods due to the lack of irrigation that prevent IDPs from growing crops and selling them on the market. The lack of a source of irrigation locally means that IDPs have no possibility for local crop cultivation.

Respondents unanimously highlighted the lack of livelihoods available for youth and women. Women in particular are seen as being reduced to staying at home, keeping themselves busy with house chores, as there is a lack of vocational training offered to them. Whereas heads of households are ready for their female relatives to work from home, on handicrafts, tailoring or sewing, to relieve the economic burden on their families, they are unable to rely on them as economic actors in the household after displacement due to their lack of skills. They have no other choice but to restrain themselves to domestic chores – not out of choice.

Under stress of economic deprivation, households tend to diversify their sources of income. However, the high level of unemployment indicated at a household, shows that **diversification of income is severely restricted** because of the absence of additional members who can earn or the
lack of skills and general unavailability of employment. Therefore, many are forced to rely on external assistance. There are however, inter city differences to be observed.

The economic deprivation in Herat for IDPs was evident from the number of people dependent upon assistance from various agencies. 24% each depended on assistance from international programs and relatives and 18% depended on charity. 16% said they earned additional income from salary and wages. In addition, 3% of the sample said that they beg and one respondent even confessed to theft for coping. In Helmand 67% respondents said they had no additional sources of income classified under the “other” category. 14% of people indicated additional sources of income from occasional work while 12% in Helmand earned it form salary and wages.

The differences between the two provinces is that, while in Helmand the family size often allowed two male working members per family, Herat only had average of one. Thus household members in Herat were likely to work in two jobs over a week (wherever it was possible) while from Helmand, it was more likely that two parallel income streams are available to the family.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources of Income</th>
<th>Herat</th>
<th>Helmand</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salary / Wages</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pension</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savings</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occasional work</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government assistance</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International assistance programs</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other charity (religious)</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support from relatives</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittances from abroad</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>360</strong></td>
<td><strong>360</strong></td>
<td><strong>720</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Challenges to income generation: Unavailability and lack of access

There are two key barriers to finding employment – unavailability and lack of access. IDPs in Herat and Helmand suffer from both, though the degrees of deprivation are different. 86% of respondents in Herat said that there was no available work opportunity for them as opposed to 67% in Helmand. From the options that indicated lack of access, lack of information or lack of skill were cited as reasons why IDPs were unemployed or employed sporadically.

Interestingly, 32% of people cited lack of skill as the challenge in obtaining livelihood while only 15% said that there was a skill mismatch. IDPs are thus aware that they have no skill that can help them earn a decent and sustainable income. Most participants of the qualitative interviews cited the need for vocational trainings to help them become eligible for jobs in the cities.
Unmet education and training needs

IDP respondents singled out the lack of training as a key hindrance to securing livelihoods. More specifically, respondents referred to the need for:

- Literacy classes,
- Formal school,
- Vocational training,
- Learning materials,
- And other.

From Helmand, the 38.3% responses under the category “other” can be classified into three broad classes. First, respondents indicated a need for infrastructure and study material (chairs, tables, classrooms, bathrooms in schools, pens, notebooks, shoes and clothes). Secondly, respondents indicated a lack of professional teachers (especially females) available for the schools. Finally, there was a lack of access to a school itself either due to unavailability or due to lack of access from the school being far away.

Graph 4.6: Unmet education and training needs
4.2.3. Debt and Loans

Higher levels of poverty lead to borrowing as a coping strategy. IDP households are expected to have high levels of borrowing. Figures below confirm the same by showing that 90% households in Herat and 83% in Helmand have borrowed in the past. Most individuals are unable to pay back the loans when they cannot find employment, which heightens protection risks for IDP family members. Specifically, excessive debt levels recorded in Herat lead to key protection risks: loans incurred from places of origin, before displacement, are accrued upon during displacement and in the locations of displacement, leading to practices of selling daughters for marriage. The level of indebtedness is particularly heavy and a burden for families in the locations of displacement. Almost all focus group members interviewed had taken debts from their relatives back home to pay for transportation until Herat and for a couple of days of provision upon arrival. Faced with a lack of work upon arrival, they are then unable to pay back, running out of resources, and being forced to borrow more from relatives, friends and shopkeepers. In Helmand, IDP respondents pointed out that, previously, they would cultivate and sell opium but due to the ban, they had lost a key economic resource forcing them to take loans instead. In both provinces, the trend points to a cycle of excessive indebtedness among IDP households.

Box 2. Excessive indebtedness and Associated Protection Risks

“One respondent in Herat indicated that his debtors were asking for their money back but he did not have it. He offered his daughter to them so that they could sell her. But other members of the IDP community intervened and convinced the debtors to allow him more time to generate the money. Naturally, this is a long-term protection issue and a concerning trend for young girls in IDP communities living with the weight of excessive indebtedness”

- Key informant interview, Herat

The new IDPs indicated that that they had taken debt from their relatives back in the place of origin to pay for travel to the current location and sustenance for a few days after arriving. Upon arrival, families are able to rent/lodge themselves in houses and hotel rooms in the city. Once the money runs out, they shift to camps on the outskirts or even take refuge in abandoned buildings if they are
unable to find a tent or any other suitable accommodation. Some IDP families came to Herat after multiple moves, and had to borrow each time adding to the debt burden. Protracted IDPs however, borrowed for social occasions such as wedding and to go on pilgrimage.

Longer duration of displacement leads to borrowing more from local communities as networks are established. Graph 4.7 indicates a difference in sources for borrowing across Helmand and Herat. In Helmand 31% and 29% of the respondents borrowed from shopkeepers or local community members. In Herat borrowings from these sources was considerably less. This is because local communities and shopkeepers do not easily provide loans without considerable trust that the borrower will repay. While IDPs in Helmand have been able to develop these networks thereby earning their trust, new IDPs in Herat lack such networks with the local communities. However, relatives still remain the main source of borrowing for IDPs.

“**I sold my livestock and also got some debt from my relatives so that my family and I could come to this place.**”

- Adult Male Respondent, Pashtan IDP camp, Injil District, Herat

“About the indebtedness I should say that the community members are indebted to the shopkeepers, friends and relatives in the area. That is because the economic situation of the people in this area is not good.”

- Community Leader, Tapa-e-Bolan Village, Helmand

“Some people also took loans here from shop keepers, when they come to get their loans and the borrower do not have money the lender get his tents to compensate his loan”

- Community Leader, Pashtan Village, Herat

Graph 4.8 indicates that the IDPs affected by conflict are more likely to be indebted than those affected by natural disaster or human-made disasters. Only 13% conflict induced IDPs had not borrowed money in comparison to 24% for natural disaster and 29% for human-made induced displacement. This may be a consequence of the immediate nature of displacement affected with conflict where IDPs borrow and leave the place of origin in a relatively short time frame.
4.3. Property and Land Issues

In the PSUs selected for this research, IDPs lived for the greater part in informal settlements rather than formal settlements, as illustrated in Graph 4.9 – meaning they are living on land for which they do not possess deeds, either irregularly squatting land or living on government or private land. In urban areas, IDPs in Herat lived in precarious open spaces – these were newly arrived IDPs in need of immediate winter assistance and shelter. Overall, IDPs do not possess deeds to their lands. In terms of property, residents of Kamarkalaq of Herat had bought the land they were now settled on and were constructing adequate shelters, but they were an exception. For the most part, IDP households had no property to speak of except in the places of origin – these were either inaccessible due to security issues or were severely damaged from the winter up to the point that residents did not have enough resources to repair them.

Although instances of forced evictions were not noted during the fieldwork, IDPs know that there is a possibility that they may be asked to move someday. Yet, IDPs that have lived in one place for over one or two years, have had the time to build mud houses. From their responses, in Helmand as in Herat, it was clear that IDPs considered their houses to be permanent settlements.

Nearly all IDPs claim to have property that they left behind at the place of origin. However, conflict often induces them to leave their property and lack of documentation makes it difficult to reclaim, reduction options to return to the place of origin. Similarly in the location of current residence, the lack of ownership or proper authority to reside results in uncertainty of land ownership. Finally, this section will also shed some light on the weak property regulations available to IDPs.

“There are 7,462 IDP families here. All these families are from various parts of Kandahar and from northern part of Afghanistan – Saripul. This land has been government land since the time of Governor Mullah Shaher Mohammad Akhonzada. He distributed the land without giving any documents or deeds. The people came in different years. Some people have been living here for last 11 years and some for the last 5 years. Mostly people in this area do not own their land. Since we have come here, no one has asked us to leave. If anybody comes and asks us to leave, we will not go. Even if they threaten to kill us.”

- Community leader, Mohajer camp, Helmand
4.3.1. Ownership and access in place of origin

IDPs, who came mostly from rural areas, claimed they either owned or had the right of use of property such as a house, land for house and/or land for agriculture. 62% and 10% IDPs indicated they held ownership or right of use with documentation respectively. 12% and 27% they had ownership and right of use without any documentation. Property rights in Afghanistan and especially in rural areas are weakly implemented with a lot of properties being ancestral homes without documentation.

From the IDPs who were displaced in 2012/2013, 64% referred to properties that were partially damaged, while 60% referred to their properties that were heavily damaged or destroyed. These were people who had lost housing to conflict or agricultural lands to droughts. However as the duration of displacement increased, more IDPs claimed that they did not know about the conditions of their properties in place of origin. Similarly, the share of people who claimed to have good condition properties decreased from 58% to 11% as the duration of displacement increases from 1 year to more than 7 years.

In terms of the ability to access those properties, 30% indicated they could access their houses and land back home while 18% indicated they do not know. The lack of access to properties was on account of the security situation as well as land grabbing by elites or warlords. There were differences in access between provinces of origin depending upon the nature of displacement. Consequently, people from Ghor and Badghis remain unable to access their property due to security issues.

“Sometimes the IDPs, secretly go to the place of origin to check in on their agricultural land and houses” – Community Leader, Tapa-e-Bolan Village, Helmand

4.3.2. Ownership and access in place of displacement

The share of new IDPs who migrated recently stayed in tents/temporary shelter provided by international organisations/charitable individuals or bought by them. For the purpose of ownership of property, these individuals were filtered out, and the remaining sample analysed for ownership profiles. The profile of property owned by IDPs varies between Herat and Helmand. The following figures outline the kind ownership and property that IDPs have access to in the place of refuge.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal status</th>
<th>Herat</th>
<th>Helmand</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ownership (with documentation)</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ownership (no documentation)</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right of use (with documentation)</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right of use (no documentation)</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent/Live with host family</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No legal right / no authorization</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20 Person may own multiple properties in different conditions of use.
1. 51% of assessed IDPs in Helmand and 80% in Herat said they had right of use of the house without documentation. In fact only 5% in Helmand and 4% in Herat said they had documentation for the legal right to stay in their houses.
2. The same was the case with land on which the houses were established. Merely 18% in Helmand and 8% of assessed IDPs in Herat said they had right of use of the land without documentation.
3. 13% respondents from Helmand indicated they rented the apartments/houses they lived in.
4. No IDP household in Herat owned any commercial property like shop or land for agriculture.

The lack of formal documentation is accompanied by the constant threat of eviction and uncertainty in residence, which prevents IDPs building up assets. Lack of assets restricts IDPs’ access to formal credit towards investment into opening or expanding a business or even for household consumption in times of distress. As such reliance on informal means of borrowing increases leaving them outside the purview of regulated systems of credit.

Evidence of land or housing bought by IDPs in Herat came from few individuals in Ishaqabad village on the periphery of the city. The respondents mentioned that after living in Herat for more than seven years, they purchased these lands and are now constructing houses.

### 4.3.3. Challenges to reclaim lost property

As indicated in section 4.3.1, a number of people lost their properties due to land grabbing by warlords and elites. **About one third of all IDP households – 34.7% - indicated having lost property rights in the past.** This was especially pronounced in Herat where 59.4% of IDP households claimed to have lost property rights, as opposed to 10% in Helmand.

In 90% of such cases, a place of residence such as a house/apartment/room was lost. Share of IDPs who had migrated last year and who had lost property was high (80%).

**Graph 4.10: Loss of property rights (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat Type</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family disputes</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats by government actors</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law, regulation, order or other</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats by non-government actors</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Graph 4.10 shows that 34% of the IDP population claimed to have lost their properties to one of the reasons mentioned in the axis. The figures confirm previous claims of the IDPs that they lost access to their properties through land grabbing by warlords. Such cases are classified under loss of
property from physical threat and other action. Loss of property from such threat indicates an added protection issue to the IDP families if they try and return to the place of location.

The fact that only six of the 250 households who had lost their families tried to reclaim their properties indicates firstly, the physical threat associated with reclaiming property, and secondly, the lack of formal system of justice courts available to these people. The physical danger is comes from the security concerns about the property in trying to access it due to mines, unexploded ordnance (UXOs) and other armament, which limits access to the property itself. The lack of access to formal justice systems can be attributed to lack of money, documents and freedom of movement.

4.4. Vulnerable Demographic Groups and Cross-Cutting Issues

There are protection issues that particularly detrimental to women, youth and children, who form the most vulnerable sub-sections of the IDP populations in Herat and Helmand. An overwhelming concern, among community leaders, host communities, and heads of households, was the protection risks associated with high youth unemployment: the lack of opportunity for young men to spend their time productively was leading to concerns over addiction to narcotics and drugs, in Helmand as in Herat. Simultaneously, the vulnerability of IDP women – especially widowed women, but more generally so for all displaced women – who were not able to act as economic contributors to their families’ wellbeing, and hence proved to have a low-level of participation in their household. In Herat specifically, the tendency for men to go to Iran for work meant added vulnerabilities and protection concerns for women left behind.

4.4.1. Vulnerable demographic groups

The section below presents instances when displacement related vulnerabilities manifest themselves with specific vulnerabilities for particular demographic groups. While women suffer from restrictions in movement and in economic participation, the idleness of youth is reported to push them towards drug addiction. Want of money urges families to sell the girl child for marriage. Such means become the coping strategies for families post displacement.

Women

Box 3. In favour of women’s economic participation

They were in bad situations because they were not involved in any income generating activities, they do not have any job and they were deprived from having livestock because of lack of money. Women have skills of animal bearing through which they can earn money. If the vocational trainings are provided for women, their living conditions might improve. For example, if a woman can have chicken at her home, she can earn money by the selling of the eggs; or she can sew clothes at homes for herself, her family and for sale to the community.

- IDP focus group, Helmand
Trainings for women in agriculture and home-based activities was a common request in both Helmand and Herat – in both locations, heads of households were in their majority in favour of women’s economic participation through home-based work. Even in a conservative province like Helmand, IDPs are open to letting their women contribute to the income of the household. This has important implications for implementation and coordination of assistance. Vocational trainings are one way to respond to the gendered vulnerabilities identified in previous studies (NRC/Samuel Hall 2012) and to diminish the impact of displacement on livelihoods. Often times, women find themselves inactive in the place of displacement: they used to earn an income or contribute to the household income in their place of origin, but no longer do after displacement due to the new environment they live in and the lack of networks. In past studies, the unwillingness of male relatives to let women work was partly to blame. From this sample, the readiness of male relatives to include women in income generating activities is an open door to more effective programming tailored to home-based vocational training programmes.

Beyond issues related to livelihoods, women are also particularly vulnerable to the lack of proper water, sanitation and health infrastructure. This was observed in Herat – in Shaydayee, Karezak and Pashtan IDP camps, as well as Karazek and Noorzai villages, where women did not have access to drinking water, had to walk miles for potable drinking water, and lacked as well access to education, fuel for heating, vocational training, health facilities and sanitation facilities. In one of the locations, out of about 200 tents, there were only 6 available toilets in the camp. In Pashtan IDP camp, women did not have access to toilets, equipped shelter, winter clothes, health facilities, fuel for heating or cooking. The basic amenities lacking for women have a double effect of negatively impacting their wellbeing and comfort – in highly conservative populations – and that of their children as they are unable to provide them with the basic hygiene needed for a proper child development.

**Box 4. Protection interventions for IDP women**

First of all a maternity clinic should be established for the women because they come knocking to my door in the middle of nights and ask me to find them a cab so they can carry their patients to the hospital and it is very hard to find a car on that time. Poultry farms, tailoring and literacy courses should also be established for the women because currently the security situation has improved and there are no obstacles for that. There should also be several midwives in the village which calls for a need to proper trainings on this field for the women.

- Community leader, Tapae Bolan, rural Helmand

The documented effects of displacement on women are also observed from the sample collected for this study\(^\text{21}\). Vulnerability of those who were recently displaced is still higher than protracted cases.

**Economic isolation and closure of social networks leading to problems in accessing livelihoods:** The economic isolation that stems from rural to urban migration can be noticed. More women than men indicated that they lacked the skill to get employment. The economic pressures often led them

to beg on streets, which added to their vulnerabilities. This was especially true for female-headed households who lacked the option of male members supporting income and hence were more likely to beg.

**Lack or mismatch of skills unsuitable for the urban setting:** They indicated lack of work to suit their skills was the main issue. In this sense, they were probably referring to their ability to sew or weave. They were sporadically employed in activities such as weaving and tailoring but did not earn enough, because either the job did not pay very well or the frequency of finding work was low. In addition, a woman participant said: “No, I don’t have Tazkera because I don’t have allowance from my man to get Tazkera”.

**Lack of access to household infrastructure:** On average, 44% women said they had no access to proper sanitation facilities in the area. Lack of sanitation facilities cause additional problems such as maternal infections and deaths. At this time, pregnant women were particularly vulnerable to such infections causing risks to the mother as well as the unborn child or infant.

**Lack of access to education due to restricted movement:** Interviews with men and women in Helmand indicated restrictions on women to leave house and work at home. The pressure on girls to be involved in household activities is an additional barrier to attending a local school (assuming that there is one). One of the focus group participants said: “Now I can’t go to school because our people don’t like the girls to go to school, but I’m dreaming of school.” A male member from one of the discussions said: “women cannot go out because they are not allowed to”. Women indicated lack of access to formal institutions (79%) and literacy classes (76%).

**Pressure of displacement on households leading to domestic violence:** While the women did not report any protection issue, 6.3% men reported incidents of domestic violence. The number may be underestimated due to non-reporting. Statistics from past surveys reported in Majidi and Hennion (2014), indicate that domestic violence is seen among IDP communities as an outcome of the pressures of displacement.

In both provinces, the demand for women’s vocational training is high. The men indicated that while women were not allowed to go outside, there were no restrictions to women working from home and generating income. In fact, they asked for it since they realise the importance of additional sources of income in the family.

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22 Women respondents could only be accessed in Herat; in Helmand, qualitative data was collected from IDP women through focus group discussions.

Youth

Youth – referring to the category between 15 to 24 years of age – suffered from a double layer of vulnerability: their illiteracy and unemployment. On the one hand, the lack of educational facilities and the displacement impact on education meant low literacy rates, while on the other, the lack of jobs meant that the youth’s time was often unutilized. The concern among community leaders and host communities was the prevalence of drug addiction among the unemployed youth, linked with petty criminality. Even in semi-urban locations visited, the educational facilities were available at a distance only – prevent young children and girls to travel alone to school.

Young people are often frustrated by the lack of opportunities open to them. Turning to adults within their community adds to this frustration because adults can offer little support. The community leaders were particularly aware of this as referred in the above Box 5. Indeed one youth from Herat said: “Nobody asks us anything. We have no part to play. In this community there are no youth groups, we do not even know what this is.” Since they no longer help out on farms or with livestock, they remain jobless all day, while the there are no adults to supervise or help them. This clearly indicates the lack of social space and guidance for their build up as adult human beings.

This is accentuated by the fact, that many are not enrolled into educational institutes. As a youth from the Karezaq village in Herat said: “We visited the local schools twice to give us admission. But due to the lack of identity cards, they did not take us”. Another FGD participant from the same group shed light on the barrier that youth face in enrolling themselves for schooling: “We are young now but it is a shame for us if we start from class... It is humiliating that if we start we have to sit with younger children than us”.

A lack of job opportunities means that some turn to drug use: ‘Because of unemployment, they get addicted to drugs’- IDP camp leader Qaka-e Bust, Helmand. A host-community leader from Bolan, Helmand, corroborates this view: “Most of them [youths] are addicted because they are unemployed and because they can easily find drugs here.’ The community leaders were particularly concerned with the spread of drug use among the children.

Lastly, in the face of unemployment and lack of opportunities in the place of displacement, IDP youth resort to irregular migration to Pakistan or Iran for work. The research team noted a tendency

Box 5. Protection interventions for youth

“The problems faced by adults are that the youth come to us and ask us for employment opportunity but we cannot provide it to them. They do not have a specific place or hall where they can come together and discuss the problems of their community and take decision. The government does not listen to us. If we want to go to the city, we do not have any transportation. Finally, when they take decision regarding any issues relating to the community they end up spending their own money. The government should provide youth with money for their service. Youth problems include – unemployment and illiteracy. Due to this unemployment they become addicted to drugs. They are illiterate. We have school but the teachers are not good. Fourth, they do not have any professional skills.”

- Community leader, Mohajer camp, urban Helmand
among youth and younger male populations specifically to migrate to Iran – irregularly, causing them to be deported back to Afghanistan. Some had gone abroad while their families were still in the place of origin, to find work as day labourers but had returned due to deportation back to their places of origin. After that, due to conflict and/or drought, these youth, along with their families, had been displaced. These multiple movements, and extreme experiences of deportation and forced removal, meant that youth have accumulated layers of vulnerabilities throughout the years – through unaccompanied travels to Iran or Pakistan, irregular work and difficult work conditions, along with the experience of forced removal and forced return back home.

**Children**

Access to education for children was indicated as a challenge especially in Herat. 74% households in Herat and 35% in Helmand said their children did not go to school. Additionally, 23% households from Helmand said that they sent only boys to school/or had schools only for boys in the community. Restriction in education for children was due a combination of factors such as lack of access (due to distance or simply unavailability), lack of documentation, security and economic unaffordability.

| Table 4.6: Access to educations for children |
|-----------------|-------------|----------|
|                 | Herat       | Helmand  |
| No              | 74%         | 35%      |
| Yes, boys and girls | 24%         | 42%      |
| Yes, boys only  | 2%          | 23%      |
| Total           | 360         | 360      |

Child marriage was reported as a coping mechanism in IDP camps surveyed. The girl child will often be sold for a price to prospective husbands and families of the same or older age. This is however, not reported by the respondents themselves. The humanitarian practitioners who are in touch with these communities inform that the problem is quite widespread. A practitioner from Herat informed that: “child marriage is the more serious problem here. Often the families are in debt and to repay, they sell their daughters”.

Disrupted education is a threat to children in IDP camps. **Qualitative interviews among IDPs found that one of the main concerns is a lack of education facilities for children:** “Literacy courses should be established for the IDPs because they [children and youth] have remained illiterate due to moving from area into another, and they won’t be admitted into schools at an adult age” – IDP camp leader, Tapa-e Bolan, Helmand. The lack of education for children is linked directly to instances of paid or unpaid child labour. In all of the IDP camps visited in Helmand, for instance, children above the age of seven were involved in different jobs – from street vending, to collection of waste and garbage removal. **The link between disrupted education and child labour** was also highlighted in Herat. When asked why they were not sending their children to school, IDPs responded that apart from community schools, where only grades one to three exist, they do not have access to schools. In the community schools, one male and one female teacher come from the city to teach about 200 children – which is ineffective according to IDPs interviewed. Children were interviewed as well and confirmed the negative perception of the quality of education in these community schools. When researchers asked a boy in Kamar Kalokh, Herat, if he was attending school, his answer was yes. However, he added that he was studying the same books that he had already studied last year, adding “there is nothing new for me to learn”. This has important implications for aid agencies: if
there were more initiatives to provide access to schools and to higher quality education, the over-reliance on child labour could be derailed, building a more balanced approach that would aim at securing child protection through schools in order to diminish practices of child labour.

The physical act of moving from one location to another is one of the main threats to a steady level of education. However, increased economic strain, on large families in particular, in their new locations often forces children out of education and into the labour force. According to one young male focus group participant in Mahajir camp, Helmand: “I get 250 AFs a day when I get work, with which amount I provide for 10 family members. I don’t go to school now. I only studied up to third grade.”

13% of the quantitative survey respondents also said that they knew of or had in their own families, instances of child labour. Child labour is again used as a coping mechanism in order to add more sources of income to the family. In Herat, Ishaqabad village, one focus group participant said: “Our children are busy in street vending while I am jobless.”

4.4.2. Other cross-cutting Issues

During the qualitative interviews with IDP community leaders, adult men and women and youth, a number of issues were highlighted that were a consequence of displacement or the deprivation that follows it. Mostly, the issue of land acquisition for IDPs and their interaction with the host communities for limited resources often breeds tensions.

Site Dispute

Land disputes are a recurrent theme among focus group participants and interviews. “The land on the periphery of the camp is owned by host community individuals. Since we have come here, no one has asked us to leave. If anyone comes and asks us to leave we will not go, even if they threaten to kill us” – IDP Camp Leader, Mohajer Camp, Helmand.

Focus group participants from Mohajer camp in Helmand, explained that they were initially given land by local government, but the absence of official documentation to prove this transaction leaves IDP communities feeling highly vulnerable to eviction. The threat of eviction is an everyday reality for the community here, because the local host community wants to remove the IDP camp in order to turn the land over to cultivation.

In some places, such as Noorzai village in Herat, the quality of land is so poor that few people raise objections when people establish themselves in the local area – not even the government – whether they are IDPs or not: ‘We don’t have any problems with eviction because this land is a complete desert and government cannot utilise this, therefore no one came and told us to evacuate this place.’

However these locations come with a cost – access to potable water, schools, and basic healthcare facilities is a problem. In addition, locals may struggle to find basic commodities for survival like firewood. According to one male IDP lining in rural Herat: ‘We are staying almost in a desert and there are no host communities for miles around.’ As a result of this isolation he said that they suffer
from: ‘Lack of access to food, lack of access to heating fuel, lack of a clinic, lack of sanitation, lack of schools and lack of job opportunities.’

‘We are living in a dry desert area which is completely barren. There is no scope to irrigate here. We don’t even have water to drink. There is no scope to cultivate here. Every day, people go from here to the city to scavenge around for things they can burn to get some heat in their homes’ – community leader Karezak village, Herat.

**Host community relations**

The IDP camps in Helmand were not merged with the host community but were located on the periphery of host community residences and agricultural lands (in case of rural locations). The following features were observed about the relation between host communities and IDPs in Helmand:

1. Although the IDPs were settled on land, permitted by the government, the host community voiced its resentment of the fact that IDPs were building durable houses. Although IDPs had not yet faced force of eviction, they had been asked by the host community every now and then to leave.

2. Although local shopkeepers extended debt to regular customer, they did not do so for IDPs since they did not trust them and did not know how long they would be staying here.

3. In rural and semi-rural areas, host communities owned the agricultural land but they used IDPs as daily labour on the farms to cultivate wheat, corn, vegetables, melons and watermelons. Some of these products were also sold in the villages.

In Herat, relations with host communities were reported as positive by the IDPs. In fact they were grateful because some people from the host community had offered them bread for a couple of weeks to eat. They reported no major problems with the host community. However, from the host community perspective, whether in protracted or newer IDP locations, concerns were raised: host community leaders were unhappy with IDPs’ presence because they blamed them for crimes such as opium trafficking, smuggling, thefts, kidnappings, killings and even their suspected relations with anti-government elements. Relations with host communities are indeed often strained. In Qala-e-Bust, Helmand, one IDP camp leader says that the local community is trying to evict IDPs from the area, even though the land allegedly belongs to the...
government, rather than the host community. In Bolan, also in Helmand, a host-community leader said that: ‘IDPs are forced to eviction by the powerful people, who are supported by the government.’

Such rumours, linking IDPs with crimes, has to be noted and addressed as such statements will inevitably limit the possibility for durable solutions given IDPs’ stated preference for local integration. The host community leader in Bolan, Helmand added: ‘In my opinion they have to return back to their place of origin because they create lots of problems. For example, since they came here, the process of products has increased because the population is increasing and their needs are higher.’

Even buying food from shopkeepers in the local community presents its own challenges. Some shopkeepers simply refuse to extend credit to IDPs because they consider them to be untrustworthy. Conversely, those who are able to convince the shopkeeper to extend a line of credit are tied into financial commitments that they may or not be able to uphold: ‘About the indebtedness, I should say that the community members are indebted to shopkeepers, friends and relatives in the area. That is because the economic situation of the people in this area is not good’ – IDP community leader, Tapa-e Bolan, Helmand.

Indeed, the IDP camp leader from Pashaan village, Herat, explained that this cycle of debt with local shopkeepers carries a heavy price: ‘...some people also took loans here from shopkeepers; when they come to get their loans and the borrower does not have money, the lender gets his tent to compensate his loan.’

IDP camps are often socially, as well as economically, isolated from host-communities, as one focus group participant from Mohajir camp, Helmand, expressed: ‘...we don’t live with the host community in this camp. The host communities are living around this location, but we don’t have a good relation with them.’ Another participant in the same focus group said: I have faced violence and threats. One day when I was on my way, I encountered a member of the host community who fought and beat me. Then he warned me that he will not leave me alive.’

Social isolation carries a further cost. IDP communities often lose important connections and networks with local figures of authority. When they arrive in a new place, many feel disempowered because they do not know who to turn to for help, and nor do they have connections to government: ‘...we don’t have access to electricity because we are Pashtuns and in Herat province, the majority of government office employees are related to other ethnicities.’

Fear and suspicion of IDPs runs deep in some areas. In Karezak village, Herat, for example, the local community leader said: ‘They [IDPs] are very harmful to the community. Personally, I know that these IDPs, which are settled from the last 12 years, have connections with the Taliban, and they put mines to blow the culverts; they steal and reap host-community agricultural products; they are always fighting between each other and most of them are addicted [to drugs].’

Later, the same respondent added: ‘...each of these IDPs received more than 10 tents and they sold all in the market; most of these settled IDPs visit the places of new IDPs and mix with them and receive assistances and sell them in the market.’
However, not all host communities are unwelcoming. In Tapa-e Bolan, the IDP camp leader said that the local community was largely supportive of the IDP community because many of them had themselves been refugees in Pakistan: ‘The community members provide some assistances for the IDPs. For example, they provide them with bushes and firewood to make fire with, and they also help them with other social works.’ Similarly, female focus group participants from Faqiran village, Helmand, all agree that relations with local communities are very good: ‘We don’t have any problems with these women and they don’t have any problems with us.’

“We have three requests for host communities: first, we should be treated in a good manner by the host community; secondly, host communities should think that IDPs are part of their community now; third, they should treat us preferentially, giving IDPs food at a lower cost; and last but not least, host community members should participate in our sorrows and happiness.”

- IDP respondent, focus group, Faqiran, semi-urban Helmand

Relations with local authorities
Relations with local authorities are sometimes worse than with local communities. In Tapa-e Bolan, the local community is generally supportive of the IDP camp, while the local government authorities put continual pressure on the IDPs to move their camp. In Karezak village, Herat, one of the host-community leaders recalled a conflict between the local government and IDPs. He said: ‘Once the mayor came and requested them to leave the place, the IDPs came out and hit the mayor’s car with stones and broke the mirror – after that we did not see any government officials telling them to evacuate the place.’

A number of participants in the focus groups and depth interviews were distressed at being labelled ‘migrants’ either by government or by local communities. As ‘migrants’ they feel that they do not belong to Afghanistan – more precisely, they feel that other people do not think that they belong to Afghanistan. ‘We are upset that we are labelled as migrants in our own country. This means that we do not belong to this country as the word ‘migrant’ is used for Afghans living in Pakistan and Iran.’

Instances of security considerations in the past have prevented programmes from international agencies being implemented in some communities of Helmand. As a community leader in Helmand mentioned: “If they [community members] accept those trainings and start home-based businesses, the Taliban will come at night and set their houses on fire”.

Relations between groups of IDPs
It should be noted that, in some instances where relations are positive with host communities and local authorities, tensions exist within IDP locations – between different IDP communities. These intra-IDP tensions are indicative of sources of tension and community-based mechanisms to be put in place. There are notable intra-IDP tensions when there are groups from different ethnicities and origins in one location, competing for the same resources and assistance distribution. This is a common assessment particularly of urban IDP surveys, where competition over assistance is generally higher than in rural areas due to the easier distribution environment in urban settings. One example is Mukhtar camp in Helmand: the coexistence of two different groups of people, one Kuchi nomads and the other Tajiks, resulted in one group becoming angry and unhappy when the other had access to assistance or other benefits in their place of displacement.
5. Needs and Vulnerability Assessment

Past research on IDPs in Afghanistan highlight three priority needs: 1) land and housing, 2) employment and 3) food security\(^\text{24}\). Land and livelihood have been discussed in the preceding Protection chapter. This chapter will focus on specific needs related to shelter, food security, and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), as a basis for tailored programming recommendations.

Our data shows that IDPs in Herat and Helmand are substantially vulnerable due to the lack of a decent shelter and sufficient nutrition. As a result, land tenure insecurity and food insecurity were key needs highlighted by respondents.

The section will detail the profile of the IDP households in displacement, with respect to housing and shelter, food and Non Food Items (NFIs), Water Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) and finally health care. The lack of access to the first three items mentioned above leads to health issues, which are more severe for some population sections than the other. In particular, women and children are more vulnerable to the effects of unhygienic and improper living conditions than men.

“There are three kinds of IDPs living here. The first has received assistance from UNHCR with tents and were settled on what is government land. The second group are people who missed out on UNHCR’s assistance and has small tents of their own which were placed behind the UNHCR camp, forming a separate cluster. The third group, which are the most vulnerable, are those that do not even have a tent and re staying as a separate cluster. The second and the third group informed us that a rich private owner had allowed them the use of the land. Their most important requirement is for proper shelter. The tents with the second group were hardly enough to hold 1-2 people, whereas there are entire families (4 or more people) staying in them. The third group does not even have that.”

-Community leader, Pashtan / Faqiran, Herat

5.1. Shelter

Shelter and NFIs present the immediate needs of the IDPs once they are displaced. Temporary shelter in tents with inadequate infrastructure and overcrowding characterize housing for IDPs in location of displacement. Most often, the nature of displacement compels them to leave household items behind, which increases their deficit in protecting themselves especially in the winter months.

“IDPs stayed in houses of mud and wooden roof that had worms. Hence, there was a real danger of the roof falling down. These houses did not seem robust to floods, which are common in this area.”

- Kamarkalaq, Herat

\(^{24}\)For a full description of these protection needs, refer to NRC/IDMC/JIPS/Samuel Hall (2012) Challenges of IDP protection.
5.1.1. Current housing profile

Lack of shelter and unhygienic living conditions raise both protection issues (mainly for women and children) as well as vulnerability to diseases. Due to both unaffordability and unavailability, most IDP households comprise of around seven members crowded in a tiny house of one room or tent – up to an average of 12 members in Helmand.

Box 6. Types of IDP settlements

The definition of settlements for IDPs differs greatly between most agencies. For this research the following definitions were used to classify the settlements:

*Formal Settlements:* Settlements that are planned residence areas with permanent housing, under the jurisdiction of the municipality or the city authorities. The legal characteristic of such settlements dictates ownership/right of use with proper documentation.

*Informal Settlement:* Informal settlements encompass both unplanned and illegal nature of occupation of the residential area. People here lack formal legal deeds for their properties. They lack recognition by the government or the municipality and area characterized by absence of public services such as education, health care, drainage, water supply, sanitation and electricity services.

*Villages:* These are permanent settlements outside the city municipality’s purview and in the rural areas of the district. The land is legally bought and owned by the residents and nature of housing on these may mud or brick.

*Open spaces:* Open spaces are ad hoc settlement that come up over free spaces of land. While most of these are illegally occupied spaces, open spaces may also be temporarily government allocated pieces of land, inside or outside the city premises.

Upon arrival, IDPs take temporary lodging with relatives or small hotels in the city, but very soon move out to open spaces. 97% IDPs living in open spaces are those that came to the city only last year. However, as the duration of displacement increases the IDPs start to shift towards informal settlements, formal settlements and villages. IDPs from Helmand were more protracted cases of living in informal settlements and villages.
The kind of shelter differed between the type of residences of the IDPs. Most respondents living in open spaces, were from Herat, staying in tents provided by international agencies. These were only temporary shelters. In total 51% of the IDPs surveyed were still living in temporary shelters at the time of the survey. Additionally:

1. 88% of urban IDPs and 89% of rural IDPs in Herat living in open spaces. In Helmand, 84% rural IDPs were in villages and 93% urban were in informal settlements.

2. 91% peri-urban respondents from Herat were staying in villages: even if they were living in districts neighbouring the provincial capital district, they did not have the amenities nor advantages of easy access to urban centres and its services.

3. Type of shelter in Helmand was almost exclusively mud houses for IDPs (99%). In Herat, the IDP village had mud houses, while formal settlements had partly mud and partly brick houses.

Graph 5.2: Size of household residence
Despite the large family sizes in Helmand, 46% of the IDPs indicated their quarters were not crowded. 45% families in Herat said they were moderately crowded in the places of residence. In Herat, the number of rooms that a family has available is not in proportion to the family size. This is due to a large proportion of people living in one-room tents. Houses in Helmand had on average 3 rooms per household.

5.1.2. Unmet shelter needs

The shelter needs for the new IDP cases from Herat were greater than for other IDPs. This is evident from the graph below, which indicates that urban and rural respondents who were new IDPs are more skewed towards asking for shelter kits or permanent/transit shelters. The peri-urban settlements that were surveyed were more evenly distributed between shelter kits, land for shelter and protective walls. The responses indicate that the IDPs prioritize their needs.

Graph 5.3: Current place of residence and province (%)

Helmand however presents a different picture. Even with protracted cases displaced on average for 7 years, 63% still indicate the need for shelter kits and permanent shelter. This means that they still stay in temporary residences, indicating persistent barriers to housing and shelter.

In case of type of displacement there is a difference between shelter requirement for conflict induced IDPs as opposed to natural disaster. 66% conflict affected IDPs required shelter kits while 56% of Natural disaster IDPs required so. Similarly, 62% and 48% respectively required blanket/bedding, 41% and 28% respectively required household items. Typically, conflict induced displacement expressed more immediate needs in terms of shelter and housing.
5.1.3. Shelter interventions

Herat and Helmand showcase different levels of shelter interventions – overwhelmingly, Herat’s level of shelter intervention is significantly higher than in Helmand where only a minority have received shelter assistance. In Herat, about half of the IDP households interviewed had received shelter assistance. Notably, government-led shelter interventions were more prevalent in Herat than in Helmand:

- Almost half – 46.1% – of IDPs in Herat had received shelter assistance from the government as opposed to 8.1% in Helmand.
- Most of the interventions were delivered in urban areas (43.8%), and rural areas (36.7%) with close to no focus on peri-urban areas (only two out of 240 families living in peri-urban areas reported receiving shelter assistance from the government).
- Priority was given to conflict induced IDPs – two thirds (66.7%) of those who received shelter assistance were conflict-induced IDPs, one fourth (24.6%) were both natural disaster and conflict induced IDPs, and 8.2% were natural disaster induced,
- Priority was also given to the most recently displaced IDPs (newly displaced in the past year – 2012/2013) with 84.6% of beneficiaries, 2.1% displaced between two and seven years, and 13.3% among the protracted caseload of over seven years in displacement.

The same breakdown was seen in shelter provision by NGOs and the international community:

- Half of the Herat sample – 49.2% – received shelter assistance from NGOs and international organizations, as opposed to one tenth – 10.6% - of IDPs in Helmand;
- Most of the assistance was provided in urban (55.3%) and rural (41.9%) areas, while peri-urban areas were disregarded in terms of the assistance provided;
• Conflict induced IDPs were the focus of the assistance – notably due to UNHCR’s focused assistance on this specific category of IDPs through its shelter assistance programme – with 61.9% of shelter beneficiaries being conflict-induced, 27.9% being both natural disaster and conflict induced (mixed drivers of displacement), while only 9.3% of beneficiaries were natural disaster induced;

• Newly displaced IDPs (one year of displacement or less) were the focus of NGO/IO assistance with 80.9% of beneficiaries, while protracted caseloads (above seven years) covered 16.3% of cases, and 2.8% were beneficiaries displaced between 2-7 years at the time of the survey.

Interventions by government, IOs and INGOs paint a similar profile: a focus on conflict induced, newly displaced, urban and rural IDPs, while natural disaster IDPs and peri-urban IDPs were marginalized in the assistance received – with significant provincial disparities between Helmand and Herat – hence pointing to recommendations to fill both beneficiary and provincial gaps by stakeholders.

5.2. Non food items and winter needs

This study has shown that many IDPs are living in space and shelters that are insufficient by themselves to protect them from the hardships of the winter. This is especially true for the newly displaced, conflict-induced IDPs. The table below indicates that items to protect against the winter were the most sought after by the IDPs at the time of the survey (at the start of the winter period, in December 2013). The lack of heating, and the lack of money to purchase fuel, meant that IDPs were forced to camp on desert lands with no protection from the outside environment.
5.2.1. Winterization assistance

Winterization plans were being drawn up by stakeholders at the time of the survey. Some winter assistance had already been delivered, and diverted. In Herat, IDPs still reported important winter-related needs – even among IDPs who had received winterization assistance a month earlier. This was due to the fact that IDP households had sold blankets and empty gas cylinders for money to buy food. This is one of the main coping mechanisms for families during the winter: selling of assistance for food. This coping strategy needs to be taken into accounting while disbursement of emergency needs to IDP households – non-food and food items should be part of an overall winter assistance package, to avoid the risks of aid diversion or re-selling of aid on the local market. At a large scale, the market value of non-food items can significantly decrease and hence not even provide its real financial value to beneficiaries.

The timing of winter assistance is one of the key factors in increasing or decreasing vulnerabilities among IDP households. One trend reported was that IDP heads of household and men avoided going to find work during the day as they were afraid that, in their absence, assistance will be delivered and but not given to the women, youth or children in the household. This highlights the vulnerable position of these demographic groups – seen in the previous chapter – and the lack of trust of IDPs in their community leaders, and to some extent, in the organizations tasked to deliver assistance. Again, aid diversion was high among the concerns held by IDPs surveyed, and the need for aid a priority (above finding paid work) for IDP households. This dependency on aid is a result of the risks and dangers of the harsh Afghan winter on IDP households: the greatest vulnerability that IDP respondents feared were the health risks for infant children in the approaching winter. There had already been three reported deaths of children in November and December 2013 in Herat because of the cold, a trend that community leaders feared would increase in the upcoming winter months.

In Herat, winterization was underway in December but reported as insufficient and not adapted to the size of households. International organisations had assessed needs and begun delivering aid to the most vulnerable families – including tents for the shelter-less, food rations, blankets for each family member, warm clothes and fuel for heating. However, IDPs indicated that the food and fuel rations were not sufficient to sustain large families as the rations did not vary according to the size of the household.

In Helmand, most of the IDP households surveyed were able to purchase fuel from the city market for heating and cooking. At other times, people sent their children out to scavenge for fuel. One of their biggest concerns was the lack of adequate clothing for children and women during the winter months. However, IDPs in Helmand seemed prepared for the winter – with more permanent shelters that protected them from natural hazards, better than the tents and temporary housing seen in Herat.
5.2.2. Unmet NFI needs

Reported winter assistance needs were high at the time of the survey. IDPs were focused on emergency – rather than long-term – needs.

In Herat,
- 94% respondents reported that they required a source of heating,
- 83% needed clothing and
- 75% required bedding and blankets.
- Fuel and electricity was another unmet need that the IDPs indicated.

Herat province illustrated different levels of heating and fuel needs:

In Ishaqabad, 90% of the houses were made from brick and were built for permanent residence. Some houses were constructed with proper compound walls and shelter was not an issue for the IDPs surveyed. However, they were unable to heat the houses since they had no money to buy fuel.

In Kamarkalaq, another challenge was raised: houses were made of mud with wooden roofs, constructed by the community members themselves. However, houses were in need of repairs and maintenance. They were not resistant to floods, which were common in the area, raising specific concerns at the onset of the winter.

Houses in Shaidayee, Kareshaq and Pashtan were specifically vulnerable to the winter with tents provided by humanitarian agencies or purchased by IDPs themselves, and some newly displaced IDPs in Pashtan not having a tent, and sleeping with no roof over their heads.

In Helmand,
- 70% households needed a source of heating
- Along with fuel and electricity, clothing, bedding and blankets.
The requirement for NFIs was more pronounced among conflict displaced IDPs. The share of natural disaster IDPs who indicated they had an unmet need for the various non-food items were lesser than the share of conflict IDPs who demanded the same items.

From the qualitative interviews, it was also noted that the newer IDPs asked for immediate assistance in the form of food, shelter and clothing. They indicated vulnerability by showing they had children in need of these items more than themselves. The protracted cases of IDPs however, did not require NFIs and their demands were more naturally skewed towards facilities and services for communities such as education.
5.3. Food Security, Health and WASH

Food needs are the most pressing challenges for IDP household living under severe strain of poverty. Most often the coping strategy is reduction in the quantity and quality of food. Naturally, such obstacles translate into health issues, notably for infants who are highly vulnerable to the lack of proper food intake. In this regard one of the primary requirements that IDP households mention is the presence of affordable medical care and facilities in their vicinity. This remains especially true of rural and peri-urban households, who do not own means of transport in case an emergency presents. Finally, WASH requirements are also examined, which are an indication of the housing infrastructure available to the IDPs.

5.3.1. Food Security

There are both invisible and visible barriers to IDP households’ food security:

1) Invisible physical barrier due to distance from food markets
   The lack of access to food is prevalent even in a province like Herat, as markets are more than 20 minutes away from IDP camps, a distance that is both costly and resulting in an invisible physical barrier for access by IDP households. This was particularly the case in Pashtan where IDP households reported not being able to afford a two-way ride to and from the city.

2) Visible barrier due to lack of access to farming land
   In Helmand, even in urban locations like Mohajer camp, most IDP households are skilled with agricultural know-how but are mainly involved in daily work in the building or road construction sectors as they do not have farm land to use their original skills. However, in the areas where they live, the host community cultivates wheat, corn and vegetables on arable land. These agricultural lands, however, belong to the host communities – and are not accessible by IDPs, constituting a visible barrier between host and IDP communities. Members of the host community sell some segments to IDPs but mainly use the rest for their own consumption. The water for irrigation comes from the Helmand river, and IDP households are forced to get their food from the Helmand market. However, prices on the market are high for IDPs who cannot afford most of the items on sale.

The shortage of food among new IDP camps was unanimous, with households indicating that they sometimes went 1-2 days on one meal. In the absence of food, children were often sent to scavenge. While this left them extremely vulnerable and out in the open without adult supervision, there were also differences in what they were able to find based on the location of residence. Scavenging for food was easier in urban areas than in rural areas.
Expenditure on food formed the largest portion of the expenditure of the household’s income. In Herat, 89% of income is spent on food while in Helmand 81% of the income is spent on food. This leaves little for the families to buy fuel or heating during the winter which adds to the vulnerability of the families during this period. Also, with over 80% income being spent on food, IDP households are vulnerable to food-price shocks.

83% people in Herat indicated that their food expenses could not be covered by their incomes. Only 28% people in Helmand have the same issue. The post-displacement shock to income leads to the reduction in the quantity and quality of food with severe detriments to health, labour productivity and cognitive development in children. With dependents in the households, adults forego their

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nutritional requirement in order to feed their children. From the responses in both survey areas, more people indicated the inability to feed adults than the children. 82% people from Herat and 48% from Helmand said they sometimes had problems feeding the adults in the family. Additionally, 55% over all families said they were also in need of cooking fuel.

Only 11% of people indicated that the local government had intervened for IDP food requirements. In Helmand, the little assistance in food that was provided by local government or by the international NGOs was concentrated towards the urban areas. However, from the table above we see that unmet requirements in nutrition are higher for rural and per-urban areas. 23% people in Herat had been assisted by NGOs.

Graph 5.10: Interventions in food by household size (%) 

“Since living here, the IDPs have received food items including wheat, oil, and flour and so on. Some of them, however, haven’t received any assistance.”

Community Leader, Tapa-e-Bolan Village, Helmand
5.3.2. Health: Needs and Lack of access

The same barrier to accessing food markets was seen in the access to health facilities. The PSUs surveyed did not have any health clinics near them – especially in semi urban and rural areas. This meant that the residents had to travel to the city for medical attention, a financial obstacle for them and a health hazard in cases of emergency needs. The access was made difficult either due to the distance or the lack of paved roads in both Helmand and Herat. There was also a heavy prevalence of tuberculosis and hepatitis observed in the IDP settlements, most notably in Helmand. The main reasons for these chronic illnesses were reported to be the lack of potable water, a food diet dependent on oil and general lack of hygiene – all factors that could be remedied by external intervention, especially given the readiness of IDPs to seek medical assistance. Only 9% declared not relying on medical help, while for the most part, IDP households were willing to attend clinics (41.4%) or hospitals (30.3%) when one of their relatives was injured or sick. However, given their limited access to such facilities, one in four relied instead on local traditional healers or private doctors (24.1%).

The lack of nutrition, vulnerable living conditions and ill-equipped shelter to deal with winter, naturally result in health issues among the IDP families. Health concerns were more serious for women and infants. Not only do the IDPs suffer from severe health issues, the lack of access to the clinics and doctors has already had repercussion on certain families losing their family members.

Respondents in Herat and Helmand reported similar rates/frequency and types of illnesses. 72% of respondents reported that one of their household members had been sick or injured in the last 3 months, with 56% in Helmand and 44% in Herat. Among health issues reported by respondents were:

- 74.2% - fever, cough and cold
- 25.3% - vomiting and diarrhoea
- 6.1% - other
- 5.1% - wound, infections
- 0.3% - trauma or injury
81% people in Helmand and 68% people in Herat were household’s afflicted with fever cough and colds. Another 31% in Helmand and 20% in Herat said that vomiting and diarrhoea were the main medical issues they suffered from. Surprisingly, more people in Helmand seemed to suffering from specific medical conditions than people in Herat.

**Graph 5.12: Health ailments by province (%)**

![Graph showing health ailments by province](image)

The health issues that are faced by these families are also outcomes of displacement-related deprivation. Scavenged food comes from discarded and spoilt food from garbage outside hotels and residential areas. Lack of heating meant that individuals collected plastics and papers (unclean when burned), dried up twigs and leaves from the surrounding areas to burn as fuel, which caused indoor pollution. Finally, a lack of sanitation, solid waste disposal and waste water management led to desperately unhygienic conditions of living. All these led to respiratory diseases and Diarrhoea. On top of that the onset of winter caused fevers and colds.

**Graph 5.13: Unmet medical/health care needs by province (%)**

![Graph showing unmet medical/health care needs by province](image)
There is a sharp difference between the health requirement from IDPs in Herat and Helmand. A significantly higher share of respondents from Herat indicated unmet needs in health services than the people in Helmand. The most pressing health concerns in Herat are mobile clinics (86%), female doctor (76%) and a health referral system (73%). The same issues are also pressing in Helmand though requirement of female doctors are more urgent. From the table it appears that IDPs of urban Herat are most anxious for health services all around.

As we saw, IDPs in Herat have only 11% and 19% of their incomes left for other expenditures after food needs are taken care of. In that case, a member of the family with a severe health condition leads to increased vulnerability of them and their families.

5.3.3. Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH)

Two thirds of respondents – 63.2% – identified drinking water as a problem in the locations surveyed: 38.6% of concerns focused on access to drinking water, and 24.5% on the quality of the water available to IDPs. Concerns over quality and access to drinking water were evenly spread between the two provinces, although the majority of responses in both cases were recorded in Helmand, closely followed by Herat.

The informal settlements and villages had no proper facilities for water and the residents had dug their own wells that were not very deep. Hence, people complained of the taste of the water. In Herat, 50% IDPs in peri-urban locations indicated a problem with the quality of water while 43% in urban areas indicated a problem of access. A recent positive development in Herat includes efforts by the local DoRR to construct wells in the locations surveyed, and the supply for protracted IDPs of water tankers twice a day. In the latter case, the only issue faced was not the quality but the quantity of water that often fell short, with IDPs having then to rely on local streams that lacked
proper hygiene. The water collected from a nearby stream was often dried up and resulted in pockets of stagnant water filled with dirt due to gravelling activities taking place around some of the camps. As far as sanitation was concerned, the older IDP camps in Herat were populated with concrete or mud houses that had sanitation facilities. In some cases, the lack of sanitation facilities resulted in open defecation inside the house. Where UNHCR had built temporary sanitation facilities, in protracted IDP camps, this problem was avoid but not entirely: such temporary facilities were not enough to completely prevent open defecation. As a result, the lack hygiene was a significant and widespread problem noted by the research team, with IDPs being confined in spaces and not having proper waste disposal mechanisms. As a result, even in Herat, where interventions had been planned by DoRR and UNHCR, there are still many improvements to be made on access to water and decent levels of sanitation and hygiene. This trend was noted in Helmand as well: most villages lacked access to clean drinking water, at the root of many diseases and often infant deaths according to community leaders interviewed.

Graph 5.15: Is your sanitation needs care covered by income? (%)

The sources of water available to the IDPs were self-dug wells, water tankers by international organisations, bore wells dug by the DoRR and in case of Helmand, the Helmand river. Peri-urban settlements where protracted IDPs have now settled are being provided by permanent wells by the DoRR. Field observation estimated four wells per 100 families being dug by the MoRR but the actual figure might differ from observation.

Access to water is a challenge to many IDPs. According to one focus group participant from Qala-e Kohna in Helmand: ‘And we have challenges of drinking water – our drinking water system should be fixed. While we need water, we can get it from a faraway place. This is the main challenge for our women and children.’

Issues related to access of water were often cited as a cause of tension among IDPs and host communities in FGDs. Water sources were often at a distance from the IDP camps and shared with the host communities. Young men (youth) who were sent to collect the water said that boys from the host community often harassed them and restricted them from collecting the water.
The health problems of IDPs are accentuated by the proper lack of sanitation facilities. Starting off, 64% people in Herat indicated no proper access to sanitation. The informal settlements and villages lacked sanitation in their households. Similarly, 42% people in Helmand also indicated lack of latrines in the household. Though, only 18% people from Herat and 14% from Helmand indicated that waste disposal was a problem, in reality the issue was much more dire. Especially in urban areas, the IDPs were living close to piled high garbage and sewage water running through the streets between houses. The peri-urban and rural camps were located in the open and the visibility of waste was much less. However, a proper waste disposal system was absent from either.
6. Conclusions and Recommendations

6.1. Filling in the information gap: Lack of information plagues IDP households and access to durable solutions

Overall, the lack of ability to make an informed decision about return, resettlement or local integration, or the lack of ability to access jobs, all point to a deficit of information that plagues IDP communities. Marginalized, more vulnerable than the average urban poor (2011 WB/UNHCR), IDPs require more extensive counselling and information sharing. This research paints a picture of IDP populations who are – especially for the newly displaced – lacking information. While they build up their networks and coping mechanisms with time, these are not always a way out of their vulnerabilities. Some coping mechanisms – such as irregular migration abroad for work, or incurring more debts and loans – entrench IDPs in a cycle of poverty that they cannot break out from without external assistance.

The lack of information has an impact on:

- **Movement intentions**: In Herat, men are unable to find jobs in the city as they blame the lack of market information and the lack of job opportunities as a hindrance to their ability to secure temporary or permanent livelihoods, beyond casual day labour. As a result, at an individual level, cross-border movement for work characterizes IDPs’ movement intentions, with heads of households or single adult males crossing the border and leaving their families behind.

- **Durable solutions**: The majority of respondents (61%) are undecided about their decision to settle locally or to move again. This is largely due to their lack of information and knowledge about their prospects in displacement. Our findings show that most people remain undecided because they are either not given the opportunity to integrate or do not know how this option could be viable. When further prompted to choose between one of the three durable solutions, the answers given were directed towards local integration rather than resettlement or return – a trend confirmed with the duration of displacement.

  - A structural information gap on durable solutions: When specifically asked whether households had enough information to make a decision about return, local integration or resettlement to a third location, 90% of respondents declared not having enough information. The numbers matched in Helmand and Herat indicating that this is not dependent on the local context but a structural gap in the information available to IDPs.

- **Obtaining and sustaining livelihoods**: Among the five main reasons that IDPs report being the main obstacles to livelihoods in displacement is the lack of information about the local labour market for one in four respondents surveyed (23.6%). The lack of support from local governments and discrimination against IDPs also stem from an information gap that hits not only IDPs, but other stakeholders as well.
- **Displaced youth:** Young people interviewed are increasingly frustrated by the lack of opportunities open to them, and by the lack of information and support given to them by community members. Adults are seen as offering little guidance or support to youth – an information gap that needs to be filled, not only to strengthen community cohesion, but to prevent youth from finding their own coping mechanisms. These can often be risky and hold a potentially negative protection impact as youth can turn to drug use, or irregular migration for work, as reported in this survey.

In general, IDPs interviewed were seeking two types of information:

1) Information on assistance from international agencies; and
2) Information regarding the situation in their place of origin.

The sources for such information and news were quite different in the two provinces. 93% of the sample in Herat said they get their news from their family and friends. Networks have traditionally played an important role for transfer of information in Afghanistan and the same feature is retained by IDPs. Communities and religious/political groups also help in information transfer. 82% of the respondents in Herat were looking for information about livelihood and work opportunities in the intended place of destination. Naturally, 37% of the sample from both provinces was also looking for more information on the security situation in the place of destination.

Overall, IDPs expect more from their government than the assistance they have been receiving locally. Recommendations detailed below will provide insights into initiatives that IOM can lead to fill in the information gap, and the gap between stakeholders and IDPs’ expectations.

### 6.2. Understanding Movement Intentions: Focus on Local Integration

When prompted to choose between one of the three durable solutions, local integration was chosen. Given this overwhelming preference, the research team assessed correlations between variables most closely linked to local integration intentions. The research finds that there are six significant statistical correlations between the preference to integrate locally and:

- **Duration of displacement:** As the duration of stay in the place of displacement increases, the share of families who decide to remain in the current location also increases.

- **Household size and number of active household members:** Those who stated the intention to integrate locally not only have a statistically significant larger household but also a great number of people working in the household.

- **Nature of employment:** The data shows that there is a statistically significant correlation between nature of employment (permanent, temporary or casual / day labour) and the desire to integrate locally. Those with the most unstable jobs, that is daily or casual labour, were less likely to want to integrate locally (64%), while those with permanent (78%) or temporary jobs (82%) showed a greater trend towards local integration.
- **Housing and agricultural land ownership in places of origin**: Those who own housing and/or agricultural land at place of origin are less likely to state a preference for local integration.

- **Health care and clean water access**: While testing relationships between different vulnerabilities and the willingness to locally integrate, the data reveals the strongest ties between two sets of vulnerabilities and the desire to locally integrate. These are (i) a statistical relationship between access to clean water covered by income and the desire to integrate, and (ii) between functioning health facilities covered by income and the desire to integrate locally. This means that IDPs are highly influenced in their choice of durable solution by the access that they have, and the ability that they have to cover their health needs and safe water needs with their income in the location of displacement.

### 6.3. Health and Clean Water: Strengthening access and quality of services

IDP surveys have long shown the barriers in accessing food markets and the vulnerability of IDPs to food insecurity. This survey highlights the health hazards, particularly pronounced during the winter months, but overall present year-round. The PSUs surveyed did not have any health clinics near them – especially in semi urban and rural areas. This meant that the residents had to travel to the city for medical attention, a financial obstacle for them and a health hazard in cases of emergency needs.

**Access to health services** was made difficult either due to the distance or the lack of paved roads in both Helmand and Herat. There was also a heavy prevalence of tuberculosis and hepatitis observed in the IDP settlements, most notably in Helmand.

The main reasons for these chronic illnesses were reported to be the lack of potable water, a food diet dependent on oil and general lack of hygiene – confirmed by the fact that two-thirds of respondents – 63.2% – identified drinking water as a problem in the locations surveyed: 38.6% of concerns focused on access to drinking water, and 24.5% on the quality of the water available to IDPs.

All of these factors could be remedied by external intervention, especially given the readiness of IDPs to seek medical assistance. Only 9% declared not relying on medical help, while for the most part, IDP households were willing to attend clinics (41.4%) or hospitals (30.3%) when one of their relatives was injured or sick. However, given their limited access to such facilities, one in four relied instead on local traditional healers or private doctors (24.1%).

The lack of nutrition, vulnerable living conditions and ill-equipped shelter to deal with winter, naturally result in health issues among the IDP families. Health concerns were more serious for women and infants. Not only do the IDPs suffer from severe health issues, the lack of access to the clinics and doctors has already had repercussion on certain families losing their family members.

Respondents in Herat and Helmand reported similar rates/frequency and types of illnesses. 72% of respondents reported that one of their household members had been sick or injured in the last three months, with 56% in Helmand and 44% in Herat. Among health issues reported by respondents were mainly fever, cough, cold, vomiting and diarrhoea.
6.4. Winter Assistance as a Pull Factor in Herat and Helmand

This survey of IDPs in Herat and Helmand points to dynamic migration profiles that show an uncertainty for IDPs: although return is not an option for them, IDPs are at a loss in terms of what durable solutions are offered to them: is local integration an option for IDPs in Afghanistan? If so, how? The lack of information about durable solutions and the lack of knowledge on how to secure such solutions have led 61% of this sample to declare being undecided about what options are available to them.

This survey further paints a dynamic migration and displacement profile of IDPs, in both Helmand and Herat: there are overlaps in the causes of displacement: 55% have been displaced due to conflict, 12.5% due to natural disasters, but one third – 32% – due to both conflict and natural disasters. This means that they have accumulated layers of displacement related vulnerabilities. Qualitative interviews with host communities and local authorities highlight assistance as another driver of displacement: the availability of aid being a pull factor drawing IDPs to urban locations primarily. Our research confirms a level of dependency and reliance on aid, although it does not qualify aid as being a pull factor in and of itself. In some cases, especially in the harsh winter months, expectations for immediate assistance drives IDPs to camps and leads men to prefer staying at home, in order to not miss an aid delivery, than try to find work.

However, overall, interventions are still lacking. First, there is a limited response capacity: local authorities, wanting to prevent aid from becoming an incentive for IDPs to gather in specific settlements, have restricted the reach and scope of interventions by NGOs and international organisations. As such, interventions have been restricted and several questions remain: should interventions happen in displacement or at the source? Should interventions be restricted to immediate or branch out to longer-term needs, linking relief with recovery? These are the issues that marked the stakeholder landscape in 2012 at the time of the Samuel Hall/NRC research on IDP protection, and is still a reality in 2013 and 2014, at a time of the launch and implementation of the National IDP Policy (February 2014).

6.5. Targeting vulnerabilities for a coordinated response

Whereas coordination and response efforts locally have focused on differentiating between caseloads and drivers of displacement – wanting to differentiate for instance between conflict and natural disaster induced populations – this research draws stakeholders’ attention on the types of vulnerabilities as the primary factor for planning response. Among the types of vulnerabilities highlighted in this research are the prevalence of:

- **Health concerns and disabilities**, 55% of IDP households surveyed had at least one member suffering from a disability that required special attention.

- **Education and high rates of illiteracy** among 79% of the sample, with extremely high rates – 97.5% for women IDPs, and with less than one third of IDP girls attending school,
• **Documentation and the lack of identification**, except for electoral cards, which point to the potentially strong political force (and potential manipulation) of IDPs at a time of elections in Afghanistan. In Herat, one third of IDPs surveyed did not have any documentation. This strongly impacted women, with 65% who lacked any type of documentation. This is particularly concerning given the importance of identification in accessing services: health, education or even employment. Youth interviewed highlighted this lack as a main obstacle to their enrolment in educational institutes.

• **Livelihood challenges and the dual lack and mismatch of skills**, rendering IDPs unprepared for the local labour market. The lack of information about the local market and the inability to diversify income are great obstacles to the financial and job security of IDP households in displacement. There are hence 2 barriers to employment: first, unavailability of jobs (a direct consequence of the lack and mismatch of skills, and of sectoral changes pre and post displacement); and second, the lack of access to jobs (a direct consequence of the lack of information and networks, especially for the newly displaced). IDPs are aware that they lack skills and express their need for vocational training in all interviews and focus group discussions – voicing the need not just for men, but also for women, in both provinces. IDPs have unanimously singled out the lack of training as a key hindrance to their wellbeing.

• **Damaged, destroyed and lost property and the prevalence of temporary housing.** Over 60% claim that their property has been destroyed or significantly damaged. With time, only one third had access to their property and 34.7% had lost their property rights.

• **Vulnerable demographic groups**, specifically women, youth and children who stand out as the most vulnerable of all groups among the IDPs surveyed. Women are socially and economically isolated in displacement – they require home-based vocational training, basic literacy and numeracy courses, improved sanitation facilities at home to help them play a role not only as housewives but as economic actors in their households, to help diversify income, and as social actors who can protect the health and sanitation of their households. As for youth, the dual challenge of illiteracy and unemployment, the dual bind of being too old to attend school yet too young to have acquired sufficient skills for well-paid jobs, prevent them from locally integrating and lead them to adverse coping mechanisms such as irregular economic migration. Lastly, children are specifically vulnerable in displacement: two thirds of children in Herat and one third of those in Helmand did not go to school. This was further worsened by trends in child marriage and child labour that are key protection concerns. The lack of education facilities has to be addressed as a priority by stakeholders.
6.6. Recommendations

The recommendations below focus on IOM’s mandate and capacity, and on the findings highlighted in this report. The recommendations are two-fold: first, to strengthen sectoral humanitarian response, and second, to fill in the information gap through an information and counselling activity to be designed by IOM using the findings from this survey.

6.6.1. A 9-point programming response plan

The needs and vulnerability analysis points to the need for stakeholders to coordinate their programmatic response as part of a nine-point response plan for assisting IDPs in Helmand and Herat. This nine-point framework has been built taking into consideration IOM’s migration management strengths including emergency and humanitarian assistance— and IDPs’ priority needs as recorded in this survey. These recommendations fall within the scope of IOM’s humanitarian assistance programme.

1) Shelter interventions

IDPs surveyed live in open spaces in urban settings, in mud homes that lack sanitation facilities, and overwhelmingly in temporary shelters. They rank their needs as follows: shelter kits, permanent shelters, access to land and construction of protective walls for their housing. Specific gaps in shelter interventions were noted in Helmand due to i) a lack of stakeholders and interventions by the government in peri-urban areas – with urban and rural areas being systematically privileged and ii) a gap in providing shelter assistance to natural disaster-induced IDPs. Conflict induced IDPs were better mainstreamed in shelter response, notably through UNHCR’s efforts locally.

✓ IOM should continue to focus on natural disaster induced IDPs’ emergency shelter needs while identifying partners to ensure permanent shelters are built for IDPs. As seen in an evaluation of IOM’s return and reintegration programmes led by Samuel Hall26, IDPs are often marginalized in terms of access to permanent shelter. Similar findings were noted in the Evaluation of UNHCR’s Shelter Assistance Programme27. This calls for renewed efforts to provide permanent shelter solutions for IDPs upon return, as well as providing land and housing for safe resettlement options.

✓ With regards to local integration and shelter needs, an urban shelter response team is required given that IDPs increasingly settle in periphery or outskirts of urban centres. Shelter response – whether emergency, temporary or permanent – is so far not adapted to urban needs. Along with UNHABITAT, UNHCR, IOM and implementing partners, as well as government representatives at national and subnational levels, a working group within the Housing, Land and Property task force can develop an urban shelter intervention design fit for the needs of IDPs in urban centres.

26 Samuel Hall (2014), External Evaluation of IOM’s Return and Reintegration Project for Returnees and IDPs, commissioned by IOM.
2) **Non-food items and winterization needs**
One of the main challenges noted by the research team was a diversion of aid with NFIs being sold to buy food. Furthermore, in Herat, aid was considered insufficient while in Helmand, IDPs were better prepared for the winter. However, IDPs expressed needs in heating, clothing, bedding and blankets, fuel and electricity, as key concerns for the winter period.

✓ A key recommendation is the need to combine non-food with food item distribution to avoid the sale of NFIs for food and prevent aid diversion altogether, especially when aid is sold at a cost below its value.

✓ The set-up of a comprehensive national registration system is considered by IOM as a useful tool in tracking assistance provision and regularly capturing, processing and disseminating urban migration information to provide an understanding of the changing location, vulnerabilities and needs of affected populations throughout the migration process.

3) **Improving food security**
Barriers to food are physical – the distance from local markets being a financial disincentive blocking IDP households’ access to proper food, and the lack of farming land that is mainly available to host communities but not IDP communities. As a result, IDPs are unable to use their farming skills to fulfil their households’ food needs. When 83% of IDP households surveyed declare that their food needs are not covered by their income, and that they have for the most part not received any food assistance or only intermittently, this points to the need to better bridge the provision of food aid with other types of interventions. This focus on improving food security has to provide a gender-sensitive lens as the deteriorating access to food and coping strategies in displacement negatively impacts women’s role in the household, especially in urban areas where they cannot contribute as they used to in rural areas. The impact on displaced women’s resilience is particularly acute in Afghanistan.

✓ A mixed intervention approach combining food and non-food items is required especially during the winter season. Food runs the risk of being easily diverted away from the most vulnerable – a monitoring system should accompany all distributions, at the very least during the winter season. Triangulation of M&E – including community-based monitoring, external monitoring and random visits by the IOM staff to each household (not restricted to community leaders only) – is the best way to ensure that aid reaches target beneficiaries and is at least tracked to allow for immediate, affordable and cost-effective problem solving in the most dire cases.

4) **Health response – strengthening access and quality of health care for IDPs**
72% of households had one of their family members injured or sick in the last three months before the survey. Health needs are prevalent – but access to health facilities is limited. Whether the lack of clinic, referral systems or female doctors, IDPs voiced their concerns that

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their health needs were not being addressed. They feared death and illnesses, especially among infants, during the winter. An adequate response for winter months should be the increase in the number of mobile clinics, health assessments and transportation options to the most nearby hospitals and clinics for the most serious cases. For the rest, distribution of medication would suffice as the most prevalent health concerns can be remedied: vomiting, diarrhoea caused by the lack of hygiene, coughing and colds caused by the winter.

- The health hazards identified in this survey call for a partnership strategy to be piloted by IOM with the health cluster members in Herat and Helmand first, using this data as baseline to build future assessments on the health needs of IDPs. Under the leadership of IOM and WHO / partner NGOs a proper monitoring of health risks through a baseline, mid-line and end-line can ensure effective response in IDP settlements in Afghanistan.

5) **Water, sanitation and hygiene**

Related to priority 4 (improving access and quality of health care), is the need for a clear WASH strategy to increase access to clean water for IDPs: two thirds of IDPs reported not having access to clean drinking water, with clear implications for the health of their family members. In addition, the lack of sanitation facilities and latrines, and overall waste disposal, added to their WASH needs. Specialized interventions to provide families with sanitation facilities are required of humanitarian agencies on the ground – and should be negotiated with local authorities. Positive developments in Herat have included the digging up of wells for IDPs by DoRR. These developments should be further capitalised on to extend similar interventions on a wider scale in Herat as well as in Helmand. However, for health hazards to be significantly diminished, the provision of potable water should be matched with the provision of sanitation facilities, which has not been done systematically in the areas surveyed.

- Advocacy efforts need to be strengthened, under the leadership of IOM and UNHCR, with government authorities to ensure that they allow not only for water tankers and emergency water supplies to be delivered, but allow for more structural changes and longer-term water provision with the digging of wells. Such progress in negotiations for all settlements – as part of the push to implement the National IDP policy – will then allow IOM to partner with NGOs such as Action Against Hunger who have been seeking for years possibilities of implementing water delivery services for vulnerable populations, including the displaced, in Afghanistan.

6) **Gender-based programming**

One of the key findings of this research is the willingness – and even demand – for IDP women to become economic actors in their households. The lack of income diversification and the high dependency ratios have translated in a willingness to ensure that women can have an economic role to play. This has been voiced by male and female interviewees alike. Interventions will need to be focused on home-based livelihood activities and vocational training. Women cannot leave their homes to enrol in vocational training, at least not on a large scale. As such vocational trainings have to be provided inside IDP communities and inside IDP...
women’s homes. Such initiatives have been led in urban settings and can be learned from to build strong gender-based vocational training programming. A study by Samuel Hall for Solidarités in 2012 highlighted sectors for urban-based and gender-based vocational training in Kabul city.

 ✓ A review of IDP women’s skills and a parallel labour market study in each province can result in stakeholders identifying the most financially viable skills to teach to women in Herat and Helmand.

7) **Youth-based programming**
IDP youths are seen as a ‘problematic category’ by IDP and host communities. IDP elders and heads of households repeatedly reported not being able to offer opportunities for their youth to contribute to their households while host communities highlight the security risks posed by youth and their tendency to rely on drugs as a coping mechanism in displacement. The dual challenge of illiteracy and lack of skills has to form the basis of youth-sensitive programming. Similarly to the previous recommendation,

 ✓ A review of youth skills and local labour markets is required to build tailored interventions for IDP youth in both provinces.

8) **Child protection response**
The lack of educational facilities and female teachers were blamed for the low levels of school enrolment among IDP children. Even in the most conservative areas of Helmand surveyed, respondents were in favour of sending their children to school if the infrastructure existed.

 ✓ The lack of facilities, protective walls, and gender-sensitive educational opportunities has to be addressed by a consortium of actors mixing government (for public schools) and NGOs, to support the government in the initial stages of setting up “schools for IDPs” in the locations surveyed, as a way to derail practices of child marriage and child labour noted in the qualitative data for this research.

9) **Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)**
Despite occurrence of periodic natural disasters, the lack of preparedness towards natural disasters and coordination mechanisms among relevant authorities and community members both in places of IDP origin and those of destination remains a major challenge. This is exacerbated by multiple migration layers that complicate the understanding behind the drivers of internal displacement.

 ✓ Supporting information management: Existing available disaster related information should be streamlined in ANDMA. The wealth of data being collected through assessments funded by various agencies should provide for enough baseline data that will aid in the development of a DRR strategy for Herat and Helmand, and linked to the implementation of the National IDP policy in these provinces.
Community-based emergency preparedness measures need to be enhanced in order to contribute to stronger resilience within communities. These efforts can be linked to IOM’s on-going discussions with MRRD.

Profiling of each province with a specific focus on movement intentions and push/pull factors that influence internal and external migration, including an assessment on whether these populations are sufficiently informed about their options, and if they feel supported – or represented – by national stakeholders, whether community leaders, local authorities or government stakeholders.

6.6.2. Building an information and counselling programme for IDPs

Beyond these sectoral programming responses, the study reveals the opportunity for IOM to address a horizontal gap and concern: the lack of information that impacts movement intentions, durable solutions, livelihoods and protection for key demographic groups. As a result, the second component of the recommendations focuses on information and counselling needs to complement the sectoral response detailed above. The priority for IOM should be a two-fold information and dissemination approach built around:

1. Informing national stakeholders: In support of national authorities including ANDMA, MoRR and DoRRs

Interviews reveal that misunderstandings and negative views of IDP populations persist among national stakeholders. IDPs feel that they are not sufficiently well informed about their options, nor do they feel sufficiently supported – or represented – by national stakeholders, whether community leaders, local authorities or government stakeholders. At the same time, government stakeholders repeatedly highlight their frustrations in the identification of ‘genuine IDPs’ from non-IDPs, and the inadequacy between capacity and needs. They blame community leaders for submitting highly inflated numbers, as well as trends where families split to receive more assistance, fake cases especially in old settlements, and ‘recycler IDPs’ i.e. families already assisted by trying for additional assistance by changing their identity or splitting their family. The limited capacity or tracking mechanism in place results in such trends to become more pronounced as the government and its directorates at the local level have a limited capacity to respond, and lack clarity as to the division of responsibilities between stakeholders. As a result, and at a time when the National IDP Policy, recently launched, is entering its implementation phase, IOM’s role in support of the government should be to:

- Clarify through the training of civil servants at national and subnational levels the guiding principles on internal displacement, along with national responsibilities towards IDPs,
- Build the capacity of ANDMA and MoRR to coordinate activities and liaise with other relevant ministries (MoPH, MoLSAMD) to mainstream displacement issues in their response,
- Strengthen role and capacity of national authorities to address IDP needs including developing an effective information management systems with technical assistance,
- In parallel with the above, provide national stakeholders with information from tracking mechanisms, DTM and other surveys, in a succinct and ‘ready to use’ format in order for them to provide information to communities across IDP locations in Afghanistan,
Provide communities with advocacy efforts to heighten attention at the national and subnational levels.

2. **Informing IDPs: community-based information and counselling services**

This research highlights the need to regularly monitor movement intentions and provide an information base to IDPs in their location of displacement. This can be implemented through:

- An information campaign addressed to all community members through community-wide meetings, and sub-meetings disaggregated by gender and age,
- Counselling services for households and individuals tailored at specific demographic groups: heads of households, women, youth and children. Second, these services should be tailored to specific factors that influence local integration: disaggregating by household size, nature of employment, access to health care and clean water,
- Information updates on locations of origin and the feasibility of return as a durable solution, with updates on physical and economic security, infrastructure and services, in provinces and districts of origin.

These two priorities will allow IOM to fill in the information gap highlight in this study while capturing movement intentions and protection needs.

6.6.3. **Implications for DRR and community resilience**

Although the population surveyed was mainly composed of conflict-induced IDPs, the information collected on migration dynamics and movements, along with existing data sources, this study strengthens the need for DRR initiatives through ANDMA and community-based participatory approaches to disaster risk reduction. This will require a set of hard and soft measures aimed at a strengthening of DRR mechanisms.

The survey reveals a lack of preparedness of authorities and communities to natural disasters, and the subsequent lack of information on durable solutions. Such a lack of information includes the lack of know-how of how to be better prepared for potential repetitions of natural disasters and how to be better prepared in the face of repeated crises in places of origin and/or of displacement.

As IOM’s current disaster response intervenes at a community level, ‘soft’ DRR measures can be implemented in these locations. Such soft measures should include

- A thorough mapping of hazards, vulnerabilities and existing DRR interventions, and
- The development of early response systems through Community Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) and clear guidelines or Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).

These initiatives will complement national authorities’ responsibilities in the area of DRR, in coordination between ANDMA and MRRD.
6.6.4. Further Research Needed

This study – and its recommendations – highlights the need for more research to be conducted to support interventions. The priority research needs can be broken down into research studies and needs assessments, on the one hand, and strategic studies, on the other.

1. Research studies on:
   a. The health hazards of IDPs, including their access to clean water
   b. The conditions for IDPs upon return (learning from experiences of return among the displaced in Afghanistan to highlight best practices and challenges)
   c. Women’s skills and labour market needs: Assessing the potential for gender-based livelihood and training interventions
   d. Youth skills and labour market needs (as above, for youth-based interventions)

2. Strategic assessments to:
   a. Design a strategy for shelter interventions in urban settings
   b. Set up an information and counselling programme for IDPs
   c. Map the current vulnerabilities and DRR needs, hazards and DRR interventions to develop soft DRR measures

3. Extending the DTM survey to other provinces for a comparative review of needs, vulnerabilities and migration intentions, to further narrow down the information gap.
ANNEX 1. Provincial Snapshot

Helmand

Displacement & Migration

- Share of IDPs by reasons for displacement:
  - Conflict induced: 51%
  - Natural Disaster induced: 10%
  - Man made activity induced: 2%
  - Both: 37%

- Last year 1% came directly to current location
- More than 7 years: 51%
- 2-7 years: 43%

Intra-Province (Districts in Helmand): Musakala, Marji, Nadali and Nawa
- Inter-Province (Provinces): Kandahar, Uruzgan, Farah, and Ghor
- Ghazni and Jowzjan
- Balkh, Faryab, Bamiyan, Saripul, and Dallalud

79% of the IDPs in Helmand are Pashtuns

Household Socio-economic and Protection Profile

- 35% children not attending school
- 57% of households without fixed income
- 14% households under threat of eviction

Property Ownership in place of refuge:
- Rent: 47%
- documentation: 35%
- no documentation: 9%

Future intentions for migration:
- Resettle/relocate: 2%
- Waiting on factors: 7%
- Locally integrate: 42%
- Undecided: 49%

Needs, and Vulnerability

- 57% dedicate unmet need of cooking fuel
- 70% require source for heating during winter
- 81% respondents complain of fever, cough and cold

- Insufficient income for basic amenities:
  - Health: 44%
  - Shelter: 18%
  - Food: 28%
  - WASH: 5%

89% people rely on debt for sustenance

57% require shelter kits and permanent residences
Herat

Displacement & Migration

- Share of IDPs by reason of displacement:
  - Conflict: 58%
  - Natural Disaster: 15%
  - Man-made activity: 1%
  - Both: 26%

Intra-Province (Districts in Herat)
- Gulran and Pashtun-Zargan
- Ghor (Chaghcharan)
- Badghis (Qala-e-Naw)
- Faryab, Kandahar and Khost

85% came directly to current location

61% IDPs in Herat are Tajiks

Future intentions for migration
- Resettle/relocate: 1%
- Locally integrate: 13%
- Waiting on factors: 14%
- Undecided: 73%

Household Socio-economic and Protection Profile

- 81% children have no access to school

Property ownership in place of refuge:
- 81% households under threat of eviction

- 54% unemployed
- 20% unclassified
- 13% vocational
- 9% other
- 2% trade & transport
- 1% agriculture
- 1% service

Have you borrowed money?
- 92% people rely on debt for sustenance

Needs & Vulnerability

- 94% require source for heating during winter
- Insufficient income for basic amenities
- 75%
- 72%
- 74%
- Health
- Shelter
- Food
- WASH

- 68% respondents complain of fever, cough and cold
- 63% require shelter kits
- 87% indicate difficulty in feeding adults in the household
## ANNEX 2. Provincial Comparative Overview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHARACTERISTIC</th>
<th>HERAT</th>
<th>HELMAND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. MIGRATION PROFILE and MOVEMENT INTENTIONS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source of displacement</td>
<td><strong>Intra-Province</strong>: Gulran, Pashtun-Zargun, Ab Khamari, Koshki Khorna</td>
<td><strong>Intra Province</strong>: Nawa-e-Barakzai, Nawzad, Baghran, Garmsar, Musaqala, Khanshin and Sangen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Intra-Province (district)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Intra-Province (province)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Ethnicity</td>
<td>Tajiks</td>
<td>Pashtuns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Duration of Displacement</td>
<td>2 Years and 10 Months</td>
<td>9 years and 7 Months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate and Secondary Movement</td>
<td>15% migrated to an intermediate location prior to the current location</td>
<td>6% migrated to an intermediate location prior to current location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration Intentions and Durable Solutions</td>
<td>72% are undecided, 42% will locally integrate, 0.3% will return to PoO, 0.3% will settle elsewhere</td>
<td>49% are undecided, 13% will locally integrate, 1% will return to PoO, 0.6% settle elsewhere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Household size</td>
<td>7 (1 adult male, 1 adult female, 4 children)</td>
<td>12 (3 adult males, 3 adult females, 6 children)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary sector of employment</td>
<td>Unemployed/ Casual labour</td>
<td>Construction, Casual Labour and Agricultural Wage Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenges to income generation</td>
<td>Lack of skill/mismatched skills with new IDPs. Unavailability and lack of access is also a problem.</td>
<td>Lack of availability for casual labourers is sometimes an issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of Debt</td>
<td>Most were under debt from their relatives and friends taken pre-displacement to move or to sustain household consumption</td>
<td>Debt from shopkeepers and local community was popular due to more established social networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property and ownership in place of current residence</td>
<td>Living in open spaces in tents. No ownership and documentation</td>
<td>Living in informal settlements in mud houses. Generally owned or right of use without documentation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 3. RISK AND VULNERABILITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHARACTERISTIC</th>
<th>HERAT</th>
<th>HELMAND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Risk from unmet shelter needs</td>
<td><strong>High</strong></td>
<td><strong>Low</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Specific needs</em></td>
<td>Shelter kits, permanent</td>
<td>Land to construct shelter,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>shelters</td>
<td>shelter kits, Adequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>piping/water system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk from unmet NFI needs</td>
<td><strong>High</strong></td>
<td><strong>Medium</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Specific needs</em></td>
<td>Fuel, electricity, Source</td>
<td>Source of heating, fuel &amp;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of heating, bedding &amp;</td>
<td>electricity, clothing,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>blankets and clothing</td>
<td>beddings &amp; blankets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk from Food insecurity</td>
<td><strong>High</strong></td>
<td><strong>Medium</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Specific needs</em></td>
<td>Feeding family members</td>
<td>Cooking fuel, feeding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of all ages, cooking fuel</td>
<td>family members above 18 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk from health issues</td>
<td><strong>High</strong></td>
<td><strong>Medium</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Specific needs</em></td>
<td>(From fever, cough &amp; cold,</td>
<td>(From fever, cough &amp; cold,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vomiting &amp; diarrhea)</td>
<td>vomiting &amp; diarrhea)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mobile, clinic units,</td>
<td>Female doctors/midwives, mobile clinic units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>female doctors/midwives,</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>health referral system</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Risk from unmet WASH needs</td>
<td><strong>High</strong></td>
<td><strong>Low</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Specific needs</em></td>
<td>Sanitation facilities,</td>
<td>Latrines, Sanitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>water containers in</td>
<td>facilities, water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>households, latrines</td>
<td>containers in households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerabilities</td>
<td><strong>High</strong></td>
<td><strong>Low</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Specific cases</em></td>
<td>Child marriage as a coping</td>
<td>Maternal infections to pregnant women due to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>strategy from lack of</td>
<td>lack of medical facilities</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>income</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Youth afflicted to drugs</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>due to lack of education</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and employment</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female Headed Household</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>likely to beg for income</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in absence of income stream</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Herat is located in the western region of Afghanistan. Its capital, Herat city has historically seen extensive IDP movement and returnee settlements from Iran. More recently, Herat is now playing host to the scores of IDPs moving from drought affected around its periphery as well as newly conflict displaced persons. Herat city provides not just good security but is also an economic hub in the west, which makes it a primary destination for economic migrants. Herat like many cities in Afghanistan has seen rapid urbanization due to this. Often IDPs and returnees mix with each other and settle in the same location.
Case Study:

Karezaq IDP camp is an old camp that has recently seen a new influx of IDPs from Ghor and Badghis. The community leader for the new IDPs, Ashraf Haq (55 years old) was from Ghor and had to move out quite suddenly due to conflict breaking out between two villages. A lot of lives of their associates were lost and that is why they decided to move. The moment they came, they occupied private houses without permission for 16-17 and eventually were forced to move out. Some people received tents from international organizations, some from private charitable individuals and the rest purchased their tents from the markets. The tents provided by individuals or bought were of very bad quality and not suitable for winter. The WFP provided them with oil and pulses but most families cannot sustain themselves for more than just a few days on that. Finding a job takes longer than the food stock lasts. Due to the lack of food, adults have to eat food scavenged from the garbage and as a result there are many people that suffer from stomach ache and tuberculosis.

Karezaq, was one of the few camps that was settled close to the host community and came in contact with them. Javed, 30, who is an adult male member of the host community, said that the new IDPs were very vulnerable. He said that those who came just 1-3 months back need assistance. But Karezaq also had older IDPs against whom he had many complaints. He said that the older IDPs slowly take over our land and are also involved in narcotics trade.
Case Study:

**Shadi Khan, 62 years old** is an IDP and a community leader in the peri-urban village of Kamarkalaq, Injeel district in Herat. He belongs to Koshakona district in Herat province but moved away from there to Guilan district (another province of Herat) due to drought in his village. After staying in Guilan for 4-5 years, fighting between government and AGEs forced him and his family away from Guilan. He came to stay in Kamarkalaq five years ago. He stays here along with 120 other IDP families. His community together built mud houses on the land provided by the government. He feels insecure because the IDPs from his community were all nomads before they were displaced and have no property in their place of origin. Hence, if they were asked to move out, they would have nowhere to go.

He points 50 meters away from the village, indicating that the site is used by crush plant/cement plant to dig for sand and earth and that most men of the village work as daily paid labour for these plants. Some others work as porters for the customs department in the city while the youth from the village travel to Iran for work. Some women make string from cotton and receive AFN 25 for making one kg of string.

The villagers initially, dug their own wells, which were not very deep. The water they got from these wells was not portable and as a result, last year a lot of people from the village had diarrhoea. Additionally, the barren landscape meant that the stream that ran between the village and the main road was unstoppable during the rainy season, which made it difficult for residents to cross over.
Case Study:

Shahram Mohammad is 35 years old and the head of his household. He moved his family from Badghis merely 45 days back and came to Herat. For a couple of days his family rented a cheap hotel room during which time he heard about the assistance being provided for the IDPs. His family received a tent from UNHCR along with some assistance, and was settled on a barren piece of land about 40 minutes away from the city called Pashtan IDP camp.

Xx mentions that his main priority everyday is to find a job. But even before that he must look for fuel, food and water for his family before he can go to the city to start looking for a job. Everyday, he has to send his small children out to scavenge in the countryside for materials to burn, cook and eat. He is also worried that if assistance from some INGO or government comes while he is away then his wife and children might not be given the assistance. Here he says that for children, education is not a priority. Blankets and warm clothes are more important because children cannot cope with the extreme cold there have been fatalities due to this in the recent past.

Right now, he says that some assistance is being provided but that is not likely to carry on. Hence, he must find a job. But the problem is that no one wants to hire him since he does not know any skill except for rearing livestock. Here they have no livestock and the only job available is in construction.
Helmand is located in the south of Afghanistan. In terms of area covered, it is one of the biggest provinces of Afghanistan. Helmand is considered one of the most volatile provinces in terms of security and as a result, the center of Helmand has seen a lot of movement from periphery districts in addition to movement from other provinces. Helmand also shares its southern boundary with Pakistan. The Chaman-Quetta border has historically seen extensive movement of IDPs and migrants on both sides. Hence, Helmand is also a place where a lot of returnees came back and settled after the end of the civil conflict.
Case Study:

The case study is of one Abdul Qader (21 years old) who lives in the camp along with 9 other family members. Abdul’s family is originally from Ghor province where they owned agricultural land and worked as farmers. However, they lost their land in the conflict and subsequent economic condition forced them to move out of Ghor. Even though he is just 21 years of age, Abdul has been travelling to Iran on and off for the last 6 years in search of work. Now, however, he is unable to travel there anymore and has to find work here. Abdul searches for work everyday as a casual labourer. His daily wage comes out to around 250 Afs. On some days he is unable to find work.

Abdul and his friends are young. Some of his friends even go to school. But they often clash with the host communities on their way to school, which have turned to physical altercations in the past. They are referred to as ‘migrants’. This was what they used to be called in Iran also which makes Abdul feel that he is not part of this country.

Abdul along with his non-school going friends look for jobs to sustain their families. However, they feel helpless because of their lack of skill to get good pay and permanent jobs. Abdul's friend Abdul Matin used to work in construction on daily income like him, but lost his leg when a wall collapsed on it. In addition, Abdul fears that he and his family might be evicted given that the camp is based on grazing land used by the local community.
Case Study:

**Naghma is 25 years old** and lives with her family in Faqiran village. Her family migrated to Quetta, Pakistan the year that she was born, due to the soviet invasion. Eventually, 9 years ago her family returned to Nawa district of Helmand province before coming to Faqiran. The family moved because of the on-going conflict, which raised the threat to life as well as destroyed the local economy. Naghma, knows how to weave and sometimes contributes to the family’s income. Most days however, she cannot find such projects and remains at home doing chores. She is illiterate and uneducated because she did not have permission from her family to go to school. However, in this village, there is school for girls younger than her and says it is accessible.

Naghma gets together with other women in the village to discuss the opportunity of getting weaving, tailoring, sewing projects and even literacy classes from the city. Although, they try their best, they think that there would be more opportunities had they stayed closer to the city. Despite the poverty and joblessness that face Naghma and her family in this village, she would not like to move out of the village because she is tired of migrating. She is looking for formal justice system to be established in the village along with assistance for food and shelter.
Case Study:

**Haji Malik Mohammad Gul, 50 years old, is the community leader for his village.** The village consists of Internally Displaced People from Marja and Nawa districts who are settled amongst a local community that also had migrated to Pakistan. Haji mentions that being migrants themselves makes local communities sympathize with Haji and his people. He says that his village is able to earn income from agricultural wage labour by working on local community owned farms, daily labour and government jobs such as the Police and the Army.

The village itself is based on government land and Haji has been approached on behalf of his community, by the government to clear the land. People have built temporary housing from Mud in the village, and Haji fears eviction above all else, which will lead to him and his people losing the houses they built for themselves.

Haji wants clinic to be built in the community. Or if not that, at least the village should be sent a female doctor/midwife because households contact him in the middle of the night in case there is a pregnant woman needing help. He has difficulty finding a cab at the time to take the patient to the hospital because the nearest clinic is far out. Also, should there be a requirement for him and the other elders to gather to resolve issues in the community, they do not have any place to do so.
IOM and Samuel Hall. Contacts

For more information

iomkabul@iom.int
info@samuelhall.org
www.samuelhall.org